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Abstract
Even though there has been a rapid increase in state cybercapacity over the last two
decades, researchers have paid little attention to this phenomenon. In my dissertation Public
Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity, I employ a combination of formal theory,
event history analysis, and interviews to shed light on what drives a state’s decision to
develop this capacity in the form of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs)—publicly observable
efforts meant to signal the state offensive and defensive cybercapacity—and the effects these
PCIs have on its adversaries’ decision-making. Unlike existing scholarship which emphasizes
the cyberthreat environment as the main driver of PCIs, I empirically model the international
proliferation of PCIs as a diffusion process and argue that it happens through different types
of networks. The distinct pathways behind different types of PCIs reflect the different types
of signals each is intended to send.
National cybersecurity strategies diffuse through networks of “like-minded” states, with
similar preferences on cybersovereignty. The development of a military cyberapparatus
diffuses through military alliance networks, following the logic of complementarity. National
strategies are among the less costly PCIs a country could adopt, but—because their
purpose is to articulate a country’s main goals, threats and priorities in the cyber
domain—governments cannot adopt them without first considering the role the Internet
plays within their polity and how heavily they wish to regulate it. Military cybersecurity
units, meanwhile, have higher startup and maintenance costs, and the willingness to pay these
costs sends a potentially informative signal to a country’s allies and adversaries. Rather than
xi
“free ride” off the cybercapabilities of one’s allies, however, countries tend to complement the
activities of their allies (e.g., invest more if their allies invest less). I test these theoretical
explanations with newly collected data sets on national cybersecurity strategies and on state
cybersecurity organizations between 1999 and 2018, and find robust empirical support.
Using an incomplete-information model I also demonstrate that PCIs meant to
demonstrate an increase in cybercapacity only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the
costs created by this increased cybercapacity. Despite this, states tend to over-invest in
PCIs. In particular, weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince adversaries that they
are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that
they are weak states pretending to be strong. In doing so, these states reduce their overall
cybercapacity. Through my interviews with cybersecurity experts, intelligence reports, and
examples of attempted election interference campaigns, I establish the empirical plausibility
of this theoretical result. These findings, which focus on a fundamentally new domain of
warfare and statecraft, have important implications for national security policy.
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Public Cyberinstitutions
The Internet is the backbone of the modern economy and modern communications. Billions
of people have benefited from the opportunities provided by the adoption of information
and communications technologies (ICTs). ICTs facilitate economic growth by increasing the
reach of businesses, creating new employment opportunities, and lowering technology and
supply costs. ICTs also increase efficiency by enabling more efficient allocation of goods and
services and better integration between sales and production. Lastly, ICTs can help with
fighting poverty, combating diseases, providing better education, and integrating isolated
communities into the global economy.
While societal reliance on the Internet grows, technology remains inherently vulnerable to
cyberthreats. Over the last two decades, countries worldwide have experienced an increase
in the use of cyberoperations.1 In 2010, countries learned that for at least two years the
Stuxnet worm had been targeting an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility with the purpose
1 Joint Publication 3 13 Information Operations (2014, II-9) define “cyberoperations” as “the employment
of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.”
Cyberoperations include both cyberespionage campaigns meant to collect intelligence and cyberattacks
meant to destruct, damage, or destroy components of Internet-connected devices.
1
of slowing down the development of the nuclear weapon development program. In 2015 and
2016, Ukrainian power grids suffered cyberattacks that left citizens in the western part of the
country and the capital without electricity for a number of hours. In 2017, the WannaCry
ransomware attack encrypted more than 300,000 computers worldwide in 150 countries,
causing damage in billions of dollars. Figure 1.1 displays targets of large cybercampaigns
between 1999 and 2016.
Figure 1.1: Targets of Major Cybercampaigns (1999-2016)
The figure displays the distribution of targets of major cybercampaigns between 1999 and 2016.
Valeriano and Maness (2018) defines cybercampaigns as an accumulation of cyberattacks meant to
achieve strategically important goals. Source: Valeriano and Maness (2018)’s Dyadic Cyber
Incidents Dataset (DCID) (version 1.5).
Nations have been taking steps to protect themselves in cyberspace. Some of these
steps have been publicly observable. For instance, governments have: adopted new
strategies, doctrines, and legislation; created new cybersecurity agencies or assigned
cybersecurity responsibilities to existing agencies; and increased intra- and intergovernmental
cooperation. I define these efforts as public cyberinstitutions (PCI). Figure 1.2a displays
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countries that adopted at least one national cybersecurity strategy between 1999 and 2016,
and Figure 1.2b displays countries that created at least one agency within its military
responsible for cybersecurity. If cybercampaigns that a country has suffered were to drive
cybercapacity development, why do we see a disconnect between Figure 1.1 and Figures 1.2a
and 1.2b—many more nations have been developing their public cybercapability than those
that suffered from large cybercampaigns? If the perception of potential attacks instead drove
this development, why do some of the nations seem to lag behind? What other factors could
be driving a country’s decision to adopt different types of PCIs? And what effects do they
have?
I view the global spread of cybercapacity as an example of diffusion where a
nation’s decision to publicly signal its cybercapacity influences other countries to publicly
signal similar capacities. In this thesis, I argue that different types of diffusion
networks are important for the public development of different types of PCIs. National
cybersecurity strategies developed by countries with whom a nation shares preferences on
cybersovereignty—a government’s desire to exercise control over the Internet within their own
borders—capture the diffusion of national strategies. Military cyberapparatuses developed
by the nation’s allies capture the diffusion of military cybercapacity. To test this theory, I
apply an event history analysis to two new datasets on national cybersecurity strategies and
state cybersecurity organizations.
In addition to explaining factors that motivate countries to publicly signal their
cybercapacity, this dissertation also considers how effective these signals are in deterring
adversaries. Using a formal model, I demonstrate that PCIs have a limited effect and deter
only those adversaries that are susceptible to the additional costs created by PCIs. Despite
that, countries tend to over-invest in PCIs to appear strong. To establish the empirical
plausibility of this theoretical result, I use interviews with cybersecurity experts and the
example of elections. Section 1.2 further elaborates on my theoretical explanations and the
3
Figure 1.2: Distribution of State Cybercapacity (1999-2016)
(a) National Cybersecurity Strategies
Source: National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSS) data collected by the author. See Chapter 3 for
a detailed description of this data set.
(b) National Military Organizations
Source: State Cybersecurity Organizations (SCO) data collected by the author. See Chapter 4 for a
detailed description of this data set.
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obtained results in turn.
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2: Debates over Cybersovereignty as a Driver of the Global Cybersecurity Strategy
Diffusion
This chapter explores potential drivers of national cybersecurity strategies—one of the first
“public” lines of defense against cyberthreats. The few existing studies that use quantitative
analysis tend to prioritize the threat environment as the main driver of state cybercapacity.
In particular, Craig and Valeriano (2016c) show that a country’s Internet dependency and
democratic government increases the likelihood that it publishes its national cybersecurity
strategy. Unlike existing works, I view the global spread of national cybersecurity strategies
as an example of policy diffusion. Using a newly collected data set on national cybersecurity
strategies between 1999 and 2018, I demonstrate that nations are more likely to adopt their
first cybersecurity strategy if other nations with similar preferences on cybersovereignty
have adopted cybersecurity strategies. These preferences matter because they define how
governments will exploit the opportunities and address the challenges presented by this new
global medium.
Currently, the views on cybersovereignty are split. One group of countries advocates
for government control over distinct parts of the Internet whereas another camp prefers a
single boundary-less Internet with free flow of information. I argue that before a government
adopts its first national cybersecurity strategy, it should decide on the role it envisions for
the Internet in its society. Observing the choices made by nations sharing similar views on
this subject helps. This theory is robust to a number of alternative explanations and model
specifications. By providing the first account of the spread of cybersecurity strategies as an
example of policy diffusion, this research helps us better understand how policies spread in
the information age.
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Chapter 3: Alliances and Complementarity of State Military Cybercapacity
Whereas Chapter 2 outlines a theory of possible drivers of one of the most basic forms of
public cyberdefensive capability—national cybersecurity strategies—this chapter attempts
to understand how states choose to develop their offensive capabilities. Unlike existing
scholarship, which measures these capabilities by cyberattacks and cyberoperations that
have been attributed to nation-states, this research instead looks at the global spread of
cybercapability in the form of the development of military cyberapparatuses.
Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which a state can develop its
cyberapparatus —assigning cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing agency and creating
a new cybersecurity agency. What determines this choice? I argue that it depends on the
type of signal a nation wants to send to its allies. If the country’s allies signal toughness by
creating new units, then the country may not need to do the same and instead assigns
cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing military agency. But if the country’s allies
take a softer approach by assigning cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing military
agency, then the country has an added incentive to create a new cybersecurity agency in
order to signal toughness. As a result, the responses to allied behavior follow the logic of
complementarity. To test this argument, I construct a new cross-national time-series data set
on state cybersecurity organizations for the 1999-2018 period. The analysis provides robust
empirical support for my theoretical argument.
This important finding demonstrates that the theories of “free riding” in military alliances
do not necessarily translate when it comes to military cybercapacity (Olson and Zeckhauser
1966). If they did, they would have predicted (1) the assignment of new responsibilities to be
the dominant strategy for all but the wealthiest alliance members, and (2) the smaller the ally,
the more likely it is to free ride. As my finding shows, this is not necessarily the case. It is not
that easy to free ride on military cybercapabilities of allies. Cyberdefenses are unique to each
country and not easily transferable; close allies are often reluctant to disclose information
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about their offensive cybercapabilities and/or commit cyberattacks on an ally’s behalf (as
compared with their willingness to offer military assistance during territorial invasions).
Chapter 4: Deterrence in the Cyber Realm: Public versus private cybercapacity
Having explained the drivers of different types of public cyber institutions (PCIs), Chapter 4
attempts to understand whether this increased capability can indeed deter adversaries. This
focus on PCIs presents a significant departure from the existing literature, which primarily
focuses on the coercive ability of cyberoperations and argues that it is limited due to the
difficulty of attributing the origin of cyberoperations. By developing an institution, a state
no longer needs to consider whether its signal might be lost in transmission. Moreover, the
state no longer needs to worry about exposing its cybercapability via cyberoperations whose
value diminishes after the first use. By developing PCIs, the state can send an immediate
signal that allows adversaries to roughly estimate the state’s cybercapacity. Can this signal
deter adversaries from attacking the state, though?
Using an incomplete-information model, I demonstrate that deterrence works in cases
when the adversary is susceptible to the costs created by these PCIs. Despite this
limited effect, nations continue over-investing resources into public cybercapacity instead
of distributing these resources between PCIs and covert cyberactivity to maximize their
overall cybercapacity. This result demonstrates the inefficiency of resource distribution
among governments—weak states over-invest to appear strong and strong states over-invest
so that they do not appear to be weak states pretending to be strong. Using a series
of interviews with cybersecurity experts, intelligence reports, and examples of attempted
election interference, I establish the empirical plausibility of this theory. These results echo
the findings of Chapter 3—weak cyber nations have an incentive to over-invest in their public
capability to appear strong because they cannot always rely on their stronger partners for
deterrence.
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Chapter 5: Limitations and Future Research
In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I outline the limitations of this dissertation
and a few directions of future research. Since the dissertation primarily focuses on strategic
factors in international politics, I plan to incorporate the role of domestic politics, and in
particular public opinion, in my future work. How do people perceive the development of
PCIs by their own and adversarial governments? Do they feel secure, anxious, or indifferent?
For instance, how do Americans perceive the development of information troops by the
Kremlin and how, if at all, do they want the U.S. government to respond? Similarly,
how do Russians feel about the U.S. National Cyber Strategy (2018), which allows the U.S.
government to confront its adversary on its home turf and how do they think the Kremlin
should respond to this strategy?
By explaining the causes and effects of the initiation of state cyberapparatuses, my
dissertation only looks at the tip of the iceberg. The development of cybercapacity is a
complex process and involves public-private, inter- and intra-governmental interactions. For
my future steps, I plan to take advantage of the datasets on state cybersecurity organizations
and policies that I compiled and understand how these complex interactions occur within
the government, how they translate into actual capacity, and what implications they have
for how states lead their domestic and foreign policies.
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1.3 Policy Implications
While each chapter outlines a number of policy implications that pertained to a particular
question that it investigates, here I briefly outline just a few most important implications
of this dissertation that takes the first stab at an important and novel area of scientific
inquiry—state public cybercapacity.
My findings demonstrate that public signaling of cybercapacity might be a double-edge
sword. While it can prevent some attacks, it also allows perpetrators to adjust their tactics
to exploit new vulnerabilities. We have observed this in practice. For instance, responding
to the U.S. government’s effort to protect its 2018 elections, Russian bots and trolls adjusted
their behavior and started operating during the election off-season (Roeder 2018). These
influence campaigns, even if conducted during election off-seasons, shape public opinion
and might affect public voting behavior. This cat-and-mouse game, to some extent, echoes
the findings from the counter-terrorism literature that demonstrates that while observable
counter-terrorism tactics (e.g., security checks in the airports) make people more secure,
they are less effective against terror groups who can easily adjust their tactics to more easily
achieve their goals (Bueno de Mesquita 2007).
Second, since states tend to over-invest in their public cybercapacity, policymakers should
take the signaling of cybercapacity via PCIs with a grain of salt. While PCIs provide them
with an immediate—even if rough—estimate of state cybercapacity, policymakers should
consider a variety of indicators to accurately assess other nations’ cybercapabilities. These
indicators might include economic and technological indicators, cooperation with the private
sector, reliance on allies, among others. Only having carefully evaluated all these indicators,
governments may better evaluate their chances to withstand their enemies and minimize the
risk of escalation.
Lastly, my findings hint at how the developments of state cybercapacity can affect future
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evolution of state interactions and international politics. While existing military alliances
are important for the development of military cybercapacity, my findings demonstrate that
reliance on the cybercapacity of military allies is more problematic than it is in the case of
conventional capabilities. Cyberdefenses are unique for individual countries and countries
are reluctant to use their offensive cybercapabilities on behalf of their allies due to the
diminishing nature of these capabilities. However, this might change, given that nations
are currently working on synchronizing their capabilities that might improve their overall
operational capacity. This development might suggest that future deterrent tactics might
involve combination of both conventional military and cyberoperations.
My findings also suggest that in addition to working with their existing partners, countries
also define new relationships. Specifically, as the world is currently debating the future of the
Internet governance, new (cyber)alliances currently explore the use of cyberspace to define
new and redefine old geopolitical spheres of influence. While these new alliances are at the
early stages of their development, we are witnessing the birth of a new phenomenon that
might have tremendous impact on how nations conduct their domestic and foreign policies.
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Chapter 2
Debates over Cybersovereignty as a Driver of Global
Cybersecurity Strategy Diffusion
The last decade has seen an explosion in the number of countries that adopted national
cybersecurity strategies. Specifically, by the end of 2010, twenty-seven countries adopted a
total of thirty-three strategies (Figure 2.1), whereas over the next eight years, an additional
104 countries adopted 184 new strategies. Despite the centrality and importance of this
phenomenon, we know surprisingly little about the factors that drive this policy change.
Existing scholarship views the cyberthreat environment as the main explanation of this
development (Craig and Valeriano 2016a,b,c). While cyberthreats have presented a serious
concern for national economies and security over the last three decades,1 I argue that it is not
the main defining factor. Instead, I view strategy adoption as an example of policy diffusion
in which one government’s decision to adopt a strategy influences other governments’
decisions to adopt similar strategies. The adoption of cybersecurity strategies—especially
the first strategy—motivates governments to think about the role the Internet plays within
1 The Morris worm—the first computer virus distributed via the Internet—attracted the attention of
policymakers as early as 1988. The 1990s experienced an explosion in the number of viruses passing through
the Internet as well as cyberespionage campaigns aimed at “surreptitiously snoop[ping] on a user’s activity”
(Al-Khatib 2016) and the 2000s witnessed a significant number of state-sponsored cyberoperations.
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Figure 2.1: Adoption of National Cybersecurity Strategies over Time
Source: Author’s calculations based on countries’ data.
their society, the challenges and opportunities it presents, and whether and how they want
to regulate it. Before they make this important decision, I argue that nations observe the
choices of other nations that share similar views on this subject.
To test this hypothesis, I apply a Cox-Proportional Hazard model to a newly collected
cross-sectional time-series data set of official cybersecurity policies from 1999 and 2018.
I measure a country’s stand on cybersovereignty using United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) resolution votes on national sovereignty (Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey 2017). The
analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument. This finding suggests
that cyberthreats do not solely drive nations’ decisions to adopt policies meant to guide their
behavior in this new domain. Instead, new (cyber)alliance politics, which explores the use of
cyberspace to (re)define new and existing geopolitical spheres of influence, has an important
role to play.
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This research helps us better understand how policies spread in the information
age. Existing scholarship focuses on the effect of globalization on the spread of liberal
economic ideas (Simmons and Elkins 2004), bilateral investment treaties (Elkins, Guzman
and Simmons 2006), human trafficking laws (Simmons, Lloyd and Stewart 2018), and
technological and military innovation (Pennings and Harianto 1992; Robertson, Swan and
Newell 1996; Bitzinger 1994), but it fails to explain the effect of these global changes on
the diffusion of policies meant to address the rapid growth and spread of ICTs. By filling
this existing literature gap, this analysis makes a substantive contribution to the field of
international relations.
This chapter also provides the first account of the spread of cybersecurity strategies as
an example of policy diffusion. Most existing works on cybersecurity focus on cybercoercion,
explaining how governments use cyberoperations and influence operations against other
governments (Borghard and Lonergan 2017; Brantly 2016; Gartzke 2013; Kostyuk and
Zhukov 2019; Libicki 2009; Lindsay and Gartzke 2015; Nye Jr 2017; Valeriano and Maness
2018) or use them as tools of repression against domestic opponents (Gohdes 2020, 2014;
Lutscher et al. 2020; Roberts 2018; Rød and Weidmann 2015; Weidmann and Rød 2019). The
few existing works on the main drivers of cybersecurity policies are comparative (Sabillon,
Cavaller and Cano 2016) or country-specific (Osho and Onoja 2015). Lastly, by introducing
highly comprehensive cross-national time-series data on national cybersecurity strategies
that serve as a proxy of countries’ first and basic defensive cybercapabilities, this research
serves as an important stepping stone for future research on the causes and effects of state
cybercapacity.
2.1 Diffusion of Cybersecurity Strategy
Since the mid-1990s, the Internet has had a revolutionary impact on various aspects of
life, including culture, commerce, technology, and communication. The rapid growth of
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this global network has contributed to innovation and economic growth, while allowing
governments, criminals and other perpetrators to exploit network vulnerabilities. Over
the past two decades, countries have started adopting policies to address the impact of
the Internet on their societies, leading to the following two questions. Are cyberthreats and
economic opportunities the only reasons why countries adopt cybersecurity strategies? What
other factors contribute to the spread of these strategies internationally?
A few existing works on this topic argue that a country’s cyberthreat environment
drives its decision to build better defensive measures in the form of national cybersecurity
strategies (Craig and Valeriano 2016c,a,b). The main logic of this explanation builds on the
interest-capacity theoretical framework that international relations scholars use to explain
the proliferation of conventional capabilities, such as nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke
2007), civil space capabilities (Early 2014), and drones (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2017).
In particular, an interest-based explanation focuses on a state’s political or strategic needs
as drivers of policy adoption, whereas a capacity-based explanation focuses on the state’s
resources and abilities. Threats to national security—in particular cyberthreats (Craig and
Valeriano 2016c)—which fall under an interest-based explanation, are one of the main reasons
why nations adopt their national cybersecurity strategies.
While a country’s threat environment is an important factor to consider, I argue that
it does not fully explain the decision to adopt a cybersecurity policy. Instead, I view the
global spread of national cybersecurity strategies as an example of policy diffusion. Defined
as “any pattern of successive adoptions of a policy innovation” (Eyestone 1977, 441), policy
diffusion treats the policy adoption by one state as a result of the adoption of a similar policy
by another state. Globalization has made it easier for national leaders to share their ideas,
observe how others respond to similar challenges, while learning from their errors.
I further theorize that a nation is motivated to adopt its first cybersecurity strategy
when other nations with similar preferences on “cybersovereignty” have adopted cybersecurity
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strategies. The term “cybersovereignty” or “splinternet” describes a government’s desire to
control the part of the Internet within its own borders. Currently, there are two camps
of nations with distinct views on cybersovereignty. The anti-cybersovereignty group of
countries, led by the United States, advocates for a single Internet, arguing that any division
of this medium into smaller components will derail the whole purpose of this global web
meant to connect everyone. Governments in the pro-cybersovereignty camp, led by Russia
and China, argue that state control over the Internet will allow them to better protect their
citizens against cyberthreats and insulate online communications from foreign disruption
and interference. In particular, Russia argues that such control is necessary to protect its
population from external threats. Such control, however, will also allow them to monitor
dissent and restrict the free flow of information.
A government’s stand on cybersovereignty determines how it chooses to exercise control
over the Internet for years to come. Given the tremendous importance of this subject
affecting each country’s national security, economy, and development, countries have
passionately debated cybersovereignty on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA). In 2010, the United States submitted its resolution, advocating for “possible
strategies to address the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve
the free flow of information” (A/RES/63/41 2010, 2). The following year, Russia and China
(along with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) presented their resolution, advocating for a new
international code of conduct for information security that should comply with the UN
Charter and respect states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity (A/66/359 2011).2
States have also been vocal about their position on cybersovereignty in their replies to
UNGA resolutions on “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in
the context of international security.” For instance, Germany advocated for cyberspace to
be “a public good and a public space” (A/66/152 2011, 9), whereas Greece favored “....the
2 Russia submitted the first, although rather general, resolution on the topic of information and
telecommunications in the field of information security in 1998 (A/RES/53/70 1998).
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requirement for a nation to preserve its sovereignty and maintain its own base of information”
(A/66/152 2011, 11-12). In its September 2014 reply to UNGA resolution A/RES/ 68/243
(2013), France reiterated its anti-cybersovereignty view by stating that the country “does
not use the term ‘information security,’ preferring the terms ‘information systems security’
or ‘cybersecurity.’ As an active proponent of freedom of expression online...France does not
consider information as such to be a potential source of vulnerability requiring protection,
except under conditions strictly established by law, in a proportionate and transparent way,
in accordance with article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”
(A/69/112/Add.1 2014, 3). Responding to UNGA resolution A/RES/71/28 (2016), Belarus
expressed its pro-cybersovereignty view, “...it is crucial to gradually advance the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States and mutual rejection of aggressive
actions in the information sphere. Such steps should principally be achieved through support
of the information sovereignty of United Nations Member States...”(A/72/315 2017, 6).
I argue that the adoption of national cybersecurity strategies by nations that share similar
views on cybersovereignty—so-called cybersovereignty partners—provides information on the
costs and benefits of developing similar strategies for nations that have no cybersecurity
measures in place. These strategies also help nations build certain international reputations
because when adopting a national cybersecurity strategy, nations tend to place themselves
in one of the two cybersovereignty camps.
Before designing their strategies, nations understand that they are not able to eradicate
cyberthreats alone—international cooperation remains vital. To make this cooperation
successful, nations need to make their domestic cybersecurity apparatuses comparable with
those of their partners. Before developing a cybersecurity strategy, a government needs to
understand to which extent it prefers regulating the Internet in their polity. As a result, it
looks at the strategies of nations that have similar preferences on this topic. Having developed
a cybersecurity strategy, a nation signals to its partners its readiness to contribute to joint
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efforts in addressing cyberthreats. As a result, I derive the following hypothesis to test my
claims:
• Hypothesis: If a country shares the same view on cybersovereignty with other nations
that adopted national cybersecurity strategies in year t− 1, then the country is likely to
adopt its first national cybersecurity strategy in year t.
2.2 Additional Alternative Explanations
In addition to considering a country’s threat environment as one of the alternative
explanations of cybersecurity strategy adoption (Section 2.1), I also consider a number of
alternative explanations, such as cultural similarity, communication channels and expert
communities, harmonization after partners, and legitimacy or modern behavior, and regime
type. Section 2.5 demonstrates that none of these alternative explanations affect a country’s
choice to adopt its first cybersecurity strategy.
Alternative Explanation #1: Cultural Similarity
When developing policies, countries tend to learn from the successes and failures of
culturally similar nations that have already adopted such policies (Rogers 1995; Simmons
and Elkins 2004). As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, cultural proximity could indeed be a driver
of cybersecurity policy. Not only is it easy for a nation to look at the policies of countries
that use the same or similar (official) languages, it also ensures that various terms related
to cybersecurity are not lost in translation. For instance, instead of cybersecurity, some
countries use the term “information security” which emphasizes protecting information—its
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Simply substituting the broader term of
“information security” with the much narrower term of “cybersecurity,” meaning security
of Internet-connected devices, in a national cybersecurity strategy might leave a nation
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unable to execute its proposed defense plan and send a misleading signal to its domestic and
international audiences.
While cultural similarity is an important factor for to consider, I argue that it is not
a defining factor for the adoption of a cybersecurity policy, in particular. Globalization
has created a world in which average citizens, and especially policymakers, speak multiple
languages and travel extensively for work, both domestically and internationally. The
Internet allows people to connect to almost any part of the world from their living-rooms
within a matter of seconds. As a result, policymakers can choose to examine the policies of
culturally-similar nations, as well as the policies of other, more far-flung, countries that are
less similar to their own.
Alternative Explanation #2: Communication Channels and Expert Communities
The exchange of information among connected actors is a driving force behind diffusion
of various sociological processes (Axelrod 1997; Rogers 1995). There is a great diversity
of forums where this exchange can take place. Think-tanks, research institutes, and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are examples of forums that play significant roles
in the spread of policies between governments (Brooks 2005; Füglister 2012; Stone 2004;
Ward and Cao 2012). There has been a rapid increase in the number of bilateral and
multilateral intergovernmental meetings over the last decade, during which governments
exchanged knowledge and ongoing research devoted to various aspects of cybersecurity
(Kostyuk 2020b). The exchange of information at these meetings could potentially explain
global cybersecurity strategy diffusion.
Alternative Explanation # 3: Harmonization after Partners
To consider harmonization as a driver of strategy adoption (Bennett 1991), I consider
the possibility that a country adopts its cybersecurity strategy in reaction to its so-called
partners. I consider three groups of partners: (1) military allies; (2) trading partners; and
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(3) United Nations partners (i.e., nations that vote similarly on United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) resolutions).
Countries sign long-term pacts to fight against common threats in physical and (now)
virtual domains (Leeds, Long and Mitchell 2000; Marinov, Nomikos and Robbins 2015).
Since states cannot avoid cooperation with their allies on cybersecurity and they absolutely
pay attention to what more advanced alliance members are doing, some might argue
that countries might adopt their strategies after their military allies. Similar to military
capability, cybersecurity strategies signal the level of a country’s defensive capability because
they outline a set of measures that a nation plans to implement to protect itself from
cyberthreats. But these measures are defensive in a broad sense, covering various aspects
of everyday life (e.g., educating the public about proper cyberhygeine), technical means to
protect Internet-connected devices, and joint research projects and international cooperation
aimed at exchanging knowledge, resources, and assistance in order to increase national
cybercapacity. All these steps are more basic and less resource- and expertise-intensive
than the syncronization of state military cybercapacibilities with allies—a more advanced
step in the process of state cybersecurity-apparatus creation—and this is not where nations
generally start.
Since foreign policy interests are influential in alliance formation (Gibler and Rider
2004), some might argue that such interests might extend outside of military alliances to
other non-military partnerships that also shape foreign policy preferences, such as voting
blocs formed in the UNGA and trading partners. UNGA votes that measure preference
similarities are generally described as cheap talk (especially given a non-biding nature of the
UNGA resolutions) that reflect pre-existing coalitions and alliances (Farrell and Gibbons
1989; Voeten 2005). Moreover, they cover preferences on a variety of issues, not related to
cybersecurity. Even though resolutions on “Developments in the field of information and
telecommunications in the context of international security” have occupied the UNGA floor
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since 1998 (A/RES/53/70-A/RES/74/29), they have either been adopted with a consensus
or with almost no variation in voting (e.g., the United States was the one country to vote
“no” on A/RES/63/37, which had 178 “yes” votes). This is not surprising, given that these
resolutions contain rather vague language about threats presented by cyberspace when used
by criminal and terrorist groups and the call for international cooperation meant to address
these threats. As a result, I expect that there is no correlation between cybersecurity
strategies by a country’s so-called UNGA partners and the country’s choice to adopt its
strategy.
Lastly, I consider an impact of the country’s trading partners. Given that cybercrime
is a serious threat to international trade and e-commerce,3 some might argue that a
cybersecurity strategy signals to a country’s trading partners that the government takes
cybercrime seriously and is working on its eradication. But before designing an approach
to fight cyberthreats, the government should decide how it views the Internet—single or
divided—because this fundamental decision will determine the approach it designs.
Alternative Explanation # 4: Legitimacy or Modern Behavior
Modern organizations and institutions often come to resemble each other, not because of
competitive selection or rational learning, but because institutions mimic each other (Meyer
and Scott 1992; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Using this “new institutionalism” perspective
and applying the state-isomorphism idea (Finnemore 1996; Ramirez and Boli 1987), some
might argue that national cybersecurity policies serve a similar role to national flags, airlines,
and Olympic teams, as they have a lot of “symbolic throw-weight” (Selznick 1949; Suchman
and Eyre 1992). Cybersecurity policies that are deemed appropriate by powerful leaders
might signal “modern behavior” (Sagan 1997) and the fulfill a government’s need to appear
3 Close to $600 billion USD or about one percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost
to cybercrime each year (Lewis 2018). Major economies remain the main victims to cybercriminals who
leverage black markets and digital currencies and adopt new technologies to fill their pockets (Cook 2017).
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legitimate in the eyes of its constituency and the international community (Fordham and
Asal 2007).
Alternative Explanation # 5: Regime Type
I consider two possible effects of regime type. First, public fears stemming from large
cyberincidents may drive a state’s decision to adopt cybersecurity policies; these observable
national responses might make voters feel secure and guarantee leaders’ reelection (Gelpi,
Reifler and Feaver 2007; Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003). Alternatively, cybersecurity can
be a public good at the national level if the government provides it through enforcement or
deterrence.
Second, since states with similar identities—regime type in this case—tend to co-ally,
cooperate with each other, and learn from each other (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013; Lai
and Reiter 2000; Smith 1995), some might argue that countries with the same regime
type are more likely to follow each other’s lead on a cybersecurity strategy adoption. But
cybersovereignty preferences are not simply a proxy for regime type. For example, Greece,
which is a democracy, prefers having control over the Internet. In its 2011 reply to the 2010
UNGA A/RES/65/41, Greece stated, “National sovereignty rights regarding information
security in global information sharing should be maintained....” (A/66/152 2011, 11-12).
2.3 Data
Dependent Variable: National Cybersecurity Strategies. I focus on the adoption of
cybersecurity strategies because they define the first and main efforts that national leaders
take to develop defensive responses to cyberthreats. They also signal to domestic and
international communities the significance a country’s leadership attributes to cybersecurity.
These strategies generally: express “high-level objectives, principles and priorities that guide
a country in addressing cybersecurity”; describe the steps that the country will undertake
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to achieve these objectives; list the stakeholders responsible for undertaking these steps;
and set the country’s cybersecurity agenda over the next few years (generally five years)
(InternationalTelecommunicationsUnion 2018, 13).
More importantly, cybersecurity strategies, especially the first-adoptions, motivate
governments to examine the role that the Internet plays in their society, the challenges
and opportunities it presents, and whether and how governments want to regulate it. The
existing views on this issue are split. On the one hand, there are countries that want to have
a single Internet and believe that no single government should regulate it. On the other
hand, there are those that want to split the Internet into smaller parts, each of which will be
under control of a specific government. While there are still a number of undecided nations
in the middle, a number of countries that belongs to either camp has been rapidly growing.
Depending on how countries view cybersovereignty, they use different terms to
define Internet security. Anti-cybersovereignty nations generally use “cybersecurity” and
pro-cybersovereignty nations generally use “information security.” The former, narrower
concept focuses on protecting vulnerabilities through ICTs whereas the latter, broader
term includes information protection, including its confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA). As mentioned in Section 2.1, countries emphasize this important but striking
difference in their statements to the UNGA. They also carefully choose between these two
terms when crafting a name for their national strategies meant to address challenges and
opportunities presented by ICTs and the Internet. For instance, many Western nations that
favor cybersecurity refer to these policies as national cybersecurity strategies. Countries that
favor information security tend to refer to these policies as information security strategy and
information and communication technology strategy, among others. Sometimes, countries
combine both concepts in their strategy names as Sri Lanka did in its 2018 Information and
Cyber Security Strategy.
In addition to the choice between cybersecurity and information security, the choice
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between policy, strategy, (action) plan, and roadmap further distinguishes the document
names of various countries and complicates the selection criteria according to which the
documents should be sorted in the final data set. While Western nations first adopt
strategies that guide future policy, this characteristic does not seem to apply universally,
at least not from the English translation of the document names. To ensure that my sample
includes only the most relevant documents, I consulted country experts and databases of
national cybersecurity strategies created by international organizations, such as the ITU,
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and the United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research.
Using this process, I have collected a highly comprehensive data set of national
cybersecurity strategies (NCSS) adopted between 1999 and 2018. My data set has 223
strategies adopted by 132 nations. While most countries adopted only one strategy as of
2018 some countries adopted and revised multiple strategies during this time frame (e.g.,
Luxembourg has three strategies). These additional strategies are relevant for constructing
weighted average effects of my main independent variable and diffusion variables, mentioned
in Section 2.2.
My dependent variable is the adoption of the first national cybersecurity strategy
(Adoption). Countries are coded as a “1” if they enacted such a strategy.4 Figure 2.2 displays
the global spread of cybersecurity strategy over time. Similar to Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 shows
rapid strategy diffusion starting in 2010. Specifically, by the end of 2009, only twenty-two
nations had cybersecurity policies for a total of twenty-six policies; by the end of 2014,
forty-seven nations adopted a total of 109 policies; and by the end of 2018, 132 nations
adopted a total of 217 policies.
Main Explanatory Variable: Preferences on Cybersovereignty. Cybersovereignty,
4 NCSS records the date, month, and year when a strategy was adopted. If information about date and
month is not available, I assume that the strategy was adopted on January 1.
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Figure 2.2: Diffusion of Cybersecurity Strategies (2000-2018)
(a) 2000-2009
(b) 2000-2014
(c) 2000-2018
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which has been discussed for about a decade, is a relatively new concept for the UNGA.
However, national (non-cyber) sovereignty occupied the UNGA floor from 1989 until 2005
in resolutions on “Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference
in the Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral Processes” (A/RES /44/147-A/60/164).
Similarly to the resolutions and statements on cybersovereignty these resolutions stressed
the importance to respect “the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in
the internal affairs of any State” (A/RES/52/199 1997, 2). Even though these resolutions
paid particular attention during election periods, they advocated for “the right, freely and
without external interference, to determine [a country’s] political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development” (A/RES/52/199 1997, 2). Fast-forward twenty
year. States now argue for the same right to “freely and without external interference, to
determine,” but this time how to govern the Internet and conduct ICT-related activities.
I use a country’s view on national sovereignty—its votes on UNGA resolutions on the
topic of national sovereignty—as a proxy for the country’s preferences on cybersovereignty.
Specifically, I record instances in which one country voted “yes” on a UNGA resolution
and another country voted “no” on the resolution. I assign a “1” if a dyad has different
cybersovereignty preferences and a “0” if the dyad has the same cybersovereignty preferences.
Since resolutions on national sovereignty appeared at the UNGA for the last time in 2005
(making 2006 the last available year for the lagged variable), I use the votes from this last
year to fill the data for the remaining years (2007-2018), given that the state preferences on
domestic and foreign policy issues tend to be rigid (Cordell et al. 2020; Voeten, Strezhnev and
Bailey 2017).5 Because the measure for similar preferences does not meet the proportionality
5 Cordell et al. (2020) demonstrate that human rights reporting in the U.S. Department of State reports
changed with a change in presidential administration. Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey (2017) demonstrate
that the language for many UNGA resolutions does not change much within a few consecutive years.
The language of the resolutions on “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications
in the context of international security” that occupied the UNGA floor since 1998 barely changed
(A/RES/53/70-A/RES/74/29). Moreover, the voting patterns on these resolutions barely changed—the
resolutions were either adopted with consensus or with almost no variation in voting.
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assumption of the Cox-Proportional Hazard model that I employ in my analysis, I use
the measure of dissimilar cybersovereignty preferences to create a weighted average effect
of cybersecurity policies adopted by countries that do not share similar preferences on
cybersovereignty in a period prior to the country adopting its first cybersecurity strategy
(Policies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents).6
Operationalizing Alternative Explanations. Given two nations, I measure their cultural
similarity using: (1) a binary variable that records whether the nations have the same official
language from Graham and Tucker (2019) (Linguistic Partners), (2) a binary variable
that records whether they have similar colonial experiences from Graham and Tucker (2019)
(Colonial Partners), and (3) a continuous variable that records the distance between the
nations’ capitals (Neighbors (1)).7 To account for the impact of information channels, I
use the nations’ joint membership in international governmental organizations (IGOs) from
Pevehouse et al. (2019) (IGO Partners). To identify their military allies, I use Leeds et al.
(2002)’s Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Allies (1)) and the
Correlates of War (COW) Project’s data on formal alliances (version 4.1) (Gibler 2008)
(Allies (2)). I identify each country’s trade partners using: (1) bilateral trade data from
the World Bank (Trading Partners (1)); (2) data on bilateral investment treaties from
Graham and Tucker (2019) (Trading Partners (2)); and (3) preferential trade agreements
from (Graham and Tucker 2019) (Trading Partners (3)). To account for the possibility
that a state’s foreign policy preferences drive strategy adoption, I use Voeten, Strezhnev and
Bailey (2017)’s data on the UNGA votes (UN Partners). I measure the effect of modern
behavior as a driving force of strategy adoption using each country’s average membership
6 The measure for similar preferences does not meet the proportionality assumption of the Cox-Proportional
Hazard model even after interacting this measure with the starting time to address this issue; moreover,
the measure for similar preferences is highly correlated with many other types of diffusion variables. See
Section 2.7 of Appendix 2.7 for more details.
7 I run my robustness checks using a dummy variable indicating whether states share a land border or are
separated by less than 400 miles of water from (Stinnett et al. 2002) (Neighbors (2)).
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in IGOs from Pevehouse et al. (2019) (IGO Membership). To account for the effect of
the conventional front on strategy adoption, I control for the total number of militarized
interstate disputes that a country experienced in the year preceding its strategy adoption
from Maoz (2005) (Total MIDs). I measure each country’s threat environment using: (1)
the number Internet users in the country as a percentage of the country’s total population,
taken from the World Bank (Int_Users),8 (2) the cumulative number of large, known
cybercampaigns that the country experienced in all years preceding its strategy adoption
from Valeriano and Maness (2018)’s Dyadic Cyber Incident Dataset (DCID) (version 1.5)
(Target),9 and (3) strategies adopted by the country’s adversaries (Adversaries). Lastly, I
account for each country’s regime type. Using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV
score, I create a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if this score is less than six, which
represents an autocracy, and 1, if this score is at least six, which represents a democracy
(Democracy). I use this variable to account for the effect of regime type similarities on
strategy adoption (Regime Partners). Section 2.7 of Appendix 2.7 provides a detailed
explanation of these variables and their variations.
Control Variables. In addition to considering the effect of the variables that I outlined in
Section 2.2, I control for two other factors. First is the country’s wealth measured by the
country’s GDP per capita, taken from the World Bank (GDP_PerCapita).10 Second is the
cumulative number of large, known offensive cyberoperations launched by (attributed to) a
country in all years preceding its strategy adoption, taken from from DCID (Attacker).11
8 I use logarithmic transformations to address this variable’s skewness.
9 Valeriano and Maness (2018) define a cybercampaign as an accumulation of cyberattacks meant to achieve
strategically important goals.
10 I use logarithmic transformations to address this variable’s skewness. It is worth noting that
GDP_PerCapita only considers a country’s wealth. Future extensions of this work will incorporate the
extent to which the type of economy (e.g., extractive) affects the calculations regarding security.
11 Table 2.1 lists all variables, their measures and sources. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, the data on some
of the variables ends around 2014 or even earlier (e.g., 2010 for Strategies Weighted by Adversaries).
One way to address this data limitation would be to limit my analysis to 2014 or even 2010. This option
would require the analysis to cover the less interesting times of international cyberconflict. I decided to
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
Spatial lags. To identify the effect of the strategies adopted by a country’s “neighbors”
that include but are not limited to its adversaries, allies, cultural and linguistic partners, I
create spatial lags. Instead of lagging the value of the dependent unit one variable at a time
and, as a result, adding a significant number of regressors to my model, I use spatial lags
that capture the “weighted average of the dependent variable in the actor’s ‘neighborhood” ’
(Simmons and Elkins 2004, 178). I define a spatial lag for a country i as:
Wi([t− 1]) ∗ y−i([t− 1]) =
∑
i=1,...,N
Wi,−i([t− 1]) ∗ y−i([t− 1]), (2.1)
where, Wi,−i([t − 1]) is an N × N spatial weights matrix that capture’s countries i’s
neighborhood in t − 1. Each element in Wi,−i measures different relationships between
any two nations. For instance, it could measure physical distance between two nations’
capitals (Neighbors), how much trade the two nations do (Trading Partners), or whether
they signed a military alliance treaty (Allies).
∑
i=1,...,N Wi,−i captures the weight of the
relationship between these two nations relative to the nation’s total relationships with other
nations in a given area of international relations. This weight captures the importance of a
neighbor’s influence on this country. For instance, if a nation has only one trading partner,
then their trading relationship has a weight of 100%; consequently, the partner will most
likely have a significant influence on this country’s economic decisions. On the other hand,
if a nation has twenty trading partners and each relationship has a weight of 5%, then the
influence of an individual trading partner on the country’s economic decisions will most likely
be limited. y−i([t−1]) represents whether a country’s “neighbor” −i adopted a cybersecurity
proceed with my analysis as the development of cybersecurity policies is too important of a contemporary
policy topic to ignore. Instead of limiting my strategy sample, I extend data for my covariates all the
way until 2018, using the previous values of these covariates. While this approach has its pros and cons
(Van Buuren 2018), I decided to use it, as it makes it easy to track the various moving parts of my analysis.
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strategy in year t − 1. Combined, Wi([t − 1]) ∗ y−i([t − 1]) captures the total effect of the
country’s “neighbors” that adopted or did not adopt cybersecurity strategies in t− 1.
Event history analysis: Cox Proportional-Hazards model. I use an event history
model12 that focuses on the spell of time until the adoption of a national cybersecurity
strategy occurs. My unit of analysis is the country-year. The analysis begins in 1999 when
the U.S. government started investigating a massive data breach of classified information.
Called Moonlight Maze, this data breach affected various U.S. government agencies and
defense contractors and was later labeled as the first example of an advanced persistent threat
(APT)—a stealthy computer network operation during which a state-sponsored group gains
unauthorized access to a computer network and remains undetected for some time. The
analysis ends in 2018. If the country has not adopted a cybersecurity strategy by December
31, 2018, it is right-censored in my data set. Lastly, since many of the covariates change over
time, I use interval censoring to capture time-varying covariates (Therneau and Grambsch
2000).
I fit the following Cox Proportional-Hazards (CPH) model that examines the effect of
time-varying and time-invariant covariates on the country’s decision to adopt the policy:
log(H(t;Xi([t− 1]), yi([t− 1]))) ∝ Wi([t− 1])y−i([t− 1])β1 +Xi([t− 1])β2,
where: log(H(t;Xi([t−1]), yi([t−1]))) is the log of a hazard ratio that stands for the relative
risk of country i adopting a cybersecurity strategy at time t; Wi([t − 1])y−i([t − 1]) is an
n× n spatial weights matrix, as explained above; Xi([t− 1]) = [x1i([t− 1]), . . . , xki([t− 1])]′
is a matrix of k exogenous variables; and β2 is a three-dimensional vector of coefficients.
As explained earlier, I included the following exogenous variables: (1) the number of the
country’s Internet users as a percentage of its total population in a given year (Int_Users);
12 Event history models became a common tool for studying policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990; Elkins,
Guzman and Simmons 2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons, Lloyd and Stewart 2018).
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(2) the country’s GDP per capita in a given year (GDP_PerCapita); and (3) the country’s
regime type (Democracy). I also use robust standard errors with clustering on the countries
to account for time-varying coefficients. Lastly, to make my results easy to interpret, I
standardize all continuous explanatory variables (all variables except Democracy).13
2.5 Findings
My central finding is that the cybersecurity strategies adopted by countries that share
the same preferences on cybersovereignty most consistently explain global cybersecurity
strategy diffusion. Tables 2.2-2.5 that display hazard ratios demonstrate that coefficients
for Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents are consistently smaller than
one meaning that Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents are negatively
correlated with Adoption.
Table 2.2 considers the influence of Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents on a country’s threat environment; it demonstrates that Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty Opponents is consistently negatively correlated with Adoption, even
after controlling for different proxies of the cyberthreat environment. This result supports
the argument that as a country starts building its defensive cybercapabilities in the form
of national cybersecurity strategies, it is influenced by nations that share its preferences on
cybersovereignty. It does so because its national cybersecurity strategy—the first significant
document that the country adopts on the topic of cybersecurity—sets up the government’s
future program on how it will address challenges and opportunities presented by the Internet.
In particular, Model 2 in Table 2.2 uses Target—the cumulative number of large, known
cybercampaigns attributed to the country in all years preceding its strategy adoption —as
a proxy for the cyberthreat environment. The model demonstrates that Target is not
correlated with Adoption. This is not surprising, given that large cybercampaigns are rare
13 Section 2.7 of Appendix 2.7 provides a detailed explanation of diagnostic tests for non-proportional
hazards.
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Table 2.2: Influence of strategies of cybersovereignty opponents and threat environment on national
strategy adoption (hazard ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Base
Target as
proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Strategies
Weighed by
Adversaries
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Int_Users
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
All proxies for
cyberthreat
environment
Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty
Opponents
0.807∗∗ 0.800∗∗ 0.808∗∗ 0.789∗∗ 0.787∗∗
(0.66, 0.99) (0.65, 0.98) (0.66, 0.99) (0.64, 0.97) (0.64, 0.96)
Attacker 1.133 1.019 1.157 1.103 1.027
(0.92, 1.39) (0.77, 1.35) (0.94, 1.43) (0.89, 1.37) (0.77, 1.38)
Democracy 1.777∗∗ 1.728∗∗ 1.816∗∗ 1.615∗∗ 1.619∗∗
(1.14, 2.76) (1.01, 2.70) (1.16, 2.83) (1.03, 2.52) (1.03, 2.54)
IGO Membership 1.077 1.089 1.074 1.029 1.026
(0.84, 1.38) (0.85, 1.39) (0.84, 1.38) (0.80, 1.32) (0.80, 1.31)
Total MIDs (log) 0.977 0.919 1.023 0.959 0.956
(0.79, 1.21) (0.69, 1.22) (0.83, 1.26) (0.77, 1.20) (0.73, 1.26)
GDP_PerCapita (log) 1.026∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ —— ——
(1.01, 1.04) (1.01, 1.04) (1.01, 1.04)
Target —— 1.005 —— —— 1.005
(1.00, 1.01) (1.00, 1.01)
Strategies Weighted by
Adversaries —— —— 0.882 —— 0.874
(0.71, 1.09) (0.70, 1.10)
Int_Users (log) —— —— —— 1.053∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗
(1.03, 1.08) (1.03, 1.08)
Additional Controls X X X X X
Concordance 0.651 0.647 0.658 0.666 0.668
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the hazard ratios
and confidence intervals. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. All variables but Democracy are
standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with Int_Users do not include GDP_PerCapita
because the two variables are highly correlated. See Appendix 2.7 for more details and a more detailed
presentation of results. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
and nations tend to pay attention to the changes in the global cyberthreat landscape.
Since perception is important when it comes to the definition of a threat, I use two
additional measures of the cyberthreat environment to incorporate this perception. First
is Strategies Weighted by Adversaries, which is the weighted average effect of the
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Table 2.3: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative
network measures (hazard ratios)
(a) Harmonization after Partners & Communications Channels
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Ally Diffusion Trade Diffusion
Emulation
after UN
Partners
Communica-
tions Channels
Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty
Opponents
0.784∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.777∗∗ 0.782∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.785∗∗
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.95)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
Strategies Weighted
by Allies (1) 0.986 —— —— —— —— —— ——
(0.88,
1.11)
Strategies Weighted
by Allies (2) —— 1.003 —— —— —— —— ——
(0.86,
1.15)
Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (1) —— —— 1.233
∗∗ —— —— —— ——
(1.01,
1.51)
Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (2) —— —— —— 1.050 —— —— ——
(0.84,
1.31)
Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (3) —— —— —— —— 1.121 —— ——
(0.95,
1.32)
Strategies Weighted
by UN Partners —— —— —— —— —— 0.793 ——
(0.26,
2.41)
Strategies Weighted
by IGO Partners —— —— —— —— —— —— 0.992
(0.73,
1.34)
Int_Users (log) 1.052∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.07)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
Democracy 1.577∗∗ 1.574∗∗ 1.582∗∗ 1.569∗∗ 1.544∗ 1.594∗∗ 1.577∗∗
(1.01,
2.47)
(1.01,
2.48)
(1.01,
2.47)
(1.01,
2.46)
(0.99,
2.42)
(1.01,
2.50)
(1.01,
2.46)
Additional Controls X X X X X X X
Concordance 0.663 0.663 0.667 0.663 0.667 0.663 0.663
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the hazard ratios
and confidence intervals. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. Each model includes additional controls
that are not statistically significant: Attacker, IGO Membership, Target, and Total MIDs. All variables but
Democracy are standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with Int_Users do not include
GDP_PerCapita because the two variables are highly correlated. See Appendix 2.7 for more details and a more
detailed presentation of results. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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strategies adopted by a nation’s rivals in a period prior to the nation’s strategy adoption.
Similar to Target, Strategies Weighted by Adversaries is not correlated with Adoption
(Model 3 in Table 2.2). Second is the number of Internet users as a percentage of a country’s
population (Int_Users). Int_Users is positively correlated with Adoption even if I consider
the cumulative effect of all proxies for the cyberthreat environment in Model 5 of Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 also shows that IGO Membership is not correlated with Adoption, suggesting
that countries do no adopt their national cybersecurity strategies because of prestige or to
demonstrate modern behavior. Moreover, the country’s conventional environment (Total
MIDs) is unlikely to influence this choice. Democracy, on the other hand, is positively
correlated with Adoption across all models in Table 2.2, suggesting that democracies are
more likely to adopt national cybersecurity strategies than autocracies. Lastly, while GDP_Per
Capita and Int_Users are positively correlated with Adoption across all models, these two
variables are highly correlated, thus I proceed with including only Int_Users, in addition
to all other controls listed in Model 5, into all sequential models.
Robustness Tests: Alternative Network Measures. Section 2.2 outlines a number of
alternative networks through which diffusion can take place, such as the country’s allies,
colonial partners (i.e., nations that a share common colonial past), geographic neighbors,
IGO partners (i.e., nations that have memberships in the same IGOs), linguistic partners,
regime partners (i.e.., nations that share the same regime type), trading partners, and
UN partners (i.e., nations that voted similarly on UNGA resolutions). Are any of these
alternative networks better explanations of cybersecurity strategy diffusion than countries
that have the same preferences on cybersovereignty?
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that, more likely than not, Strategies Weighted by
Cybersovereignty Opponents capture the diffusion of national cybersecurity strategies.
Model 1 of Table 2.3 shows that cybersovereignty preferences are not correlated with
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Table 2.3: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative
network measures (hazard ratios)
(b) Cultural & Regime Similarity
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Emulation
after Colonial
Partners
Emulation
after Linguistic
Partners
Emulation
after Neighbors Emulation after Regime Partners
Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty
Opponents
0.779∗∗ 0.781∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.785∗∗ 0.785∗∗
(0.64,
0.95)
(0.64,
0.95)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
(0.64,
0.96)
Strategies Weighted
by Colonial Partners 0.919 —— —— —— —— —— ——
(0.81,
1.04)
Strategies Weighted
by Linguistic
Partners
—— 0.915 —— —— —— —— ——
(0.78,
1.07)
Strategies Weighted
by Neighbors (1) —— —— 0.989 —— —— —— ——
(0.90,
1.17)
Strategies Weighted
by Neighbors (2) —— —— —— 1.001 —— —— ——
(0.90,
1.11)
Strategies Weighted
by Regime
Partners (1)
—— —— —— —— 0.885 —— ——
(0.61,
1.27)
Strategies Weighted
by Regime
Partners (2)
—— —— —— —— —— 0.755 ——
(0.52,
1.09)
Strategies Weighted
by Regime
Partners (3)
—— —— —— —— —— —— 0.958
(0.64,
1.43)
Int_Users (log) 1.053∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
(1.03,
1.08)
Democracy 1.603∗∗ 1.583∗∗ 1.573∗∗ 1.576∗∗ 1.768∗∗ 1.895∗∗ 1.612∗
(1.02,
2.51)
(1.02,
2.47)
(1.01,
2.46)
(1.01,
2.47)
(1.03,
3.02)
(1.16,
3.10)
(1.00,
2.61)
Additional Controls X X X X X X X
Concordance 0.665 0.666 0.662 0.663 0.662 0.664 0.663
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the hazard ratios and
confidence intervals. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. Each model includes additional controls that are not
statistically significant: Attacker, IGO Membership, Target, and Total MIDs. All variables but Democracy are
standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with Int_Users do not include GDP_PerCapita because the
two variables are highly correlated. See Appendix 2.7 for more details and a more detailed presentation of results.
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Table 2.4: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Cumulative
influence of alternative network measures (hazard ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Trade as
total bilateral
trade
Trade as
signed annual
BIT
Trade as
signed annual
PTA
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents 0.776
∗∗ 0.772∗∗ 0.779∗∗
(0.64, 0.95) (0.63, 0.94) (0.64, 0.95)
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries 0.871 0.880 0.876
(0.69, 1.09) (0.70, 1.10) (0.70, 1.10)
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners 0.927 0.933 0.942
(0.82, 1.05) (0.82, 1.06) (0.83, 1.07)
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners 0.930 0.924 0.930
(0.79, 1.09) (0.79, 1.08) (0.80, 1.08)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) 1.268∗∗ —— ——
(1.03, 1.56)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (2) —— 1.113 ——
(0.89, 1.40)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (3) —— —— 1.125
(0.95, 1.33)
Int_Users (log) 1.053∗∗ 1.055∗∗ 1.054∗∗
(1.03, 1.08) (1.03, 1.08) (1.03, 1.08)
Democracy 1.673∗∗ 1.632∗∗ 1.607∗∗
(1.07, 2.61) (1.04, 2.55) (1.03, 2.52)
Additional Controls X X X
Concordance 0.678 0.674 0.677
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the hazard ratios
and confidence intervals. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. Each model includes additional
controls that are not statistically significant: Attacker, IGO Membership, Target, and Total MIDs. All
variables but Democracy are standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with Int_Users
do not include GDP_PerCapita because the two variables are highly correlated. See Appendix 2.7
for more details and a more detailed presentation of results. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
alliances. This lack of correlation persists even when instead of using Leeds et al. (2002)’s
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data to define allies (Model 1), I use
the Correlates of War (COW) Project’s data on formal alliances (version 4.1) (Gibler 2008)
(Model 2). Models 3-6 of Table 2.3 consider emulation after trading partners. While Model 3
displays a positive correlation between Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1)
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Table 2.5: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative
measure of the adopted strategies (hazard ratios)
Model 1
Cumulative
strategy adoption
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents 0.810∗∗
(0.69, 0.96)
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries 0.946
(0.83, 1.07)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) 0.885
(0.63, 1.24)
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners 1.003
(0.86, 1.17)
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners 0.849∗
(0.71, 1.02)
Int_Users (log) 1.050∗∗∗
(1.02, 1.08)
Democracy 1.459
(0.91, 2.33)
Additional Controls X
Concordance 0.665
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the
hazard ratios and confidence intervals. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. Each
model includes additional controls that are not statistically significant: Attacker,
IGO Membership, and Target. All variables but Democracy are standardized. All results
based on two-tailed tests. Models with Int_Users do not include GDP_PerCapita because
the two variables are highly correlated. See Appendix 2.7 for more details and a more
detailed presentation of results. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
and Adoption, this result is not robust to alternative specifications of trade relationships.
Specifically, instead of identifying a country’s trade partners using bilateral trade data from
the World Bank (Trading Partners (1) in Model 3), I used the number of annually signed
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (Trading Partners (2) in Model 4) and preferential
trade agreements (PTA) (Trading Partners (3) in Model 5) (Graham and Tucker 2019).
Moreover, Models 6 and 7 of Table 2.3a show no evidence of emulation after UN partners
and via communications channels.
Table 2.3b provides further support for my main explanation of the global
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spread of cybersecurity strategies—Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents—demonstrating that additional alternative explanations, such as cultural
and regime similarity, do not contribute to this global spread. Models 8-11 in Table 2.3b
find no support for the cultural similarity explanation. This result is robust even after I use
an alternative measure to define a country’s geographic neighbors—in addition to using the
distance between two capitals (Neighbors (1) in Model 10), I use a dummy variable that
identifies whether these countries share a land border or are separated by at most 400 miles
of water (Neighbors (2) in Model 11) (Stinnett et al. 2002). Similarly, Models 12-14 in
Table 2.3b find no support for the regime type similarity explanation. This result is robust
even after I use three alternative ways to measure whether countries share the same regime
type.14
In addition to considering individual influences of these alternative networks, I also
consider their cumulative influence. Instead of piling highly correlated explanatory
variables upon one another (Appendix A), I employ the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) to select which of these networks provide the best fit.15 The results confirm that
the “best” model should include Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents,
as well as Strategies Weighted by Adversaries, Strategies Weighted by Colonial,
Linguistic, and Trading Partners. Table 2.4 presents the results and confirms the
negative correlation between Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents and
Adoption. Similarly, Table 2.4 shows that there is a positive correlation between the
strategies of trading partners and Adoption (Model 1), but this result disappears when I
measure trading relationships using the number of signed annual BITs (Model 2) and PTAs
14 Specifically, I create a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share the same regime, using
Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score. I use the following three cut-points to identify such
nations: (1) nations that score a “6” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score
a “5” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy) (Regime Partner (1)); (2) nations that score a “5” or above
receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score a “4” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy)
(Regime Partner (2)); and (3) nations that score a “4” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those
nations that score a “3” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy) (Regime Partner (3)).
15 Section 2.7 of Appendix 2.7 provides the results.
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Table 2.6: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative Model
Specification (odds-ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Base
Trade as
total
bilateral
trade
Trade as
signed
annual
BIT
Trade as
signed
annual
PTA
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents 0.746
∗∗ 0.739∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.740∗∗
(0.59,
0.94)
(0.58,
0.94)
(0.58,
0.93)
(0.58,
0.94)
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries —— 0.869 0.877 0.872
(0.66,
1.02)
(0.67,
1.03)
(0.68,
1.02)
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners —— 0.931 0.937 0.942
(0.80,
1.07)
(0.80,
1.07)
(0.81,
1.08)
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners —— 0.933 0.925 0.929
(0.77,
1.08)
(0.76,
1.08)
(0.767,
1.08)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) —— 1.301∗∗ —— ——
(1.04,
1.62)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (2) —— —— 1.082 ——
(0.81,
1.40)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (3) —— —— —— 1.177
(0.96,
1.44)
Int_Users (log) 1.707∗∗∗ 1.735∗∗∗ 1.759∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗
(1.20,
2.47)
(1.22,
2.51)
(1.23,
2.55)
(1.23,
2.54)
Democracy 1.699∗∗ 1.810∗∗ 1.761∗∗ 1.723∗∗
(1.04,
2.79)
(1.05,
2.99)
(1.08,
2.90)
(1.05,
2.85)
Time FE X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X
Akaike Inf. Crit. 750.948 749.186 754.006 751.890
Note: Results are from a Discrete Time Survival Model. The reported values are the odds-ratios
and confidence intervals. There are 2,502 observations. Each model includes additional controls
that are not statistically significant: Attacker, IGO Membership, Target, and Total MIDs. All
variables but Democracy are standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with
Int_Users do not include GDP_PerCapita because the two variables are highly correlated.
See Appendix 2.7 for more details and a more detailed presentation of results.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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(Model 3). Lastly, across all models in Tables 2.3-2.4, there are positive correlations between
Int_Users and Adoption, and Democracy and Adoption.
Robustness Tests: Alternative Measure of the Adopted Strategies. In addition to
considering whether a country’s so-called “neighbor” adopted a cybersecurity strategy in the
year prior to the year during which the country adopted its strategy, I use a binary variable
that records whether the country’s “neighbor” adopted a cybersecurity strategy in any year
prior to the year during which the country adopted its strategy. As Table 2.5 demonstrates
a negative correlation between Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents
and Adoption persists.
Robustness Tests: Alternative Model Specification. In addition to employing a Cox
Proportional-Hazards (CPH) Model, I also use a Discrete Time Survival (DTS) Model
to make sure that my results are robust to the model specification. Since a baseline
hazard in a CPH model incorporates the effect of time, I use time fixed effects in my
DTS model. Table 2.6 confirms that my earlier obtained results—Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty Opponents are negatively correlated with Adoption—are robust to
the model specification.
2.6 Discussion and Implications
This paper asks a basic question: what drives a state’s decision to develop its defensive
cybercapabilities in the form of strategies? Contrary to the few existing works demonstrating
that a country’s cyberthreat environment drives cybersecurity strategy adoption (Craig
and Valeriano 2016c,a,b), this research shows that the diffusion of national cybersecurity
strategies occurs along blocks of nations with distinct preferences on cybersovereignty.
Similar to existing works on policy diffusion (Brooks 2005; Drezner 2005; Füglister 2012;
Stone 2004; Ward and Cao 2012; Volden 2006), this finding points to the irrelevance of
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geographical borders on a government’s development of policies that drive their complex
interactions in this globalized world. Information and communication technologies and the
Internet have completely transformed our understanding of distance and neighborhoods,
and are slowly defining new cyberpartnerships that form among nations that will decide the
future of Internet regulations (Kostyuk 2020b). These cyberpartnerships, which are currently
in the early stages of development, will have long-term effects on how national leaders rank
their national priorities and conduct their domestic and foreign policy.
National cybersecurity strategies, to some extent, serve as a new form of soft power that
developed nations exercise when they conduct their foreign policy pertaining to cybersecurity.
In particular, these strategies send an informative signal to developing nations about the
country’s preferences on cybersovereignty and point them in the direction they should be
moving if they want to form new partnerships with more cyber-advanced nations. In that
sense, the efforts to harmonize cyberpolicies has “a coercive effect on the states that have
been slow to act” (Bennett 1991, 228). As nations continue developing their cybercapabilities,
developing nations will have more catching up to do to be on par with their more advanced
partners. If they fail to do so, they face the possibility of being abandoned by their more
advanced partners (Kostyuk 2019b: #27).
This research also demonstrates the effect of other variables on the country’s choice
to adopt a cybersecurity strategy. Not surprisingly, a country’s Internet dependency
and the desire of democratic leaders to respond to their constituencies over cybersecurity
concerns drive this choice. The public, however, might react to a worsening global
landscape of cyberthreats and not to the events directly affecting their country. For
instance, Luxembourg, with an Internet penetration rate of almost ninety-eight percent of its
population, has not suffered any major, known cybercampaigns (at least according to DCID).
But the country has adopted three national cybersecurity strategies over the last decade—in
2011, 2015, and 2018—with “strengthening of public trust in the digital environment” as one
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of its main objectives (National Cybersecurity Strategy III 2018, 7).
As the above example demonstrates, countries generally do not stop with adopting their
first strategy. As the world evolves, countries continue revising and updating their policies
to address newly presented challenges. Future research could explore why the small nation
of Luxembourg adopted three cybersecurity strategies over eight years, whereas Finland,
which has globally known tech-companies such as Nokia, Mesto, and Kone, adopted only
one strategy in 2013. In addition to exploring the temporal or vertical variation of multiple
adoptions within a cybersecurity policy area, research should explore the horizontal spread
of these policies. Countries do not stop only with the first strategy, they adopt new
policies and reinvent the old ones, “with the comprehensiveness of some policies expanding
as they spread” (Hays 1996; Volden 2006). For instance, in 2019, the Danish Ministries of
Health, Transportation and Energy adopted their own versions of cybersecurity strategies
(Cybersecurity Strategy for Health 2019; Cybersecurity Strategy for Transportation 2019;
Cybersecurity Strategy for Energy 2019).
In addition to adopting cybersecurity strategies, countries also develop a variety
of other policies meant to address the challenges and opportunities of the online
environment—government policies and regulations (e.g., Electronic Design Concept of
Society (2010); E-Government Strategy (2017)), information and communication strategies
(e.g., Information and Communication Technologies Policy (2003); Cambodia ICT Master
Plan (2014)), digital agendas (e.g., Digital Agenda (2015, 2016)), and cyberdoctrines (e.g.,
Cyber Security Strategy for Defense (2014); The DOD Cyber Strategy (2015)), among others.
Investigating vertical or temporal variation (i.e., other stages of policy development) as
well as horizontal variation (i.e., branching out different policies to different governmental
agencies and variability within these policies) in policy evolution promises to provide a more
complete view of how policies move from one government to another.
While my findings have only marginally increased our existing knowledge on this topic,
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they serve as a useful point of departure not only for international relations scholars but for
political scientists in general. The impact of ICTs and the Internet on our lives will continue
to grow with the number of Internet-connected devices (known as the Internet-of-things),
artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. To address these challengers, local leaders
have been developing cyberdefenses by drafting policies and regulations. Despite this boom
in policies and regulations, there is almost no literature that explains this spread, which has
important policy implications. As a result, this undeveloped area of scientific inquiry leaves
many questions that I encourage scholars across different subfields—international relations,
comparative politics, and American politics—to explore. Only a cumulative approach
will allow us to fully understand how nations build their cybercapabilities—a complex,
continuously evolving and expanding area of political science and public policy research
that has significantly impacted how nations interact in the age of information technologies.
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2.7 Appendix
Elite Interviews: Diffusion of cybersecurity strategies
Between February and December of 2018, I conducted sixty-four interviews of cybersecurity
experts specializing in twenty-five countries most of whom were either current or former
government employees.16 I personally conducted all interviews in-person or via Skype or
email, to control for potential interviewer effects and maintain consistency across interviews.
I conducted between one and nine (Estonia and Israel) interviews per country, with a total
duration of 43.33 hours. The duration of the interviews was between 15 minutes and 3 hours,
with a median of 1 hour and mean of 1.48 hours. Figure 2.3a displays total duration of my
interviews by country and Figure 2.3b displays a number of the interviews I conducted in
each country. These interviews shed some light on the alternative explanations that I explore
in Section 2.2 of the main manuscript.
Figure 2.3: Summary of the Interviews
(a) Total Duration by Country (in hours) (b) Total Number of Interviews by Country
Data
Data Sources: Cultural Similarity
I measure cultural similarity in one of the three following ways. First is linguistic similarity
between countries. Using Graham and Tucker (2019)’s World Economics and Politics
16 I received an IRB approval to conduct my interviews on February 14, 2018 (Study #HUM00127749).
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Dataverse (WEPD), I create a binary variable that measures whether two nations speak
the same official language. I use that variable to create a weighted average effect of the
cybersecurity strategies adopted by a country’s linguistic partners in a period prior the
country’s strategy adoption (Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners). Second
are the shared identities and values of nations because they shape the channels through which
ideas flow (Rogers 1995). I measure shared identities by using a binary variable that records
whether two nations have similar colonial experiences (Graham and Tucker 2019). Similarly,
I use that binary variable to create a weighted average effect of the cybersecurity strategies
adopted by a country’s colonial partners in a period prior the country’s strategy adoption
(Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners). Last are geographic neighbors which I
measure by the distance between the nations’ capitals.17 Similarly, I use the binary variable
from above to create a weighted average effect of the cybersecurity strategies adopted by a
country’s neighbors in a period prior the country’s strategy adoption (Strategies Weighted
by Neighbors (1)).
Data Sources: Communication Channels and Expert Communities
While it is effectively impossible to account for all the various channels in which discussions
related to cybersecurity take place, the most natural place to start is with an international
organization devoted specifically to cybersecurity. However, since no such agency yet
exists, as an alternative, I use a country’s membership in international governmental
organizations (IGOs)—viewed as norm “carriers” (Eyre and Suchman 1996)—to capture
the degree to which the country tends to adopt international norms. This measure also
incorporates the impact of information channels through which participants transmit positive
and negative lessons of cybersecurity. To create a weighted average effect of cybersecurity
strategies adopted by governments that share memberships in IGOs in the year prior to
17 I run my robustness checks using a dummy variable for Contiguity indicating whether states share a
land border or are separated by less than 400 miles of water (Stinnett et al. 2002).
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a nation’s strategy adoption (Strategies Weighted by IGO Partners), I use Pevehouse
et al. (2019)’s dyadic data on countries’ joint memberships in various IGOs. This data
includes information on 534 IGOs that discuss issues related to various spheres of life. Even
though some of these IGOs do not have an explicit connection to cybersecurity, I incorporate
countries’ joint membership in all IGOs because no sphere of life remains unaffected by the
Internet and the cybersecurity concerns caused by its spread.
Data Sources: Harmonization after Partners
To consider harmonization as a driver of strategy adoption (Bennett 1991), I consider
the possibility that a country adopts its cybersecurity strategy in reaction to its so-called
partners. I consider three groups of partners: (1) military allies; (2) trade partners; and (3)
United Nations partners (i.e., nations that voted similarly to the country on the resolutions
adopted at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)).
To identify the country’s military allies, I use Leeds et al. (2002)’s Alliance Treaty
Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Allies (1)) and the Correlates of War (COW)
Project’s data on formal alliances (version 4.1) (Gibler 2008) (Allies (2)). I use these
variables to record a weighted average effect of cybersecurity strategies adopted by the
country’s allies in a period prior to the country adopting its first cybersecurity strategy
(Strategies Weighted by Allies (1) and Strategies Weighted by Allies (2)). I
use Strategies Weighted by Allies (1) in my main analysis because ATOP extends
to 2016 and Strategies Weighted by Allies (2) as my robustness checks because the
COW data ends in 2012.
I identify the country’s trade partners using the following three variables: (1)
bilateral trade data from the World Bank (Trading Partners (1)); (2) data on
bilateral investment treaties (Trading Partners (2)) (Graham and Tucker 2019); and
(3) preferential trade agreements (Trading Partners (3)) (Graham and Tucker 2019).
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Similarly, I record a weighted average effect of cybersecurity strategies adopted by the
country’s trading partners in a period prior to the country adopting its first cybersecurity
strategy (Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1), Strategies Weighted by
Trading Partners (2), and Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (3)). I use
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) in my main analysis, and Strategies
Weighted by Trading Partners (2) and Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners
(3) to run robustness checks.
Votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) have been commonly used to
construct a measure of state foreign policy preferences (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017;
Ball 1951; Gartzke 1998; Lijphart 1963; Moon 1985; Russett 1966; Signorino and Ritter 1999).
To account for the possibility that states’ foreign policy preferences drive strategy adoption,
I use UNGA Voting Data (Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey 2017). I use Voeten, Strezhnev and
Bailey (2017)’s index that measures voting similarity between two nations—agree2un—to
create a weighted average effect of cybersecurity strategies adopted by the country’s UN
partners in a period prior to the country adopting its first cybersecurity strategy (Strategies
Weighted by UN Partners).
Data Sources: Legitimacy, Prestige, or Modern Behavior
I measure the effect of modern behavior or prestige as a driving force of strategy adoption
using a country’s average membership in various international governmental organizations
(IGOs), using Pevehouse et al. (2019)’s data (IGO Membership). As explained earlier, even
though there are no official international organizations related to cybersecurity, discussions
on this topic take place in various international forums, including IGOs.18
18 To measure the effect of prestige, I have also considered controlling for a cumulative sum of cybersecurity
strategies adopted in the year prior to the country’s strategy adoption. However, because my survival
analysis includes time-varying covariates and this variable is the same across all nations and only differs
by year, I opted to run my robustness checks using the variable that has no country-specific variation.
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Data Sources: Threat Environment or Security Concerns
I consider two types of threats about which a nation should be concerned: conventional and
so-called digital. To account for the effect of the conventional front on strategy adoption,
I control for the total number of militarized interstate disputes that a country experienced
in the year preceding its strategy adoption (Total MIDs). To create this variable, I use
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data, which measures the presence of “a threat, display,
or use of force by one state against another” (Maoz 2005).19
I measure the country’s threat environment using the following three measures. First is
the number Internet users in a country as a percentage of the country’s total population,
taken from the World Bank (Int_Users).20 This variable serves as a proxy for the country’s
vulnerability to cyberthreats and its capacity to execute cyberattacks (North Korea is an
exception).
Second is the cumulative number of large, known cybercampaigns that a country
experienced in all years preceding its strategy adoption (Target).21 The more
cybercampaigns the country experienced, or the larger those campaigns, the more likely it is
to develop defensive measures against such threats.22 National cybersecurity strategies are
generally the first and most basic strategies, but they are also the foundational defenses that
a country creates because they: outline “high-level objectives, principles, and priorities that
guide a country in addressing cybersecurity;” describe steps that the country will undertake
to achieve these objectives; and list stakeholders responsible for undertaking these steps
(InternationalTelecommunicationsUnion 2018, 13). For instance, the Estonian government
19 As a robustness check, I considered controlling for the total number of rivalries that a country had in
the year prior to its strategy adoption using Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006)’ data on state rivalries. But
because this data set has been updated only until 2001, I am unable to use it in my analysis that focuses
on the 1999-2018 period.
20 I use logarithmic transformations to address this variable’s skewness.
21 Valeriano and Maness (2018) define a cybercampaign as an accumulation of cyberattacks meant to achieve
strategically important goals.
22 The estimate of the baseline hazard of the CPH model that I employ for this analysis encompasses a
temporal effect of the global landscape of cyberthreats.
48
formulated its first cybersecurity strategy as “a direct consequence of the 2007 attacks,” which
reminded the government that it “paid little attention to the security side of [the country’s]
e-governance and e-services” (Kostyuk 2019b: Estonia, #6).23
To create Target variables, I use Valeriano and Maness 2018’s Dyadic Cyber Incident
Dataset (DCID) (version 1.5)—one of the two only available datasets on major, known
cybercampaigns. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Cyber Operations Tracker (COT)24 is
another data set that tracks cyberoperations. But since the majority of cyberincidents in
the COT data depicts non-state cyberoperations or cases of governments using spyware to
track actions of opposition leaders, this data is less suited for this project.
Variations in reporting can be a serious problem for conflict event data (Weidmann 2016),
especially for cyberoperations, due to: their relevant recency and novelty; the often desired
secrecy surrounding their execution; and the difficulty of attribution of their origin. Even
though these factors are valid concerns, they do not present an issue for this study for the
following reasons. DCID records cybercampaigns—an accumulation of cyberattacks meant
to achieve strategically important goals—instead of sole instances of cyberattacks. This
approach ensures that the recorded data suffers less, if at all, from reporting bias than
does data on individual cyberattacks. For instance, it is much easier to check the validity
of the fact that Estonia suffered from a cybercampaign in 2007 than to find information
on each individual cyberattack which the country experienced during a three-week-long
cybercampaign. Moreover, it is hard not to notice a full-scale cybercampaign, especially
when a significant amount of time has passed since the start of a campaign—between
four and twenty years (i.e., the 2000-2016 period), for the attacks in DCID. Similarly,
English-speaking outlets are more likely to cover a full-scale cybercampaign than individual,
low-level cyberattacks. Lastly, it is much easier to use multiple sources to mistakenly record
23 During 2018, I conducted sixty-five interviews of cybersecurity experts that were fundamental for the
development of my theory as they shed some light on the alternative explanations. Section 2.7 of the
Online Appendix provides an overview of these interviews.
24 Source: https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations.
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an individual cyberattack, which often lacks specific details, than to over-report large-scale
cybercampaigns.
While it is difficult to attribute an origin of cyberoperations, attribution is often no
longer a technical problem but a complex political choice (Clark and Landau 2011; Rid
and Buchanan 2015). A few governments that can attribute cyberoperations used to be
reluctant to do so because public accusations require them to present proof, which can
require them to reveal their sources and compromise ongoing secret operations, and to
take actions in response to the suffered attack.25 Governments are not willing to take
blame for cyberoperations as this would obligate them to face consequences for their
actions. Private companies, however, have business incentives to discover and attribute
cyberoperations because public attribution brings them new clients and increases their
revenue. Because revenue motivates companies to go after large cybercampaigns and ignore
individual, low-level attacks, misattribution or lack of attribution is unlikely to be the case
for the DCID data.26
Countries that do not have the capacity to attribute cyberoperations often benefit from
such third-party public attribution. For instance, the Iranian government found out that its
nuclear enrichment facility had been subjected to cyberattacks for at least two years from
reports published by private companies in 2010. To address the possibility that a country
might adopt a policy only when it discovers that it has been a target of cyberoperations
from outside sources, I supplement the start and end dates of the DCID’s cybercampaigns
with the date of the campaigns’ public discovery.
This discussion suggests that despite DCID’s limitations, the overt cybercampaigns listed
25 Recent indictments by the U.S. Department of Justice (e.g., USDepartmentOfJustice (2014),
USDepartmentOfJustice (2016), USDepartmentOfJustice (2018a), USDepartmentOfJustice (2018b), and
USDepartmentOfJustice (2018c)) demonstrate that this behavior might be changing. States might be more
willing to use their ability to publicly attribute cyberoperations as a way of signaling their cybercapability,
meant to deter their opponents.
26 It is worth noting that in order to minimize reporting bias, DCID follows a well-established practice in
conflict studies: they use multiple sources to record an event and make sure that these various sources
attribute this even to the same origin.
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in DCID serve as a good proxy for a government’s overall cyberthreat environment. The most
prominent cybercampaigns “would be expected to have the largest impact on the government
[cybersecurity] policy,” which is the main focus of this study (Craig and Valeriano 2016c, 5).
To signal its capability and demonstrate that it is on par with its adversaries, a nation can
adopt policies similar to those of its adversaries. In that sense, interstate competition can
drive strategy adoption. To account for this possibility, my third measure of the country’s
cyberthreat environment record a weighted average effect of cybersecurity strategies adopted
by the country’s adversaries in a period prior to the country adopting its first cybersecurity
strategy (Strategies Weighted by Adversaries).
Data Sources: Regime Type
To account for public opinion as a driver of policy adoption, I control for the country’s
regime type. Specifically, I use Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score to create
a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if this score is less than six representing an
autocracy, and 1, if this score is at least six representing a democracy (Democracy).
I use the following two measures to identify nations that share the same regime type:
1. Regime Partners (1): a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share
the same regime, using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score; nations
that score a “5” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score a
“4” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy); and
2. Regime Partners (2): a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share
the same regime, using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score; nations
that score a “6” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score a
“5” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy).
Similarly, I record a weighted average effect of cybersecurity strategies adopted by countries
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that share the same regime type with the country in a period prior to the country adopting
its first cybersecurity strategy (Strategies Weighted by Regime Partners (1/2)).
Empirical Strategy
Cox Proportional-Hazards model. One assumption of the Cox Proportional-Hazards
(CPH) model is that no two countries adopt strategies at the same time. In practice, this
is not necessarily the case. Many countries adopt strategies in the same year. To “break
this tie,” I used the Efron approximation in my model as it is a tighter approximation
to the exact marginal. Another assumption of the CPH model is that the hazard ratios
do not vary over time. This means that if a country’s Internet dependency increases the
probability that the country adopts a cybersecurity strategy by ten percent, this effect
should remain the same in 2010 and 2020. In practice, however, this assumption is
often not met. For instance, because citizens might be more aware of the impact of the
Internet in 2020, the country’s Internet dependency in 2020 might have a higher effect on
its probability of the strategy adoption than in 2010. This results in a non-proportional
hazard model (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn 2003). One way to test this assumption
is to use the Therneau and Grambsch non-proportionality test that uses scaled Schoenfeld
residuals (Grambsch and Therneau 1994). Since some of variables violate this assumption
(i.e., Cybersovereignty Partners, Int_Users, GDP_PerCapita), I interact these variables
with starting time (tstart) to address this issue (Therneau, Crowson and Atkinson 2020).
Despite following this recommendation by the authors of the R package, the effect of these
variables should be generally understood as an average effect over the entire studied period
and not as a conditional effect over a particular period of time.
While this test detects a number of specification errors in addition to non-proportionality,
it may yield a false-positive test if the model is specified incorrectly (Therneau, Grambsch
and Fleming 1990; Grambsch and Therneau 1994; Therneau and Grambsch 2000). Thus
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scholars recommend improving the model specification for the correct functional form of the
covariates (i.e., detect any non-linear fit). This could be done by either “including polynomial
functions of variables or using a non-parametric method such as splines” (Keele 2010, 192).
Since polynomials may be “poor approximations for more complex linear functional forms”
(Keele 2010, 195), local form of estimation—splines—are used to model non-linearity (Beck
and Jackman 1998; Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998; Ruppert, Wand and Carroll 2003). Since
in some circumstances it is difficult to use the splines, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine
function instead (Shadden and Zorn 2011).27 I ran robustness checks where I use the inverse
hyperbolic since function for continuous covariates.
Model Selection. Next I consider the cumulative effect of diffusion variables. Because
some of the control variables and diffusion variables are significantly correlated as shown in
Figure 2.4, I use the Akaike’s selection criteria to select the variables that best explain the
cybersecurity strategy adoption (Adoption). Lower value of AIC suggests a “better” model.
Each model automatically included clustering by country and selected between the type of the
main explanatory variables (Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Partners and
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents) and control variables. Table 2.7
displays the AIC values for the best four models. It demonstrates that the “best” model
should include Democracy and Int_Users. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that it
is important to include Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents. Lastly
and importantly, most of the earlier defined control variables contribute to the model fit.
Even though Total MIDs and Attacker does not show up in the top four models, I proceed
with including these controls in my sequential analysis to avoid model overfit.
Because many of the diffusion variables are significantly correlated, as shown in Figure 2.4,
I again use the AIC values to select top four models that provide the best fit. Because I
27 I considered using log-like functions but since the log function is not defined at zero, I used the inverse
hyperbolic sine function, which looks like the log function but is defined at zero.
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Table 2.7: Model Selection: Control Variables
ID # of Predictors AIC Model
1 3 1012.35 Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents + Int_Users+ Democracy
2 4 1013.50 Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents + Int_Users+ Democracy + Target
3 4 1013.71 Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents + Int_Users+ Democracy + GDP_PerCapita
4 4 1013.86 Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents + Int_Users+ Democracy + IGO Membership
Table 2.8: Model Selection: All Diffusion Variables
ID # of Predictors AIC Model
1 10.00 1015.58
original 6 + Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents
+ Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners
+ Strategies Weighted by Adversaries
2 11.00 1015.82
original 6 + Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents
+ Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners
+ Strategies Weighted by Adversaries
+ Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners
3 11.00 1016.25
original 6 + Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents
+ Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners
+ Strategies Weighted by Adversaries
+ Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners
focus on selecting the diffusion variables that contribute to the “best” model, each model
under consideration automatically includes six original controls—Attacker, GDP_PerCapita,
IGO Memerbship, Int_Users, Target, Total MIDs—as well as clustering by country.
Table 2.8 displays the results. Similarly to the earlier obtained results (Table 2.7),
the “best” model should include Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents.
Additionally, Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1), Strategies Weighted
by Colonial Partners, Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners, Strategies
Weighted by Adversaries contribute to the better-fitted model.
Concordance statistic which uses “computes the agreement between an observed response
and a predictor.”28 is another way of checking the model fit. Popularized by Harrell Jr, Lee
and Mark (1996), this technique became tone of the most used measures of goodness-of-fit
in survival models. Out of all the models presented in Tables 2.10-2.13, the models
28 Source: https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/survival/versions/3.1-12/topics/concordance
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that have multiple diffusion variables have the highest concordance value (Table 2.11).
Similarly to the results obtained from using the AIC criteria (Table 2.8), this model
includes Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents, Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (1), Policies Weighted by Adversaries, Strategies Weighted
by Colonial Partners, and Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners. I also ran
the analysis when I compared concordance for the model that contains only six control
variable and obtained a value of 0.63. This result further confirms that the model
that contains Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents does a better job
predicting which country will adopt a cybersecurity strategy at a particular time.
Figure 2.4: Correlation Plot: Yearly Data
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Summary Statistics and Correlation Plots
Figure 2.4 depicts the correlation plot and Table 2.9 shows the summary statistics for the
main dependent and explanatory variables. All variables besides Democracy have been
re-scaled to make it easy to interpret the obtained results.
Table 2.9: Summary Statistics
Variable Name Minimum Median Mean Maximum
Adoption 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.00
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries (lag, sc) -0.11 -0.11 0.00 11.46
Strategies Weighted by Allies (1) (lag, sc) -0.53 -0.35 0.00 10.42
Strategies Weighted by Allies (2) (lag, sc) -0.33 -0.33 0.00 10.06
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners (lag, sc) -0.33 -0.33 0.00 6.24
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents (lag, sc) -0.45 -0.45 0.00 2.38
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Partners (lag, sc) -0.70 -0.42 0.00 3.42
Strategies Weighted by IGO Partners (lag, sc) -0.77 -0.38 0.00 13.51
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic
Partners (lag, sc) -0.36 -0.36 0.00 10.68
Strategies Weighted by Neighbors (1) (lag, sc) -0.71 -0.41 0.00 14.00
Strategies Weighted by Neighbors (2) (lag, sc) -0.17 -0.17 0.00 7.30
Strategies Weighted by Trading
Partners (1) (lag,sc) -0.53 -0.52 0.00 6.59
Strategies Weighted by Trading
Partners (2) (lag, sc) -0.54 -0.54 0.00 7.77
Strategies Weighted by Trading
Partners (3) (lag, sc) -0.54 -0.17 0.00 6.59
Strategies Weighted by UN Partners (lag, sc) -0.88 -0.42 0.00 2.43
Strategies Weighted by Regime Partners (lag, sc) -0.70 -0.46 0.00 2.73
Attacker (lag, sc) -0.12 -0.12 0.00 20.81
Target (lag, sc) -0.16 -0.16 0.00 17.98
GDP_PerCapita (log, sc) -2.34 -0.02 0.00 2.44
Int_Users (log, sc) -1.95 0.20 0.00 1.37
Democracy 0.00 1.00 0.56 1.00
IGO Membership (lag, sc) -3.07 -0.05 0.00 2.97
Total MIDs (lag, log, sc) -0.50 -0.50 0.00 8.27
Variable Name: log: logarithmized; lag: lagged; sc: standardized
Results
For ease of interpretation, I standardize all continuous explanatory variables (variables
besides Democracy). All tables present unexpontentiated estimates and standard errors.
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Table 2.10: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative
network measures (hazard ratios (log))
(a) Harmonization after Partners & Communications Channels
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Ally Diffusion Trade Diffusion
Emulation
after UN
Partners
Communica-
tions Channels
Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty
Opponents
−0.244∗∗ −0.242∗∗ −0.252∗∗ −0.246∗∗ −0.245∗∗ −0.245∗∗ −0.241∗∗
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109)
Strategies Weighted
by Allies (1) −0.014
(0.091)
Strategies Weighted
by Allies (2) 0.003
(0.071)
Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (1) 0.209
∗∗
(0.102)
Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (2) 0.049
(0.133)
Strategies Weighted
by Trading Partners (3) 0.115
(0.092)
Strategies Weighted
by UN Partners −0.231
(0.692)
Strategies Weighted
by IGO Partners −0.008
(0.172)
Attacker −0.018 −0.013 −0.022 −0.014 0.011 −0.023 −0.014
(0.170) (0.169) (0.169) (0.168) (0.170) (0.171) (0.169)
Target 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Int_Users (log) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Democracy 0.455∗∗ 0.454∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.435∗ 0.466∗∗ 0.456∗∗
(0.232) (0.233) (0.233) (0.232) (0.233) (0.234) (0.232)
IGO Membership 0.034 0.036 0.029 0.040 0.014 0.040 0.036
(0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.135) (0.136) (0.135) (0.135)
Total MIDs (log) −0.101 −0.104 −0.105 −0.102 −0.097 −0.104 −0.103
(0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
Concordance 0.663 0.663 0.667 0.663 0.667 0.663 0.663
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the log of hazard ratios
and standard errors. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. All variables but Democracy are
standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with Int_Users do not include GDP_PerCapita
because the two variables are highly correlated. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.10: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative
network measures (hazard ratios (log))
(b) Cultural & Regime Similarity
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Emulation
after Colonial
Partners
Emulation
after Linguistic
Partners
Emulation
after Neighbors Emulation after Regime Partners
Strategies Weighted
by Cybersovereignty
Opponents
−0.250∗∗ −0.247∗∗ −0.242∗∗ −0.242∗∗ −0.243∗∗ −0.242∗∗ −0.242∗∗
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Strategies Weighted
by Colonial Partners −0.085
(0.063)
Strategies Weighted
by Linguistic
Partners
−0.089
(0.077)
Strategies Weighted
by Neighbors (1) 0.025
(0.084)
Strategies Weighted
by Neighbors (2) 0.001
(0.061)
Strategies Weighted
by Regime
Partners (1)
−0.123
(0.191)
Strategies Weighted
by Regime
Partners (2)
−0.281
(0.193)
Strategies Weighted
by Regime
Partners (3)
−0.043
(0.207)
Attacker −0.018 −0.010 −0.011 −0.014 −0.018 −0.026 −0.015
(0.168) (0.170) (0.169) (0.169) (0.168) (0.168) (0.169)
Target 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Int_Users (log) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Democracy 0.472∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.453∗∗ 0.455∗∗ 0.570∗∗ 0.639∗∗ 0.478∗
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.296) (0.271) (0.257)
IGO Membership 0.039 0.045 0.039 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.037
(0.133) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Total MIDs (log) −0.099 −0.103 −0.107 −0.104 −0.103 −0.102 −0.102
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
Concordance 0.665 0.666 0.662 0.663 0.662 0.664 0.663
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the log of hazard ratios
and standard errors. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. All variables but Democracy are standardized.
All results based on two-tailed tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.11: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Cumulative
influence of alternative network measures (hazard ratios (log))
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Trade as
total bilateral
trade
Trade as
signed annual
BIT
Trade as
signed annual
PTA
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents −0.253
∗∗ −0.259∗∗ −0.250∗∗
(0.108) (0.109) (0.107)
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries −0.139 −0.128 −0.132
(0.098) (0.098) (0.097)
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners −0.076 −0.070 −0.060
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners −0.072 −0.080 −0.073
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) 0.237∗∗
(0.102)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (2) 0.107
(0.134)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (3) 0.118
(0.091)
Attacker 0.015 0.026 0.049
(0.170) (0.169) (0.171)
Target 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Int_Users (log) ∗tstart) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Democracy 0.515∗∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.474∗∗
(0.234) (0.232) (0.234)
IGO Membership 0.018 0.044 0.009
(0.136) (0.135) (0.136)
Total MIDs (log) −0.042 −0.045 −0.036
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138)
Additional Controls X X X
Concordance 0.678 0.674 0.677
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the log of hazard ratios
and standard errors. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events. All variables but Democracy are standardized.
All results based on two-tailed tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.12: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative
measure of the adopted strategies (hazard ratios (log))
Model 1
Cumulative
strategy adoption
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty Opponents −0.210∗∗
(0.095)
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries −0.056
(0.078)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) −0.122
(0.161)
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners 0.003
(0.093)
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners −0.164∗
(0.104)
Attacker 0.023
(0.172)
Target 0.005
(0.005)
Int_Users (log) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.014)
Democracy 0.378
(0.243)
IGO Membership 0.069
(0.140)
Total MIDs (log) −0.019
(0.156)
Additional Controls X
Concordance 0.665
Note: Results are from a Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the
log of hazard ratios and standard errors. There are 2,502 observations and 114 events.
All variables but Democracy are standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
60
Table 2.13: Robustness of diffusion via strategies of cybersovereignty opponents: Alternative Model
Specification (odds-ratios (log))
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Base
Trade as
total
bilateral
trade
Trade as
signed
annual
BIT
Trade as
signed
annual
PTA
Strategies Weighted by Cybersovereignty
Opponents −0.292
∗∗ −0.302∗∗ −0.305∗∗ −0.301∗∗
(0.120) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121)
Strategies Weighted by Adversaries −0.141 −0.132 −0.137
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Strategies Weighted by Colonial Partners −0.072 −0.065 −0.060
(0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
Strategies Weighted by Linguistic Partners −0.070 −0.079 −0.074
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (1) 0.263∗∗
(0.114)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (2) 0.079
(0.140)
Strategies Weighted by Trading Partners (3) 0.163
(0.104)
Attacker 0.034 0.055 0.069 0.105
(0.189) (0.194) (0.193) (0.194)
Target 0.079 0.063 0.060 0.053
(0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Int_Users (log) 0.535∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.184)
Democracy 0.530∗∗ 0.593∗∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.544∗∗
(0.250) (0.254) (0.252) (0.253)
IGO Membership 0.101 0.078 0.105 0.069
(0.148) (0.151) (0.149) (0.150)
Total MIDs (log) −0.085 −0.026 −0.024 −0.014
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147)
Time FE X X X X
Additional Controls X X X X
Akaike Inf. Crit. 750.948 749.186 754.006 751.890
Note: Results are from a Discrete Time Survival Model. The reported values are the log
of odds-ratios and standard errors. There are 2,502 observations. All variables but Democracy
are standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 3
Diffusion of State Military Cybercapacity: The Theory of
Complementarity In Alliances
Facing a growing number of cyberthreats, states have begun building their operational
capacity in the cyber domain by publicly initiating the development of their military
cyberapparatuses. Specifically, as this initial step, some nations assign cybersecurity
responsibilities to existing military agencies (New responsibility), as Albania did with
its Defence Intelligence and Security Agency (DISA) in 2014, and some nations create
brand new military units devoted to cybersecurity (New agency), as Argentina did with
its Computer Science Troops in 2005. Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of the initial
choices that countries made when developing their military cyberapparatus between 1999
and 2018. Delegating responsibility to an existing agency allows the country to quickly begin
working on cybersecurity, but it can be difficult to optimize the development of operational
capacity. Creating a new agency, on the other hand, takes more time and resources, but it
sends a stronger signal of commitment and more effectively increases the country’s military
cybercapacity. What explains this choice? And more specifically, why create new units at
all, if that option is costlier and entails a longer path to operational capacity?
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Figure 3.1: New Cybersecurity Responsibility versus New Cybersecurity Military Agency over Time
Note: The figure displays a cumulative number of military cybersecurity agencies that countries created
when initiating the development of their military cybersecurity apparatuses. New agency—nations started
with creating brand new units. New responsibility—nations started with assigning their existing agencies
to deal with cybersecurity. Source: Author’s calculations based on State Cybersecurity Organizations
(SCO) data.
International relations scholars have been using the theory of free-riding in military
alliances for decades to explain how allies pool their resources to defend against a common
threat (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Palmer 1990; Plümper and Neumayer 2015; Sandler
1993). This theory predicts that wealthier allies tend to contribute disproportionately
large shares of their defense spending to provide defense—a common public good shared
by all members of an alliance—and smaller allies are more more likely to free-ride using the
contributions of these larger allies. Using this distinction, the theory of free-riding would
predict that all but the wealthiest alliance members should opt for the lower-cost option (“new
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Figure 3.2: Initiation of Military Cyberapparatuses by NATO countries
Note: The figure displays the initiation of military cyberappatuses by NATO nations over time. New
agency—nations started with creating brand new units. New responsibility—nations started with assigning
their existing agencies to deal with cybersecurity. Sources: (1) State Cybersecurity Organizations (SCO)
data developed by the author, and (2) National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data (version 5.0) (Greig and
Enterline 2017). Since NMC was last updated in 2012, I use countries’ military expenditure per capita
in 2012 for all nations that started the development of their military cybersecurity apparatuses post 2012.
responsibility”). Figure 3.2, which displays the public development of military cybercapacity
by NATO members, demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case.
I argue that the choice depends on the signal a country wants to send to its allies and is
affected by the previous choices its allies made when they developed their own military
cyberapparatuses, following the logic of complementarity. If the country’s allies signal
toughness by creating brand new military cybersecurity units, the country takes a softer
approach and assigns cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing military agency. But if the
allies have taken a softer approach and only assign new responsibilities to existing agencies,
the country is more likely to take an extra step and create a brand new unit. I test the
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validity of my argument using a newly-constructed cross-national time-series data set on
state cybersecurity organizations for the 1999-2018 period. I find robust empirical support
for the theory of complementarity in alliances.
This empirical analysis carries important implications for the study of national security
policy. This study contributes to an existing body of works that examines the factors that
shape a country’s defense policy1 and presents a departure from these works by treating the
spread of military cybersecurity agencies as an example of capacity diffusion. This study
further contributes to the literature on complementarity and substitutability of conventional
military operations and cyberoperations (Kostyuk and Gartzke 2019) by demonstrating that
the former is more often the case.
By investigating the changes in allies’ military cybersecurity apparatuses, this research
points to a new phenomenon—the role that a country’s allies’ behavior plays on its decision to
publicly signal its military cybercapabilities. Despite the abundance of literature on military
alliances2 and their effect on the aggregation of military capabilities (Schweller 1994; Sweeney
and Fritz 2004), no existing works study the effect of allies on a state’s choice to publicly
signal its military cybercapability. Lastly, and most importantly, this research explains why
the free-riding theory of alliance does not always explain the behavior of military allies when
it comes to the cyber domain.
3.1 Signaling State Military Cybercapacity
Military Cybersecurity Apparatus as a Proxy for Military Cybercapacity. There
are two main ways that a state can publicly signal its offensive military cybercapability. It
1 Some of these factors include military strategic culture (Johnston 1998; Kier 1995; Legro 1996), political
institutions (Avant 2000), organizational biases (Snyder 1984b), social structure and ethnicity (Hoyt 2007;
Rosen 1996), regime type (Reiter and Stam 2002), global norms (Katzenstein 1996), strategic threats
(Goldman 2007; Posen 1984; Zisk 1993; Sechser and Saunders 2010), and organizational capacity and
financial flexibility (Horowitz 2010).
2 Some prominent works on alliances include: Benson and Clinton (2016); Grant (2013); Leeds et al. (2002);
Morrow (1991); Stephen (1987); Walt (1997).
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can execute an attack or develop its military cyberapparatus. While cyberattacks provide
targets with a good estimate of the attacker’s capability, this signaling method has a few
disadvantages. First, it devalues the existing capacity because it indicates vulnerabilities that
the target can fix. Second, the target can execute a reprisal against the attacker. Third, if
the cyberattack is not publicly attributed, which often takes time and is not an option for
many countries, then the attack will not send a signal to the entire international community.
Why is the development of a military cyberapparatus a better option? Signaling via
cyberapparatus development has benefits over signaling via cyberoperations because it
preserves the value of cyberoperations, which diminishes after the first use, and provides other
nations with an immediate, albeit rough, estimate of the state’s cybercapacity. Such public
signaling is generally true for military cybersecurity units. Even though states generally
create their first offensive cybercapacity unit within their signals intelligence (SIGINT)
agencies because these agencies tend to be the best equipped to deal with “cyber” issues
(Kostyuk 2019b: #3),3 the specifics of these agencies’ work makes it preferable for their
existence to be less widely known.
Contrary to cyberintelligence agencies whose main goal is to penetrate adversarial (and
often allies’) networks and to stay undetectable for as long as possible, the development of
military cybersecurity units publicly and loudly signals the country’s capability and intent
to use its cyberoffenses to punish aggressors to the entire international community (Kostyuk
2019b: #11). With the development of military cybersecurity agencies, states tend to
release information about their projected military personnel, changes (if any) to existing
military doctrines, and projected budgets. For example, after the 2009 creation of the
U.S. Cyber Command, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its new doctrine, which
treated “cyberspace as an operational domain” (Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 2011,
5). The DoD further created its 133-teams Cyber Mission Force with 6,200 cyberoperators
3 China is an exception in this regard. See Cunningham (2018)’s work for more details.
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in 2015. The following year, the Russian government committed between $200 million
and $250 million USD per year to significantly strengthen its cyberoffensive capabilities
and to create a cyber-deterrent that “will equate to the role played by nuclear weapons”
(Gerden 2016). And the 2017 U.S. DoD’s cyber budget of $6.7 billion USD was devoted
to “strengthening cyber defenses and increasing options available in case of a cyber-attack”
(U.S.DepartmentOfDefense 2016).
Types of signals of military cybercapacity. The development of a country’s military
cybercapacity is visible to the international community. Because it signals the country’s
power to hurt and its ability to withstand an attack, the state will consider how it wants to
initiate the development of its military cyberapparatus. I consider two ways in which this
initiation can happen. First, a state can assign cybersecurity responsibility to an existing
agency within the Ministry (or Department) of Defense (MoD/DoD) or to the ministry
itself. For instance, by helping draft the 2014 Afghani national cybersecurity strategy, the
Afghan DoD became responsible for contributing to the establishment of a secure and resilient
cyberspace in Afghanistan. Second, the state can create a new military cybersecurity unit
within MoD or an army division. For example, Argentina created Computer Science Troops
within its Armed Forces in 2005. These two methods differ in how developed bureaucratic
capacity translates into operational capacity and, as a result, send different signals about
the country’s distribution of capabilities and its ability to inflict pain and defend itself and
its allies.
Assigning cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing agency allows the country to
more quickly begin working on cybersecurity but given the need to adapt the agency’s
standard operating procedures, it might be harder to optimize its work in this new area.
Specifically, the assignment of cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing military agency
requires mutual adaptation in which both innovation and organization change in important
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ways. For instance, in addition to ensuring the safety of Albanian maritime space, the
Albanian Inter-institutional Maritime Operational Center (IMOC) within the country’s
MoD became responsible for civil emergencies, airspace control and the development of
cyberdefence capability. These new responsibilities shape how IMOC ensures the safety of
maritime space, and IMOC’s organizational culture shapes how it develops its cyberdefenses.
Moreover, the addition of a new responsibility can also result in a mission creep, as
cybersecurity exceeds the core responsibilities of the agency. As a result, the assignment
of a cybersecurity responsibility to an existing military agency sends a mild signal about the
country’s cyberdefensive and cyberoffensive operational capacity.
Unlike new responsibility assignment, new agency creation requires more time and
resources but it can be designed to maximize effectiveness. Since a new agency’s sole
responsibility is cyber defense, offense, and/or intelligence, a mission creep that can
significantly slow down the development of operational cybercapacity is not an issue for
such agencies. For instance, the sole responsibility of the Cyber Defense Unit located within
the Japanese Ministry of Defense and its Self Defense Forces is “monitoring information
and communications networks and responding to cyber attacks on a round-the-clock basis.”4
Agencies that have only one focus are afforded speed in the decision-making process and
higher levels of command and control. For these reasons, a new entity sends a stronger
signal of commitment to boosting the country’s military cybercapacity that translates into
a higher operational cybercapacity.
Since the creation of a new agency happens within MoD, MoD automatically becomes
responsible for cybersecurity when it creates a new cybersecurity unit. I consider such
cases as instances of “new agencies” because the nation chooses to send a stronger signal
of commitment by developing a new military cybersecurity agency. For instance, the 2016
Bulgaria’s national cybersecurity strategy made its MoD responsible for “maintain[ing] and
4 For more information, please visit the website of the Japanese Ministry of Defense:
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/answers/cyber/index.html
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develop[ing] existing and build new advanced capabilities for cyber defense, compatible with
those of NATO and the EU...” (National Cybersecurity Strategy 2016, 42-43). In addition
to enlisting this rather broad goal, it also committed to building the Operational Center for
Cyber Defense, meant to “respond to cyber and hybrid effects of national and international
scale” (National Cybersecurity Strategy 2016, 42-43). Luxembourg’s Directorate of Defense,
on the other hand, simply listed cyberattacks and hybrid warfare as key threats to develop
a capacity to defend against in its Defence Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond (2017, 12).
In the development of a cyberapparatus, it might seem logical to start by assigning
an existing agency with cybersecurity responsibilities and then eventually develop a new
specialized unit to deal with cyberthreats. Nations also might start by developing smaller
specialized units and then elevate them into separate commands or even branches. Historical
examples of the development of air power and space capabilities demonstrate this evolution.
Formed as part of the U.S. Army in 1907, U.S. Army Air Corps eventually became the
aerial warfare service component (1926-1941) and received even greater autonomy from the
Army’s middle-level command structure when it became the United States Army Air Forces
(USAAF) in 1941. In 1947, USAAF turned into the U.S. Air Force (USAF), signaling the
establishment of a separate branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. The Space Force was initially
established within the Air Force Space Command in 1982 and became an independent
military branch in 2019. Similar evolution takes place within the development of military
cyberapparatuses. For example, Argentina created Computer Science Troops within its
Armed Forces in 2005 and established a Joint Cyber Defense Command in 2014. Established
under the U.S. Strategic Command in 2009, the U.S. Cyber Command was elevated to the
10th combatant command in 2018. While these evolutionary developments shed light on how
countries increase their operational cybercapacity, they lie beyond the scope of this research
that aims to explain the initiation of state military cyberapparatuses.
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3.2 Theory of Complementarity of Military
Cybercapacity
I view the development of initial military cyberapparatuses as an example of capacity
diffusion affected by how a country’s allies initiate the development of their own
cyberapparatuses. To maximize their security against common threats in the information
age, nations consider the potential contributions of their allies before they decide how to
start publicly developing their military cybercapacity.5 What determines this choice?
The theory of free-riding in military alliances argues that defense is a public good and
as such its benefits are available for consumption to all allies, even to those that do not
necessarily contribute to its production (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). This theory makes
the following two predictions about ally behavior. First, larger allies contribute more to
defense spending (e.g., the Unites States’ disproportionately large contribution of its defense
spending to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)). Second, it is easier for
smaller allies to under-contribute to the alliance without noticeably affecting the alliance’s
overall capacity (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Palmer 1990; Sandler 1993). As a result, the
smaller the ally, the more likely it is to free-ride. Plümper and Neumayer (2015) provide a
modification to this prediction by showing that while the vast majority of smaller NATO
allies are free-riders, the extent of free-riding is not a function of country size—the relatively
larger small NATO allies do not free-ride any less than the smallest NATO allies.
By applying the theory of free-riding to the development of military cybercapabilities,
we should see: (1) that the lower-cost option (“new responsibility”) is the dominant strategy
for all but the largest/wealthiest alliance members, and (2) that smaller allies are more
5 Since cyberoperations are often used along with or to substitute military operations, states do not
necessarily form new military alliances to deal with these threats. Instead they tend to add this new
domain to their existing agreements, as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did when it announced
cyberspace as a new operational domain in 2016.
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likely to free-ride and adopt the lower-cost option. Figure 3.2, which displays the public
development of military cybercapacity by NATO members, demonstrates that these two
free-riding theories do not necessarily hold. While the United States and the United Kingdom
started the development of their public military cybercapacities with new agencies, other
wealthy NATO partners, such as France, Canada and Germany, preferred assigning new
responsibilities to existing agencies. Some smaller allies, such as Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria,
which should have assigned existing military agencies with new cybersecurity responsibilities
(according to the free-riding theory), developed brand new agencies.
Why does the free-riding theory not completely explain the behavior of military allies
when it comes to the development of capability in the cyber domain? Since nations want
to maximize their cumulative operational cybercapacity, I argue that complementarity of a
nation’s capabilities and its allies’ capabilities better explains this behavior and guides how
nations start to publicly acquire their military cybercapacity. Building a new unit versus
assigning cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing agency, to some extent, resembles the
choice between acquiring arms or relying on allies’ arms. If the country’s allies assigned
cybersecurity responsibilities to military agencies, then they are able to produce additional
security quickly; the efficiency of this capability, however, might be in question. To increase
the strength of the alliance’s overall security, the state is more likely to develop a new
military cybersecurity unit. As the nations’ allies have already acquired some sort of military
cybercapacity, the nation can take its time and focus on the production of a more reliable and
efficient capability in its newly established agency. The opposite direction of this relationship
is also true. If the nations’ allies have already created new cybersecurity units, then the
nation has less incentive to create a brand-new unit as it can rely on its allies for protection.
But to reassure its allies that it is willing to contribute its fair share, the nation is likely
to assign cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing agency. In either case, the nation
increases the alliance’s overall security and strengthens the signal of the alliance’s overall
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military cybercapability.
Moreover, fear of abandonment by a strong partner drives a weak partner’s desire to
increase its value to an alliance (Snyder 1984a). For instance, after the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) announced cyberspace to be a new operational domain, Estonia was
one of the few nations that rapidly started developing offensive cybercapabilities for NATO
(Hankewitz 2018). Estonia also followed its NATO partners’ lead on the disclosure of its
offensive capabilities and its stand on the applicability of international law to cyberspace:
“Estonia does not deny possession of offensive capabilities, the same way like other NATO
Allies do. Estonia is also very clear that the use of any retaliation measures/offensive
capabilities will be introduced in accordance with international law, e.g., Article 51 of the
UN Charter” (Kostyuk 2019b: #42). While smaller, less resourceful nations are not able to
match their allies’ capability, this does not prevent them from complementing their allies’
actions. Their smaller bureaucracies might allow them to more efficiently create new military
cybersecurity units, even if these units are of a significantly smaller size. Alternatively,
weaker allies might be content with the larger ally’s anticipated protection, and simply
assign responsibility to existing agencies.
Using the theory of complementary of military cybercapacity discussed above, I derive
the following two hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1a: Assignment of a new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing
military agency by a country’s allies in year t − 1 increases the likelihood that the
country creates a new military cybersecurity unit in year t.
• Hypothesis 1b: Creation of a military cybersecurity agency by a country’s allies
in year t − 1 increases the likelihood that the country assigns a new cybersecurity
responsibility to an existing military agency in year t.
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3.3 Alternative Explanations
I also considers a number of alternative explanations that might drive the recent global
spread of military cybersecurity units, such as cultural similarity, expert communities, foreign
policy preferences, geography, prestige, and regime type. My results demonstrate that none of
these alternative explanations are correlated with a country’s choice to develop its military
cybersecurity apparatus.
Alternative Explanation 1: Cultural Similarity
Since cybersecurity is a rather novel topic, national leaders tend to operate in
poor-information environments when devising their military cybersecurity apparatus. The
natural place to look for relevant information is the military cybersecurity organizations
created by nations that share similar cultural contexts (Simmons and Elkins 2004, 175).
But given the ease of communication in the globalized world, I argue that cultural similarity
is not a defining factor of how countries choose to publicly signal the initiation of their
military cyberapparatuses. Figure 1.2, which displays the spread of military cybersecurity
units from 1999 to 2018, provides further evidence for this claim. As a result, I expect
that the development of military cyberapparatuses by the country’s linguistic partners to be
either negatively correlated or not correlated with the country’s choice to develop its military
cybersecurity apparatus.
Alternative Explanation 2: Expert Communities
Information exchanges drive diffusion of various sociological processes (Axelrod 1997; Rogers
1995). Such exchanges on the topic of military cybercapacity can take place between
governments either on a bilateral basis or on a multilateral basis in various international
forums. These multilateral exchanges may openly advocate for specialization. For instance
after the 1999 Kosovo bombing and the expansion of the alliances in the early 2000’s, NATO
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began to aggressively push for the development of niche capabilities to more efficiently pool
resources from smaller members for out-of-area operations. Specifically, the Czech Republic
specialized in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense (CBRN), Hungary specia-
lized in engineer troops, and Denmark focused on sealift. As these examples illustrate,
smaller nations specialize in different types of conventional military capabilities. Such
specialization is not the case for military cybercapacity (at least for now). If specialization
influenced the choice between a new responsibility and a new agency, then countries would
have developed different operational cybercapacities and would have created a variety of new
cybersecurity units (e.g., within navy, army, etc.). This, however, is not the case—nations
generally develop cyberoperations units within its armed forces tasked with the rather general
missions of conducting combat activities in cyberspace and taking part in allied operations.
Alternative Explanation 3: Foreign Policy Preferences
Since foreign policy interests are influential in alliance formation (Gibler and Rider 2004),
some might argue that such interests might extend outside of military alliances to other
non-military partnerships that also shape foreign policy preferences, such as voting blocs
formed in the United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) and trading partners. Since
neither of these partnerships have any relationship to cybersecurity, I expect them to be
either negatively correlated or not correlated with the country’s choice to develop its military
cybersecurity apparatus.
Alternative Explanation 4: Geography
Countries develop their military cybercapabilities to fight wars. Most international conflicts
occur within a limited set of dyads—“interstate rivals” (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Lemke and
Reed 2001). Contiguity (Boulding 1962; Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Hensel et al. 2000; Senese
2005) and claims over territory (Hensel et al. 2000; Huth 2009; Vasquez 1995, 2001, 2009)
74
are correlates with escalation. Moreover, conflicts over territory between contiguous states
are more likely to re-emerge (Hensel 1994; Stinnett and Diehl 2001). Using this logic, the
development of military cybercapacity by a country’s geographic neighbors might motivate
the country to develop its own capacity. Given how easy it is to attack adversaries via cyber
means, I argue that geographical constraints should be less of a concern for the development
of military cybercapacity than it is for the development of conventional military capacity.
Alternative Explanation 5: Prestige
Countries’ maintenance of technologically sophisticated militaries “symbolize modernity,
efficacy, and independence” (Suchman and Eyre 1992). Using this logic, the creation
of military cybercapacity might signal “modern behavior” and improve the country’s
international status or prestige (Sagan 1997). It can also fulfill a government’s need to
appear legitimate in the eyes of its constituency and the international community (Fordham
and Asal 2007).
Alternative Explanation 6: Regime Type
I consider two possible effects of regime type. First, the inherently transparent nature
of democracies might motivate democratic leaders to publicly signal state cybercapacity.
As one of my interviewees put it, “as any democracy, Estonia remains open about its
cybercapabilities as it is [a] reasonable” thing to do (Kostyuk 2019b: #42). Terrorism
literature argues that the feeling of security causes citizen preferences to align with
“observable” counter-terrorism measures and motivates governments to “allocate resources
to observable counter-terror” (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 9). While this might suggest why
democracies are more likely to publicly signal its military cybercapacity than autocracies,
it does not explain the choices countries make when they initiate the development of their
military cybersecurity apparatuses.
Second, Gartzke and Weisiger (2013); Lai and Reiter (2000); Smith (1995) demonstrate
75
that states with similar identities—a regime type in this case—tend to co-ally. These nations
are more likely to cooperate with each other and learn from each other. Using this logic,
countries with the same regime type are more likely to follow each other’s public initiation
of a military cybersecurity apparatus.
Alternative Explanation 7: Threat Environment
The threat environment is an important factor to consider as it has been one of the main
drivers of the proliferation of non-cyber military capabilities, such as nuclear weapons (Jo
and Gartzke 2007), civil space capabilities (Early 2014), and drones (Fuhrmann and Horowitz
2017). The lack of international regulations on the use of offensive cybercapabilities might
make nations insecure, motivating them to develop cybercapabilities in response to their
rivals developing and using such capabilities (Buchanan 2017; Deibert 2011). Given the
complementarity of cyberoperations and conventional operations (Kostyuk and Gartzke
2019), nations might also react to conventional threats that involve “an explicit threat,
display, or use of force” (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). Under this imminent sense of
threat, national leaders might be more likely to send a firm signal to their adversaries about
their readiness to respond to attacks.
There are a number of alternative explanations that I do not directly test in this study.
Kier (1997), for instance, shows that a state’s unique military culture explains its choice of
military doctrine. Other scholars point to bureaucratic and organizational factors as drivers
of military innovations (Grissom 2008) and military effectiveness (Brooks 2007). One might
expect that these factors drive the initiation of a military cybersecurity apparatus. Yet
it is infeasible to operationalize many of these variables with a quantitative cross-national
time-series design.
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3.4 Data
Dependent Variable: Military Cybersecurity Units. I collected the first of its kind,
comprehensive cross-national, time-series data set on State Cybersecurity Organizations
(SCO) that contains information on more than 2,700 organizations responsible for dealing
with various aspects of cybersecurity from 203 countries between 1999 and 2018. SCO
distinguishes between different civilian, intelligence, and military agencies. For this project,
I only use military agencies.
This data set includes information on when a military agency became responsible for
cybersecurity or when a country created new units. Since I am interested in public signaling
of military cybercapacity, I record the date when the information about the creation of
a new unit or an assignment of a new responsibility became public. Generally, countries
identify changes to their military cybersecurity apparatuses in announcements, press releases,
updated or new military doctrines, or national cybersecurity strategies. But sometimes, the
actual date of the agency creation is different from the public one. This can happen when
a unit, for instance, conducts cyberoperations secretly and does not publicly announce its
existence or purpose. For instance, information about China’s military cybercapacity became
widely known with public attribution when the Mandiant report published evidence that
linked a cyberespionage campaign to China’s 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department (McWhorter 2013). To make sure
that my sample contains the most relevant information, I consulted country cybersecurity
experts,6 primary sources7 and secondary sources.8
6 Section 3.8 of Appendix 3.8 briefly describes the interviews of cybersecurity experts that I conducted for
this project.
7 SCO includes contact information and a website for each of the recorded agencies, if such information
is available. In cases when researchers found competing information from various sources, they made an
attempt to contact the agency itself to clarify which information should be recorded in SCO.
8 Some of my secondary resources include country-specific reports on the state of their cybersecurity,
databases created by the international organizations, such as the ITU, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and various outlets.
77
Figure 3.3: Diffusion of Military Cybercapacity (1999-2018)
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Since I focus on the 1999-2018 period in my analysis, I only include information on
sixty-nine military agencies developed during this time. Thirty-eight countries assigned
new responsibilities to existing agencies, including Hungary and India, which assigned the
new responsibilities to their Ministries of Defense in 2013 and at least 2004, respectively.
Thirty-one countries created new agencies, including Canada in 2011 when it created the
Directorate of Cybernetics under the Canadian Armed Forces. Figure 3.3 displays how this
choice evolved over time. By the end of 2009, militaries or the Departments of Defense
of nineteen nations have been dealing in some capacity with cybersecurity; eleven of them
assigned the new responsibility of handling this new domain to existing agencies (the top
left plot of Figure 3.3) and eight of them created new units (the top right plot of Figure 3.3).
From 2010 until the end of 2014, sixteen more nations assigned new responsibilities to existing
agencies (the middle left plot of Figure 3.3) and sixteen more nations created new units (the
middle right plot of Figure 3.3). From 2015 until the end of 2018, eleven more nations
assigned new responsibilities to existing agencies (the bottom left plot of Figure 3.3) and
nine more nations created new units (the bottom right plot of Figure 3.3).
Since I am interested in explaining the choice that a country has to make, my dependent
variable receives a “1” when a country assigns an existing military unit to be responsible
for cybersecurity (Assign), and a “2” when the country creates a new military cybersecurity
agency (Create).
Main Predictor: Alliances. The most popularly used datasets on military alliances are Leeds
et al. (2002)’s Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions and Correlates of War (COW)
Project’s data on formal alliances (version 4.1) (Gibler 2008). Since the period in which
I am interested is quite recent, ATOP Alliance data set, which contains a more detailed
description of recent events and is more comprehensive, is more suitable for my analysis.9 I
9 Section 3.8 of Appendix 3.8 provides a detailed overview of both datasets and further expands on reasons
of why I use ATOP over COW Alliances.
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use SCO, which records all instances of the assignment of new cybersecurity responsibilities
to existing military agencies and new military cybersecurity unit creation during the studied
period, and military allies from ATOP to record a weighted average effect of the assignment
of cybersecurity responsibilities to existing agencies (New Responsibilities Weighted by
Allies) or the creation of new military cybersecurity units (New Agencies Weighted by
Allies) by the country’s allies in a period prior to the country initiating its military
cybersecurity apparatus.10
Measures of Alternative Explanations. I use Graham and Tucker (2019)’s World Economics
and Politics Dataverse (WEPD) to create dummy variable that takes a value of “1” when two
nations share the same official language (Linguistic Partners). To estimate the weighted
average effects of the foreign preferences expressed at the UNGA, I use Voeten, Strezhnev
and Bailey (2017)’s data on the UNGA resolution votes (UN Partners). I use the following
three measures of a country’s trading partners to account for their effect: (1) the annual
number of bilateral trade agreements between two countries, taken from the World Bank
(Trading Partners (1)); (2) the annual number of signed bilateral investment treaties
between two nations from Graham and Tucker (2019) (Trading Partners (2)); and (3)
the annual number of signed preferential trade agreements from Graham and Tucker (2019)
(Trading Partners (3)).
I identify the country’s geographic neighbors using the inverse distance between the two
capitals (Neighbors (1)) and a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share
a land border or are separated by at most 100 miles of water (Neighbors (2)) (Stinnett et al.
2002). To investigate the effect of expert communities in multilateral exchanges, I consider
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) whose primarily focus is security, defense, and peace
from Pevehouse et al. (2019)’s data set. I use the country’s membership in these IGOs to
measure the effect of prestige on the creation of a new cybersecurity military apparatus. To
10 Section 3.5 explains how I created this weighted average effect.
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consider the effect of the regime type, I use Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV
score to create a dummy variable that takes the value of a “0” if this score is less than six
representing an autocracy, and “1,” if this score is more than equal to six representing a
democracy (Democracy).
I use the following three measures of the cyberthreat environment. First is the number
Internet users in a country as a percentage of the country’s total population, taken
from the World Bank (Internet Users).11 Second is the cumulative number of large,
known cybercampaigns12 that a country experienced in all years preceding its continued
development of its military cyberapparatus (Target) from Valeriano and Maness (2018)’s
Dyadic Cyber Incident Dataset (DCID) (version 1.5).13 Third is the weighted average
effects of newly-assigned responsibilities and newly-created units developed by the country’s
adversaries in a period prior to the country initiating development of its own military
cybersecurity apparatus (New Responsibilities/Agencies Weighted by Adversaries).
To create these effects, I use SCO and Maoz (2005)’s data on Militarized Interstate Disputes
(MID) that records “interactions between or among states involving threats to use military
force, of military force, or actual uses of military force” to identify the country’s adversaries.14
To measure conventional military threats, I use the MID data to create the total number of
MIDs that the country experienced in the year preceding its choice to cybermilitarize (Total
MIDs) (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). Section 3.8 of Appendix 3.8 provides a detailed
11 I use logarithmic transformations to address the variable’s skewed distribution.
12 Valeriano and Maness (2018) defines cybercampaigns as an accumulation of cyberattacks meant to achieve
strategically important goals.
13 Section 3.8 of Appendix 3.8 provides a detailed explanation of this data set and its limitations.
14 Because the MID data treats incidents that involve police and border control as a use of force (e.g.,
disputes on the U.S.-Canadian border that involve fishing vessels), I exclude such events from the final
data set by removing events with an outcome labeled as “released (for seizure).” I have also considered
two alternative datasets to serve as a proxy for a country’s threat environment. First is Klein, Goertz
and Diehl (2006)’s data on state rivalries; it is not suitable for this analysis because it was last updated
in 2001. Second is the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data (version 12) that contains information on
476 international crises during 1918-2015 (Brecher, Wilkenfeld et al. 1997; Brecher et al. 2016). Because
political acts, such as “subversion, alliance formation by adversaries, diplomatic sanctions, severance of
diplomatic relations, [or] violation of treaty,” trigger about a quarter of foreign policy crises in the ICB
data, I omit from using it in my analysis (Hewitt 2003, 671-672).
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overview of how I created additional variables that account for the alternative explanations.
Additional Controls. Besides these variables, I also account for two additional controls: (1) a
country’s GDP per capita as a proxy for its wealth, taken from the World Bank, as a measure
of the country’s wealth (GDP_PerCapita); and (2) a number of alliances the country is part of
in a given year, taken from ATOP (Number of Alliances). I hypothesize that an increase
in a country’s wealth and a number of alliances it has is positively correlated with its decision
to develop its military cyberapparatus.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Lagged network-weighted effects. To identify the effect of the agencies developed by a
country’s “neighbors” I create lagged network-weighted effects. Instead of lagging the value
of the dependent unit one variable at a time and, as a result, adding a significant number
of regressors to my model, I use lagged network-weighted effects that capture the “weighted
average of the dependent variable in the actor’s ‘neighborhood” ’ (Simmons and Elkins 2004,
178). I define such effects for a country i as:
Wi ∗ y−i(t) :=
∑
j 6=i
Wi,j(t)yj(t), (3.1)
where, Wi,j(t) is an N ×N spatial weights matrix that capture’s country i’s neighborhood.
Each element inWi,j measures various relationships between any two nations (e.g., alliances,
trading relationship).
∑
j 6=iWi,j captures the weight of the relationship between these two
nations relative to the nation’s total relationships with other nations in a given area of
international relations. This weight captures the importance of a neighbor’s influence on this
country. y−i(t) represents whether a country’s “neighbor” −i assigned a new responsibility
to an existing military agency or created a new unit. Combined, Wi ∗ y−i(t) captures the
total effect of the country’s “neighbors” that developed or did not develop their military
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Figure 3.4: Competing Risks Scheme
cybersecurity apparatuses.
Method: Competing Risks Event History Model. I use a competing-risks event
history model.15 Specifically, I employ a Cox Proportional-Hazards (CPH) model that tests
for conditions that create a greater likelihood that a country initiates the development of
its military cybersecurity apparatus. I use a competing-risks model because the country
chooses to either create: (1) a new responsibility or (2) a new unit (Figure 3.4). My unit of
analysis is the country-year. My analysis begins in 1999 when the United States government
discovered that it had been victim of the first advanced persistent threat (APT)16 —the
Moonlight Maze, which was a data breach that affected various U.S. government agencies and
defense contractors—and ends in 2018. If a country has not started developing its military
cybersecurity apparatus by December 31, 2018, it is right-censored in my data set. Since
many of the covariates change over time, I use interval censoring to capture time-varying
covariates (Therneau and Grambsch 2000).
I fit the following competing-risks CPH models, which examines the effect of
15 Event history models have been widely used in political science to explain diffusion processes (Berry and
Berry 1990; Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons, Lloyd and Stewart
2018).
16 APTs are cyberoperations during which a state-sponsored group gains unauthorized access to a computer
network and remains undetected for some time.
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time-varying and time-invariant covariates on the country’s decision to develop its military
cyberapparatus. Equation 3.2 presents the log hazard that stands for the relative risk of the
country assigning a new responsibility to an existing military agency.
log(Hy(t;Xi, y, z)) = Wi ∗ y−i([t− 1])β1 +Wi ∗ z([t− 1])β2 +Xi([t− 1])β3 + logλy(t), (3.2)
where: log(Hy(t;Xi([t − 1]), yi([t − 1]))) is the log hazard that stands for the relative
risk of country i assigning a new responsibility to an existing military agency at time t;
Wi ∗ y−i([t − 1]) is an n × n spatial weights matrix, explained above, that represents a
dispersion variable which stands for a convolution of the country’s “neighbors” that assign
new responsibilities to existing military agencies; Wi ∗ z−i([t− 1]) is an n×n spatial weights
matrix that represents a dispersion variable which stands for a convolution of the country’s
“neighbors” that create new military military units; Xi([t−1]) = [x1i([t− 1]), . . . , xki([t− 1])]′
is a matrix of k exogenous variables; β3 is a three-dimensional vector of coefficients; and
logλ(t) is baseline hazard. As explained earlier, I included the following non-diffusion
regressors: (1) the number of the country’s Internet users as a percentage of its total
population in a given year (Int_Users); (2) the country’s GDP per capita in a given year
(GDP_PerCapita); and (3) the country’s regime type (Democracy). I also use robust standard
errors with clustering on the countries to account for time-varying coefficients. Lastly, to
make my results easy to interpret, I standardize all continuous explanatory variables (all
variables except Democracy).
Equation 3.3 presents the log hazard that stands for the relative risk of the country
creating a new military unit.
log(Hz(t;Xi, y, z)) = Wi ∗ y([t− 1])β1 +Wi ∗ z([t− 1])β2 +Xi([t− 1])β3 + logλz(t), (3.3)
where: log(Hz(t;Xi([t− 1]), yi([t− 1]))) is the log hazard that stands for the relative risk of
country i creating a new military agency at time t; and the rest of the variables are explained
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above in Equation 3.2.
3.6 Findings
My central finding is that a country’s choice of how to develop its military cyberapparatus
is most consistently explained by the choices its allies made when publicly developing their
own military cybercapability. The results summarized in Tables 3.1-3.3 suggest that the
country’s desire to complement its military cybercapabilities with those of its allies is likely
a major driver of the diffusion of public military cybercapacity.
Table 3.1 displays results from models that consider only the influence of allies and
the threat environment. Model 1, which presents a base model giving the effect of allies’
cyberapparatuses, shows that both the development of new agencies and the assignment
of old agencies with new responsibilities are positively correlated with Assign and Create.
With additional controls (Model 2), we clearly start seeing the complementarity of allies: the
country’s allies that assigned new responsibilities are positively correlated with the country’s
decision to create a new military cybersecurity unit and the country’s allies that created new
agencies are positively correlated with the country’s decision to assign a new responsibility
to an existing military agency.
In addition to allies’ cyberapparatuses, Models 3-6 of Table 3.1 also consider the
effect of the country’s threat environment on its decision to publicly develop its military
cybercapacity. Model 3 shows that conventional threats are not correlated with Assign but
are positively correlated with Create. This result remains consistent across all the models
in Tables 3.1 and 3.3 and might point to the complementarity of conventional and digital
fronts. Models 4-6 consider different measures of the cyberthreat environment. Model 4
shows that the cumulative number of attacks a country suffered in the years before it begins
developing its military cyberapparatus (Target) is not correlated with Assign and Create.
Internet Users is positively correlated with Assign and Create (Model 5). And New
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Table 3.1: Influence of allies and threat environment on the development of public military
capacity (hazard ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Base Base+controls
Conven-
tional
threats
Target
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Internet
Users
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Adversarial
Cyberapparatus
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Dependent Variable: Assign
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Allies 1.138
∗∗∗ 1.030 1.003 1.00 0.984 1.022
(1.04,
1.25)
(0.82,
1.29)
(0.77,
1.30)
(0.77,
1.31)
(0.77,
1.26)
(0.80,
1.30)
New Agencies
Weighted by Allies 1.508
∗∗∗ 1.706∗∗∗ 1.697∗∗∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 1.662∗∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗
(1.21,
1.88)
(1.26,
2.30)
(1.26,
2.29)
(1.26,
2.28)
(1.18,
2.34)
(1.26,
2.33)
Number of Alliances —— 1.701∗ 1.593∗ 1.593∗ 1.736∗∗ 1.628∗
(0.97,
2.98)
(0.94,
2.71)
(0.94,
2.68)
(1.01,
2.98)
(0.95,
2.80)
GDP_PerCapita (log) —— 2.384∗∗∗ 2.457∗∗∗ 2.457∗∗∗ —— 2.455∗∗∗
(1.67,
3.39)
(1.71,
3.53)
(1.71,
3.53)
(1.71,
3.52)
Total MIDs (log) —— —— 1.251 1.300 1.179 1.148
(0.87,
1.80)
(0.86,
1.97)
(0.80,
1.73)
(0.76,
1.73)
Target —— —— —— 0.883 —— ——
(0.56,
1.38)
Int_Users (log) —— —— —— —— ——
4.564∗∗∗
(2.03,
10.24)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Adversaries —— —— —— —— —— 1.141
∗
(0.99,132)
New Agencies
Weighted by Adversaries —— —— —— —— —— 0.131
(0.86,146)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
(a) Influence of Allies and Threat Environment on the Assignment of a New Cybersecurity
Responsibility to an Existing Military Agency
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Table 3.1: Influence of allies and threat environment on the development of public military
capacity (hazard ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Base Base+controls
Conven-
tional
threats
Target
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Internet
Users
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Adversarial
Cyberapparatus
as proxy for
cyberthreat
environment
Dependent Variable: Create
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Allies 1.238
∗∗∗ 1.292∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗
(1.08,
1.42)
(1.12,
1.48)
(1.13,
1.49)
(1.13, 1.49) (1.10, 1.45) (1.13, 1.51)
New Agencies
Weighted by Allies 1.220
∗∗∗ 1.233 1.21 1.21 1.158 1.211
(1.03,
1.45)
(0.93,
1.56)
(0.93,
1.56)
(0.85, 1.56) (0.91, 1.61)
Number of Alliances —— 2.476∗∗∗ 1.998∗∗ 1.998∗∗ 2.148∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗
(1.30,4.69) (1.03,3.29) (1.03,3.89) (1.12,4.13) (1.05,4.00)
GDP_PerCapita (log) —— 2.093∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ —— 2.295∗∗∗
(1.44,3.04) (1.51,3.28) (1.51,3.28) (1.54,3.42)
Total MIDs (log) —— —— 1.658∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗ 1.500∗∗
(1.11, 2.45) (1.14, 2.16) (1.01, 2.23)
Target —— —— —— 1.010 —— ——
(0.81, 1.26)
Int_Users (log) —— —— —— —— 3.825∗∗∗ ——
(2.02,7.25)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Adversaries —— —— —— —— —— 1.186
∗∗∗
(0.88,1.46)
New Agencies
Weighted by Adversaries —— —— —— —— —— 1.134
(1.08,1.30)
Additional Controls —— X X X X X
Clustering by country X X X X X X
Concordance 0.689 0.777 0.791 0.792 0.813 0.794
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuses by creating a brand new unit. Results are from a Competing Risks Cox Proportional-Hazards Model.
The reported values are the hazard ratios and their confidence intervals. There are 2,727 observations and 69 events.
Additional controls include: Democracy, IGO Membership. They are no statistically significant across all models. All
variables but Democracy are standardized. All results based on two-tailed tests. Models with Internet Users do not
include GDP Per Capita because the two variables are highly correlated. See Appendix 3.8 for more details and
a more detailed presentation of results. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(b) Influence of Allies and Threat Environment on the Creation of a New Military Cybersecurity
Agency
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Responsibilities Weighted by Adversaries marginally increase the state’s likelihood
of developing its military cyberapparatus (Model 6). This result might suggest that the
perception of cyberthreats is more influential than the cyberattacks that the country suffered.
Lastly, the models in Table 3.1 also show a robust positive correlation between the
country’s wealth (GDP Per Capita) and the number of alliances of which it is a member
(Number of Alliances) and its decision to develop its military cyberapparatus.
Robustness Tests: Alternative Network Measures. I consider a number of alternative
definitions of networks through which diffusion of military cybercapacity can occur.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3, which present the obtained results, further demonstrate support for
the theory of complementarity in alliances.
Model 1 in Table 3.2, which tests the cultural similarity explanation, demonstrates that
new agencies developed by a country’s linguistic partners are negatively correlated with its
public development of a military cybersecurity apparatus. This result is not surprising,
given the few widely-spoken languages in this interconnected world. Models 2-5 in Table 3.2
tests the similarity in foreign policy preferences as an alternative explanation of diffusion of
military cybercapacity. Model 2, which considers the effect of UN partners, demonstrates
that the agencies developed by such partners are negatively correlated with Assign and have
no effect on Create. Models 3-5 show that new cybersecurity responsibilities assigned to
existing military agencies of the country’s trading partners are positively correlated with the
country’s choice to create a new military cybersecurity unit. This finding is robust across
different specifications of trading partners. The results in Models 3-5, which demonstrate
continued importance of alliances in the development of a country’s military cyberapparatus
even after controlling for other foreign policy preferences, provide further empirical support
for the theory of complementarity in alliances.
This theory finds additional empirical support when testing it against a number of
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Table 3.2: Robustness of diffusion via military cyberapparatuses of allies: Alternative network
measures (hazard ratios)
(a) Influence of Cultural Similarity and Foreign Policy Preferences on the Assignment of a New
Cybersecurity Responsibility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Cultural Similarity Foreign Policy Preferences
Dependent Variable: Assign
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Allies
0.82 0.54 0.96 0.90 0.95
(-0.74, 0.34) (-1.6, 0.37) (-0.33, 0.26) (-0.63, 0.41) (-0.35, 0.25)
New Agencies Weighted by
Allies
1.64*** 1.65*** 1.75*** 1.72*** 1.75****
(0.17, 0.82) (0.14, 0.85) (0.24, 0.88) (0.27, 0.82) (0.23, 0.89)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Linguistic
Partners
0.46 —— —— —— ——
(-2.08, 0.54)
New Agencies Weighted by
Linguistic Partners
0.17*** —— —— —— ——
(-3.04,
-0.46)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by UN Partners
—— 0.98 —— —— ——
(-1.08, 1.03)
New Agencies Weighted by UN
Partners
—— 0.92*** —— —— ——
(-0.14,
-0.03)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Trade Partners
(1)
—— —— 0.77** —— ——
(-0.49,
-0.04)
New Agencies Weighted by
Trade Partners (1)
—— —— 0.84 —— ——
(-0.59, 0.24)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Trade Partners
(2)
—— —— —— 1.15 ——
(-0.11, 0.39)
New Agencies Weighted by
Trade Partners (2)
—— —— —— 0.46*** ——
(-1.24, -0.3)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Trade Partners
(3)
—— —— —— —— 0.94
(-0.35, 0.23)
New Agencies Weighted by
Trade Partners (3)
—— —— —— —— 0.96
(-0.23, 0.15)
Internet Users (log) 1.18*** 1.14*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.18***
(0.1, 0.24) (0.05, 0.2) (0.1, 0.23) (0.09, 0.22) (0.09, 0.23)
Number of Alliances 1.88** 1.47 1.64* 1.70** 1.61*
(0.1, 1.16) (-0.17, 0.94) (-0.04, 1.02) (0.02, 1.03) (-0.06, 1.02)
Total MIDs (log) 1.22 1.36** 1.26 1.29 1.24
(-0.16, 0.55) (0.02, 0.59) (-0.1, 0.56) (-0.05, 0.56) (-0.12, 0.55)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
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Table 3.2: Robustness of diffusion via military cyberapparatuses of allies: Alternative network
measures (hazard ratios)
(b) Influence of Cultural Similarity and Foreign Policy Preferences on the Assignment of a New
Cybersecurity Responsibility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Cultural Similarity Foreign Policy Preferences
Dependent Variable: Create
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Allies
1.18** 1.23*** 1.32**** 1.28**** 1.23***
(0.02, 0.32) (0.05, 0.37) (0.11, 0.43) (0.1, 0.39) (0.07, 0.35)
New Agencies Weighted by
Allies
1.14 1.11 1.18 1.15 1.21
(-0.15, 0.4) (-0.31, 0.52) (-0.16, 0.49) (-0.13, 0.41) (-0.09, 0.48)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Linguistic
Partners
1.04 —— —— —— ——
(-0.08, 0.16)
New Agencies Weighted by
Linguistic Partners
0.31* —— —— —— ——
(-2.49, 0.14)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by UN Partners
—— 0.61 —— —— ——
(-1.77, 0.78)
New Agencies Weighted by UN
Partners
—— 1.00 —— —— ——
(-0.08, 0.09)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Trade Partners
(1)
—— —— 1.44** —— ——
(0.05, 0.68)
New Agencies Weighted by
Trade Partners (1)
—— —— 1.09 —— ——
(-0.62, 0.8)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Trade Partners
(2)
—— —— —— 1.23** ——
(0.02, 0.4)
New Agencies Weighted by
Trade Partners (2)
—— —— —— 1.27** ——
(0.01, 0.47)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Trade Partners
(3)
—— —— —— —— 1.31**
(0.03, 0.51)
New Agencies Weighted by
Trade Partners (3)
—— —— —— —— 0.78
(-0.6, 0.1)
Internet Users (log) 1.11*** 1.10*** 1.11*** 1.11*** 1.12***
(0.05, 0.16) (0.03, 0.16) (0.05, 0.16) (0.05, 0.16) (0.05, 0.17)
Number of Alliances 2.40*** 2.05** 2.20** 2.16** 2.13**
(0.21, 1.54) (0.1, 1.34) (0.18, 1.4) (0.15, 1.38) (0.14, 1.38)
Total MIDs (log) 1.61*** 1.63*** 1.59*** 1.62*** 1.59***
(0.14, 0.81) (0.16, 0.81) (0.13, 0.81) (0.15, 0.81) (0.13, 0.8)
Additional Controls X X X X X
Clustering by country X X X X X
Concordance 0.832 0.831 0.826 0.823 0.823
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuses by creating a brand new unit. Results are from a Competing Risks Cox Proportional-Hazards
Model. There are 2,727 observations and 69 events. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.3: Robustness of diffusion via military cyberapparatuses of allies: Alternative network
measures (hazard ratios)
(a) Influence of Expert Communities, Geography, and Regime Similartiy on the Assignment of a
New Cybersecurity Responsibility
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Expert Communities Geography Regime Similarity
Dependent Variable: Assign
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Allies
0.89 0.88 0.95 0.96 0.96
(-0.51, 0.29) (-0.53, 0.28) (-0.37, 0.27) (-0.36, 0.27) (-0.35, 0.26)
New Agencies Weighted by
Allies
1.74** 1.71*** 1.76**** 1.76**** 1.74***
(0.23, 0.89) (0.21, 0.86) (0.24, 0.89) (0.26, 0.87) (0.28, 0.83)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by IGO Partners
1.13 —— —— —— ——
(-0.3, 0.55)
New Agencies Weighted by
IGO Partners
0.99 —— —— —— ——
(-0.4, 0.39)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Neighbors (1)
—— 1.13 —— —— ——
(-0.4, 0.65)
New Agencies Weighted by
Neighbors (1)
—— 1.29 —— —— ——
(-0.25, 0.76)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Neighbors (2)
—— —— 0.89 —— ——
(-0.38, 0.14)
New Agencies Weighted by
Neighbors (2)
—— —— 0.70* —— ——
(-0.74, 0.02)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Regime Partners
(1)
—— —— —— 0.73 ——
(-0.9, 0.27)
New Agencies Weighted by
Regime Partners (1)
—— —— —— 0.94 ——
(-0.99, 0.86)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Regime Partners
(2)
—— —— —— —— 0.63
(-1.01, 0.09)
New Agencies Weighted by
Regime Partners (2)
—— —— —— —— 0.75
(-0.99, 0.41)
Internet Users (log) 1.17*** 1.16*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.18***
(0.09, 0.23) (0.08, 0.22) (0.1, 0.23) (0.1, 0.23) (0.1, 0.23)
Number of Alliances 1.60 1.56 1.71* 1.64* 1.65*
(-0.1, 1.04) (-0.1, 0.99) (0.01, 1.06) (-0.04, 1.03) (-0.04, 1.04)
Total MIDs (log) 1.27 1.28 1.27 1.24 1.24
(-0.08, 0.57) (-0.08, 0.57) (-0.09, 0.57) (-0.11, 0.54) (-0.12, 0.54)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
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Table 3.3: Robustness of diffusion via military cyberapparatuses of allies: Alternative network
measures (hazard ratios)
(b) Influence of Expert Communities, Geography, and Regime Similarity on the Assignment of a
New Cybersecurity Responsibility
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Expert Communities Geography Regime Similarity
Dependent Variable: Create
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Allies
1.28**** 1.18** 1.27*** 1.28**** 1.28****
(0.11, 0.38) (0.01, 0.33) (0.1, 0.38) (0.11, 0.39) (0.1, 0.39)
New Agencies Weighted by
Allies
1.16 1.06 1.20 1.19 1.20
(-0.18, 0.48) (-0.37, 0.49) (-0.11, 0.47) (-0.12, 0.46) (-0.11, 0.47)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by IGO Partners
1.44 —— —— —— ——
(-0.19, 0.91)
New Agencies Weighted by
IGO Partners
0.82 —— —— —— ——
(-1.22, 0.82)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Neighbors (1)
—— 1.83*** —— —— ——
(0.15, 1.06)
New Agencies Weighted by
Neighbors (1)
—— 1.12 —— —— ——
(-0.24, 0.45)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Neighbors (2)
—— —— 1.01 —— ——
(-0.19, 0.21)
New Agencies Weighted by
Neighbors (2)
—— —— 0.88 —— ——
(-0.41, 0.16)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Regime Partners
(1)
—— —— —— 0.87 ——
(-0.62, 0.33)
New Agencies Weighted by
Regime Partners (1)
—— —— —— 0.70 ——
(-1.52, 0.8)
New Responsibilities
Weighted by Regime Partners
(2)
—— —— —— —— 1.01
New Agencies Weighted by
Regime Partners (2)
—— —— —— —— 0.78
(-1.24, 0.74)
Internet Users (log) 1.10*** 1.09*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 1.12***
(0.04, 0.16) (0.02, 0.15) (0.05, 0.17) (0.05, 0.17) (0.05, 0.17)
Number of Alliances 2.07** 2.11** 2.09** 2.09** 2.06**
(0.07, 1.38) (0.15, 1.35) (0.11, 1.36) (0.11, 1.36) (0.11, 1.34)
Total MIDs (log) 1.69*** 1.76*** 1.64*** 1.60*** 1.61***
(0.17, 0.88) (0.21, 0.92) (0.16, 0.83) (0.14, 0.81) (0.15, 0.81)
Additional Controls X X X X X
Clustering by country X X X X X
Concordance 0.822 0.826 0.825 0.819 0.821
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuses by creating a brand new unit. There are 2,727 observations and 69 events. Additional controls
include: Democracy, IGO Membership. They are no statistically significant across all models. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
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additional alternative explanations in Table 3.3. Specifically, Model 6 finds no support for
the expert communities explanation. Expert communities might become more instrumental
beyond the initiation phase when countries start shaping up their military cyberapparatuses
and specialize in certain types of cybercapabilities. Models 7-8 in Table 3.3 find no robust
support for the influence of geographic neighbors, suggesting that similarly to language,
geographic proximity is an unimportant factor in the information age. The last alternative
explanation—regime similarity—also finds no support (Models 9-10 in Table 3.3). The lack
of robust empirical support for these alternative explanations provides further evidence for
the theory of complementarity in alliances.
In addition to the alternative network specifications, all models in Tables 3.2 and 3.3
include additional controls. Similar to the earlier obtained results (Table 3.1), all models
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate (1) a robust positive correlation between Internet
Users and both Assign and Create; (2) a robust positive correlation between Number
of Alliances and Create; and (3) a robust positive correlation between Total MIDs and
Create.
3.7 Discussion and Implications
This research asks a basic question: What drives a state’s decision to initiate the development
of its military cyberapparatus and how does the state decide to initiate it? It demonstrates
that a country’s allies play a vital role. The responses to allied behavior follow the logic
of complementarity. If the country’s allies signal toughness by creating new units, then
the country may not need to do so and assigns cybersecurity responsibilities to an existing
military agency. But if the country’s allies take a softer approach by assigning cybersecurity
responsibilities to an existing military agencies, then the country has an added incentive to
create a new cybersecurity agency in order to signal toughness.
The genuineness of this signal, however, is the question. Even when a nation openly
93
speaks about possetting offensive capabilities, its leadership might prefer using more
traditional tools whose value does not diminish after the first use to help their allies.
Moreover, allies are reluctant to share their offensive capabilities. Since the nature of
cyberoperations requires more secrecy than traditional capabilities, even allies as close as
the FiveEye members tend not to completely share their offensive cybercapabilities (Kostyuk
2019b: # 56, 57). Countries are also reluctant to share their military defensive systems with
their allies. Even in the cases when these systems can be replicated which is easier said than
done, countries are particularly careful in sharing them with their allies due to the fear of a
leak or the risk of the systems being kept insecure.
My findings also demonstrate that an increase in the number of militarized interstate
disputes that the country suffered in a prior year increases the likelihood that it creates a
new military cybersecurity unit this year. This finding points to the fact that countries might
be developing their military cybercapabilities to respond to conventional threats. Further
research is needed to investigate whether an increase in MIDs leads to an increase of the
country’s conventional military capability. If it does not, this finding might point to the
substitutability of conventional and military tools.
As I presented the first comprehensive analysis of a complex political phenomenon, future
research should delve further into this topic. Several avenues of research present themselves.
First is the continued development of military cybercapability. While this research only
looks at the country’s initial step, countries tend not to stop right there. For instance,
India’s Ministry of Defense started dealing with cybersecurity since at least 2004 and it
did not create the Defense Cyber Agency within this ministry until 2019. The Lithuanian
Ministry of National Defence became responsible for cybersecurity in 2008, but it did not
create the Cyber Security and Information Technology Department until 2014. While the
author attempted to apply a multi-state event history model to understand what drives
the country’s decision to transition from assigning a new responsibility to creating a new
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unit, currently available data is not sufficient to fully explain this complex phenomenon.
Researchers should further pursue this question when such data becomes available.
Second is unit size and actual capacity. While current research remains agnostic to
the unit size, future research should understand how the effect of a signal changes based
on the unit type and purpose. How do nations perceive the fact that the Dutch Ministry
of Defense created its Joint Information Facility Command (JIVC) in 2012 and its Joint
Sigint Cyber Unit (JSCU) in 2014? What if a nation does not attempt to send a signal
and simply restructures its bureaucracy? I would expect that even if these re-organizational
changes are not intended to send a signal, other nations will inherently update their existing
beliefs about the state’s cybercapability. Specifically, unit restructuring often results in an
increased capacity because it achieves better integration of capabilities and coordination
(Kostyuk 2019b: #18).
Moreover, because of the limitation of its design, this research was not able to delve into
military culture or organizational factors that drive military innovation. Future qualitative
studies should carefully evaluate how these factors contribute to the development of military
cyberapparatuses. Lastly, researchers should also look at the capability within and outside of
military agencies to investigate which agencies receive more weight when its comes to dealing
with cybersecurity challenges that often require intergovernmental cooperation. The choice
of making a specific ministry or agency responsible for cybersecurity is important because
different agencies have different weights when it comes to intergovernmental cooperation
meant to deal with security issues. “Prestige for historical reasons or legal prerogatives”
drive this weight (Kostyuk 2019b: # 23).
Much of our current understanding of international politics rests on the assumption that
state behavior is shaped by the threat of war and the pursuit of military capability. The
empirical study of politics thus depends on measures of capability, which play a pivotal role
in war causation, arms races, alliance formation, conflict duration, or crisis escalation, among
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others. While future research on military cybercapacity can add more nuanced explanations
of military effectiveness, innovation, force structure, alliance formation, and the outbreak
of war, we should also consider important questions regarding norms for cyberwarfare,
the obligations of states regarding the application of offensive cybercapabilities, and the
applicability of existing laws of war and norms on the use of force in cyberspace. Uncontrolled
capacity can lead to disastrous effect.
3.8 Appendix
Elite Interviews: Causes of Military Cybercapability
To investigate the factors that drive a country’s choice to create cyber offensive capabilities
in the form of military units, I conducted sixty-four interviews with cybersecurity experts
from twenty-five countries in 2018.17 Most of these experts either have a current or past
government affiliation. I personally conducted these interviews in person or via Skype or
email. Figure 3.5a displays the number of interviews I conducted in each country. The most
interviews I conducted in a given country was nine (in Estonia and Israel). Figure 3.5b
displays the total duration of my interviews by country. My interviews, on average, lasted
for about an hour, with the shortest interviews lasting for fifteen or thirty minutes. These
Figure 3.5: Summary of the Interviews
(a) Total Number of Interviews by Country (b) Total Duration by Country (in hours)
17 The IRB approval is #HUM00127749 (February 14, 2018).
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interviews point a few common themes that I explore in the theoretical section of the main
manuscript (Section 3.2).
Data
Data Sources: Threat Environment
Since countries can use military cybersecurity units to deal with conventional threats and
digital threats, I consider both kinds of threats in my analysis.
To consider the effect of conventional military threats, I use Maoz (2005)’s data on
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) to create the total number of MIDs that a country
experienced in the year preceding its choice to cyber-militarize (Total MIDs). Gochman and
Maoz (1984, 587) defines MIDs as “interactions between or among states involving threats
to use military force, of military force, or actual uses of military force.” Because the MID
data treats incidents that involve police and border control as a use of force (e.g., disputes
on the U.S.-Canadian border that involve fishing vessels), I exclude such events from the
final dataset by removing events with an outcome labeled as “released (for seizure).”
I also considered two alternative datasets to serve as a proxy for a country’s threat
environment. The first dataset is Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006)’s data on state rivalries,
which has only been updated until 2001 and is not suitable for my analysis, which focuses
on the 1999-2018 period. The second dataset is the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data
(version 12) that contains information on 476 international crises during 1918-2015 (Brecher,
Wilkenfeld et al. 1997; Brecher et al. 2016). There are two notable difference between an MID
and an international crisis: (1) perception, and (2) (the threat or) use of force. Perception
is the key in determining whether the situation is defined as a crisis. One party might
perceive a situation as an international crisis whereas an adversary might not perceive it as
a crisis. While an MID evolves from “an explicit threat, display, or use of force” Gochman
and Maoz (1984, 587), the threat or use of military force is not a necessary condition for a
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crisis to occur. Indeed, political acts, such as “subversion, alliance formation by adversaries,
diplomatic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, [or] violation of treaty,” trigger about
a quarter of foreign policy crises (Hewitt 2003, 671-672). These two distinctions indicate that
the events in the ICB dataset is not a good proxy for understanding the threat environment
in the context of this analysis.
Following Craig (2018), I use Valeriano and Maness 2018’s Dyadic Cyber Incident Dataset
(DCID) (version 1.5)18 as an alternative way to measure a country’s threat environment.
Using this data, I create the following two variables: (1) the cumulative number of large,
known cybercampaigns that a country experienced in all years preceding its change(s) of
a domestic military cybersecurity apparatus (Target); and (2) the cumulative number of
large, known cybercampaigns attributed to a country in all years preceding its change(s) of
a domestic military cybersecurity apparatus (Attacker).
There are two main criticisms of any dataset of cyberoperations. The first one—typical
for any conflict data—is reporting bias (Weidmann 2016). To address this concern, the DCID
authors apply a well-established practice in conflict studies—the use of multiple sources to
record an event. Despite this careful approach, reporting bias could be a valid concern for
a dataset that collects information on daily cyberopations but less of an issue for the DCID
data that records known, large cybercampaigns, defined as an accumulation of cyberattacks
meant to achieve strategically important goals. Under reporting is less of an issue because it is
difficult not to notice a large event. For instance, it is much easier to check the validity of the
2007 cybercampaign against Estonia than to find information on each individual cyberattack
that Estonia experienced during the three-week-long cybercampaign. Moreover, it is hard
not to notice a full-scale cybercampaign, especially when a significant amount of time has
passed since the start of the campaign—between twenty and six years (i.e., the 2000-2016
18 DCID is one of two available datasets on cyberoperations. I do not use the Council on Foreign Relations’
Cyber Operations Tracker (COT)—the second dataset on cyberoperations—to conduct my robustness
checks because the majority of incidents in this dataset contain events executed by non-state actors for
criminal purposes and examples of governments using spyware to track actions of opposition groups.
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period), for the attacks in DCID. Similarly, English-speaking outlets are more likely to cover
a full-scale cybercampaign than individual, low-level cyberattacks. Overreporting is less
of an issue because it is also much easier to use multiple sources to mistakenly record an
individual cyberattack, which often lacks specific details, multiple times than to overreport
large-scale cybercampaigns.
The second one, unique for cyberoperations, is the difficulty of their attribution. Cyber-
attribution is no longer a technical problem but a costly political decision (Clark and Landau
2011; Rid and Buchanan 2015). Some nations have the capacity to attribute cybeoperations.
Those nations that do not have such capacity often benefit from attribution by private
companies that are always eager to go after large cybercampaigns—those in DCID—to
increase their revenue. To address the possibility that a country might change its military
cyberapparatus only when it discovers that it has been a target of cyberoperations from
outside sources, I supplement the start and end dates of the DCID’s cybercampaigns with
the date of the campaigns’ public discovery. To sum it up, despite its limitations, DCID
data serve as a good proxy for a government’s overall cyberthreat environment.
Data Sources: Military Alliances
The most popularly used datasets on military alliances are Leeds et al. (2002)’s Alliance
Treaty Obligations and Provisions and Correlates of War (COW) Project’s data on formal
alliances (version 4.1) (Gibler 2008). Since the period I am interested in is quite recent,
ATOP Alliance dataset, which contains a more detailed description of recent events and
is more comprehensive, is more suitable for my analysis. Thus I use ATOP for my main
analysis and cautiously proceed with running my robustness checks using COW Alliances. I
use both datasets to create a weighted average effect of the allies’ cybersecurity organizations
on the country’s choice of military cybersecurity organizations.
Leeds et al. (2002, 238)’s Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data defines alliances
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as “written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states,
that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the
event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate
in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.” The last
observation in the data is coded as of 2016. I use ATOP to create a weighted average effect of
the cybersecurity organizations adopted by a country’s allies in a period prior the country’s
choice of cyber-militarization. For instance, New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies
records the weighted average effect of the country’s allies’ decision to assign new cybersecurity
responsibility to an existing military agency. New Units Weighted by Allies: records the
weighted average effect of the country’s allies’ decision to create new a cybersecurity military
agency.
Similarly to ATOP, Correlates of War (COW) Project’s data on formal alliances (version
4.1) differentiates between a defense, neutrality, non-aggression, or entente (i.e., consultation)
agreement (Gibler 2008). Even though COW Alliances and ATOP code the same type of
alliances, they differ in a few notable ways. First, ATOP extends to 2016 and the last
observation in COW is as of 2012. Second, COW lacks offensive agreements, but this does
not present a challenge for this study. Third, some of the alliances in ATOP are not in
COW. Fourth, ATOP covers allies of 186 countries during the studied period whereas COW
covers only 148 countries. One of the explanations for this discrepancy could be that “Ten
of the 745 alliances in the ATOP dataset, however, would not qualify for inclusion based on
the COW list of independent states; at least one of the members of these ten alliances is a
member of the international system according to Gleditsch and Ward but not according to
COW” Leeds (2005, 8). As a result, ATOP is a more comprehensive data set during the
time frame that my study explores.
United Nations General Assembly Voting data
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Votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) have been commonly used to
construct a measure of state foreign policy preferences (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017;
Ball 1951; Gartzke 1998; Lijphart 1963; Moon 1985; Russett 1966; Signorino and Ritter
1999). UNGA resolutions cover a variety of topics but Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey (2017)
grouped them into six main topics:
1. ME: votes related to the Palestinian conflict;
2. NU: votes related to nuclear weapons and nuclear material;
3. DI: votes related to arms control and disarmament;
4. CO: votes related to colonialism;
5. HR: votes related to human rights; and
6. EC: votes related to (economic) development.
Using this distinction, I create six categories: Palestine, Nuclear, Disarmament,
Colonialism, EconDev, and HumanRights. These votes could be further grouped into two
categories: (1) those that have a non-conflict angle (i.e., colonialism, human rights, and
economic development) (UN Partners (1)) and (2) those that have a conflict angle (i.e.,
the Palestinian conflict, nuclear weapons, and arms control) (UN Partners (2)). These six
categories constitute 92% of all resolutions adopted at the UN. I also create a category (UN
Partners (3)) in which I place resolutions that do not fall into the six categories identified
above.
Since there are many resolutions on a given subject in a given year, I distribute the
votes between -1 and 1 (“yes”-“+1,” “abstain”-“0,” and “no”-“-1”), summarize them by topic
and year, and divide by the total number of resolutions on a given topic in a given year. I
use the obtained value to create the weighted average effect of the voting patterns at the
UNGA on the country’s choice to cyber-militarize. Similarly, I combine these issue variables
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with Assign and Create to create the weighted average effect of the country’s UN partners’
choices of cybersecurity organizations on the country’s choice of cyber-militarization. The
UNGA country-level data was last updated in 2018.
Data Sources: Trade
I use the following three measures to identify the country’s trading partners:
1. Trading Partners (1): the amount of bilateral trade between two countries, taken
from the World Bank ;
2. Trading Partners (2): the number of signed bilateral investment treaties between
two nations (Graham and Tucker 2019); and
3. Trading Partners (3): the number of signed preferential trade agreements between
two nations (Graham and Tucker 2019).
Similarly, I record the weighted average effect of cybersecurity units adopted by the country’s
trading partners in a period prior to the country developing its first military cybersecurity
agency (New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by Trading Partners (1/2/3)). I
use New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by Trading Partners (1) in my main
analysis and New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by Trading Partners (2) and
New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by Trading Partners (3) to run robustness
checks.
Data Sources: Cultural Similarity
Using Graham and Tucker (2019)’s World Economics and Politics Dataverse (WEPD), I
create the following two proxies for cultural similarity. First is a dummy variable that
takes a value of “1” when two nations share the same official language. Second is a dummy
variable that takes a value of “1” when two nations have similar colonial experiences. I
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use both variables to create a weighted average effect of the cybersecurity organizations
adopted by a country’s linguistic and colonial partners in a period prior the country’s choice
of cyber-militarization:
• New Responsibilities Weighted by Linguistic Partners: records the weighted
average effect of the country’s linguistic partner’s decision to assign a new cybersecurity
responsibility to an existing military agency;
• New Units Weighted by Linguistic Partners: records the weighted average effect
of the country’s linguistic partner’s decision to create a new cybersecurity military
agency;
• New Responsibilities Weighted by Colonial Partners: records the weighted
average effect of the country’s colonial partner’s decision to assign a new cybersecurity
responsibility to an existing military agency;
• New Units Weighted by Colonial Partners: records the weighted average effect of
the country’s colonial partner’s decision to create a new cybersecurity military agency.
Data Sources: Geography
To create a weighted average effect of the military cybersecurity organizations created by a
country’s geographic neighbors, I identify the country’s geographic neighbors in the following
five ways:
• the inverse distance between the two capitals (Neighbors (1)),
• the squared inverse distance between the two capitals (Neighbors (2)),
• the logarithmized inverse distance between the two capitals (Neighbors (3)),
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• a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share a land border or are
separated by at most 100 miles of water (Neighbors (4)) (Stinnett et al. 2002), and
• a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share a land border or are
separated by at most 400 miles of water (Neighbors (5)) (Stinnett et al. 2002).19
Data Sources: Communication Channels and Expert Communities
Discussions related to national security and military capabilities tend to happen on bilateral
and multilateral levels. To isolate such multilateral exchanges, I use Pevehouse et al. (2019)’s
dyadic data that has information on countries’ joint memberships in 534 IGOs between 1816
and 2014. Focusing on the 1999-2014 period, I choose only those IGOs whose primarily
focus is security, defense, and peace. Some of these organizations have security as their main
and only mission whereas others focus on other areas, in addition to promoting security and
cooperation among its members. Here is the list of thirty-three IGOs that I selected from
the IGO dataset:
1. African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW), formed “primarily to promote
cooperation, security, social and economic development and poverty eradication among
member states through the effective management of the continent’s water resources and
provision of water supply services”;20
2. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL);
3. Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), created by North Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt
in the 1989 and became instinct in the 1990s;
4. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
19 I have also considered using 200, 300, and 500 miles as my cut-off points but because these variables were
perfectly separated with my dependent variables in some of my models, I decided to include these variables
into my robustness checks.
20 Taken from AMCOW’ website: https: https://www.amcow-online.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=69%3Aabout-amcow&catid=34%3Aabout-amcow&Itemid=27&lang=en
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5. Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT);21
6. Central European Initiative (CEI);
7. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO);
8. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
9. Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) that focuses on “development, democracy and
peace”;22
10. Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPSC) that focuses on cooperation in
all areas, including defense;
11. Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA);
12. Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) that focuses on creating a safe and secure
region;
13. Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC);
14. European Institute for Peace (EIP);
15. Inter-American Defense Board (IADefB);
16. International Civil Defence Organization (ICivDO);
17. League of Arab States (LOAS), currently the Arab League;
18. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM);
19. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
20. Organization for African Unity (OAU);
21. African Union (AU);
22. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);
21 For more information, see Sapronas (1999).
22 Source: https://thecommonwealth.org/about-us/secretariat.
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23. Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC);
24. Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA);
25. Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications (RCFC), focuses on the issues
in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT);
26. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);
27. Secretariat of the Commission for East African Cooperation (EAC);
28. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC);
29. Union of the Mediterranean (UM);
30. United Nations (UN);
31. Warsaw Treaty Organization (WPact), dissolved in 1991;
32. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies (Wassen); and
33. Western European Union (WEU).
I use the total number of IGOs out of this list of thirty-three to which countries have a joint
membership to create a weighted average effect of cybersecurity organizations adopted by
governments that share IGOmemberships. Similarly, I distinguish whether governments with
joint IGO membership assigned a new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing military
agency (New Responsibilities Weighted by IGO Partners) or created a new military
cybersecurity unit (New Units Weighted by IGO Partners) in the year prior to the year
when the country makes changes to its military cyberapparatus.
Data Sources: Legitimacy, Prestige, or Modern Behavior
To measure the effect of prestige or modern behavior on the creation of a new cybersecurity
military apparatus, I use thirty-three intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that promote
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security, defense, and peace, explained above, from Pevehouse et al. (2019)’s data. I have also
considered controlling for the cumulative sum of new and assigned cybersecurity agencies
created in the year prior to the country’s development of its military cyberapparatus.
However, because my survival analysis includes time-varying covariates and this variable
is the same across all nations and only differs by year, I opted out of running my robustness
checks using the variable that has no country-specific variation.
Summary Statistics and Correlation Plots
Figure 3.6 depicts the correlation plot for the diffusion variables with newly-created military
units and controls. Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics for the main explanatory variables
and controls. All variables besides Democracy have been re-scaled to make it easy to interpret
the obtained results.
Empirical Strategy
Competing Risks Cox Proportional-Hazards Model. One assumption of the Cox
Proportional-Hazards (CPH) model is that no two countries adopt policies at the same
time. To “break” possible ties, I use the Efron approximation in my model as it is a
tighter approximation to the exact marginal. Another assumption of the CPH model
is that the hazard ratios do not vary over time. I use the Therneau and Grambsch
nonproportionality test, which uses scaled Schoenfeld residuals, to test this assumption
(Grambsch and Therneau 1994). Since some of variables violate this assumption (i.e.,
New Units Weighted by UN Partners (1), Attacker, GDP_PerCapita), I interact these
variables with the starting time (i.e., tstart) to address this issue (Therneau, Crowson and
Atkinson 2020). Despite following this recommendation by the authors of the R package,
the effect of these variables should be generally understood as an average effect over the
entire studied period and not as a conditional effect over a particular period of time.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Minimum Median Mean Maximum
New Responsibilities Weighted by
IGO Partners (lag) -0.6308 -0.6308 0.0000 12.3061
New Units Weighted by IGO Partners (lag) -0.4848 -0.4848 0.0000 11.9438
New Responsibilities Weighted by
UN Partners (1) (lag) -0.9178 -0.8654 0.0000 2.9845
New Units Weighted by UN Partners (1) (lag) -1.4824 -0.6836 0.0000 2.7759
New Responsibilities Weighted by
UN Partners (2) (lag) -0.9284 -0.5849 0.0000 2.8791
New Units Weighted by UN Partners (2) (lag) -1.4622 -0.6394 0.0000 3.2785
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Neighbors (1) (lag) -0.5020 -0.4152 0.0000 29.2884
New Units Weighted by Neighbors (1) (lag) -0.6243 -0.4881 0.0000 29.6857
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Trading Partners (1) (lag) -0.3636 -0.3636 0.0000 10.7431
New Units Weighted by Trading Partners (1) (lag) -0.4655 -0.4655 0.0000 6.3528
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Adversaries (lag) -0.0730 -0.0730 0.0000 17.2849
New Units Weighted by Adversaries (lag) -0.1330 -0.1330 0.0000 11.5740
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Colonial Partners (lag) -0.2243 -0.2243 0.0000 7.0749
New Units Weighted by Colonial Partners (lag) -0.2243 -0.2243 0.0000 7.0749
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Linguistic Partners (lag) -0.1926 -0.1926 0.0000 20.3103
New Units Weighted by Linguistic Partners (lag) -0.2725 -0.2725 0.0000 17.5567
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Allies (lag) -0.3061 -0.3061 0.0000 17.3049
New Units Weighted by Allies (lag) -0.3586 -0.3586 0.0000 7.5303
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Trading Partners (2) (lag) -0.4439 -0.4439 0.0000 19.6833
New Units Weighted by Trading Partners (2) (lag) -0.5430 -0.5430 0.0000 9.9334
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Trading Partners (3) (lag) -0.5026 -0.5026 0.0000 9.6377
New Units Weighted by Trading Partners (3) (lag) -0.5398 -0.5398 0.0000 9.5450
New Responsibilities Weighted by
Neighbors (2) (lag) -0.1081 -0.1081 0.0000 11.6679
New Units Weighted by Neighbors (2) (lag) -0.1373 -0.1373 0.0000 10.1527
Attacker (lag) -0.1136 -0.1136 0.0000 22.0658
Target (lag) -0.1541 -0.1541 0.0000 19.5390
GDP_PerCapita (log) -2.3366 -0.0905 0.0000 2.4427
Int_Users (log) -1.9551 0.2047 0.0000 1.3651
Democracy 0.0000 1.0000 0.5603 1.0000
IGO Membership (lag) -2.6714 -0.5018 0.0000 3.2950
Total MIDs (lag, log) -0.5003 -0.5003 0.0000 8.3295
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Figure 3.6: Correlation Plot: Yearly Data
Moreover, while the Therneau and Grambsch non-proportionality test detects a number
of specification errors in addition to non-proportionality, it may yield a false-positive
test if the model is specified incorrectly (Therneau, Grambsch and Fleming 1990;
Grambsch and Therneau 1994; Therneau and Grambsch 2000). I ran robustness checks that
use the inverse hyperbolic sine function for continuous covariates to address that possibility.
Model Selection. Given that some of my predictors are highly correlated, as demonstrated
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by Figure 3.6, I use Akaike’s selection criteria to first select the control variables
that best explain my variables of interest (Assign and Create). I start with a
model that automatically includes clustering by country but selects between the type
of the main explanatory variables (New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies, New
Units Weighted by Allies) and control variables (Target, Attacker, GDP_PerCapita,
Int_Users, Democracy, IGO Membership, and Total MIDs). Table 3.5 displays the AIC
values for the best five models with the lower AIC value suggesting a better model fit. It
confirms that the best model should include New Units Weighted by Allies and most of
the earlier-defined controls (Attacker, GDP_PerCapita, Int_Users, Democracy, and Total
MIDs). Even though Target and IGO Membership do not appear in the top five models, I
proceed with including these controls in my subsequent analysis to avoid model overfit.
Table 3.5: Model Selection: Control Variables
ID # of Predictors AIC Model
1 4 773.01 New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies + Attacker + Int_Users +Total MIDs
2 5 773.23 New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies + Attacker + Int_Users +Total MIDs + Democracy
3 5 773.28 New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies + Attacker + Int_Users +Total MIDs + GDP_PerCapita
4 6 773.69 New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies + Attacker + Int_Users +Total MIDs + Democracy + GDP_PerCapita
5 3 773.99 Attacker + Int_Users + Total MIDs
Next, I apply the AIC criteria to the diffusion variables that have a statistically
significant effect in the models with individual diffusion variables (IGO Partners, UN
Partners (1), UN Partners (2), Neighbors (1), Trading Partners (1), Adversaries,
and Linguistic Partners). Similarly, each model under consideration automatically
includes country-clustering and six original controls (Attacker, GDP_PerCapita, IGO
Memerbship, Int_Users, Target, Total MIDs). I include the effects of both newly-created
units and newly-responsible agencies by the country’s neighbors (i.e., Allies, UN
Partners (1/2), Neighbors (1), IGO Partners, Adversaries, Linguistic Partners,
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and Trading Partners (1)). Table 3.6 displays the results, which recommend including the
newly-created units and newly-responsible agencies by Allies, UN Partners (1) and (2),
Adversaries, and Linguistic Partners. Since New Responsibilities/Units Weighted
by UN Partners (1) and New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by UN Partners (2)
highly correlated (Figure 3.6), I include only New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (1) in my models that consider cumulative effects of diffusion networks.
Section 3.8 presents the obtained results.
Table 3.6: Model Selection: All Diffusion Variables
ID # of Predictors AIC Model
1 13.00 762.62
clustering + original 6 + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (2) + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Linguistic Partners + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Adversaries
2 11.00 762.75
clustering + original 6 + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (2) + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Adversaries
3 15.00 762.84
clustering + original 6 + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (2) + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Linguistic Partners + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Adversaries+New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by UN Partners (1)
4 13.00 763.00
clustering + original 6 + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (2) + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Adversaries + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (1)
5 13.00 764.95
clustering + original 6+ New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (2) + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Linguistic Partners + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
Adversaries + New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by
UN Partners (1)+ New Responsibilities/Units Weighted by Allies
Another way of checking the model fit is using the concordance statistic which “computes the
agreement between an observed response and a predictor.”23 Popularized by Harrell Jr, Lee
and Mark (1996), this technique became one of the most used measures of goodness-of-fit
in survival models. Out of all the models, Model #2, which contains country-clustering,
all original six controls (Attacker, GDP_PerCapita, IGO Memerbship, Int_Users, Target,
Total MIDs), and newly-assigned and created units by all diffusion variables, does a better
job of predicting which country is at risk of having an event (Assign or Create) at a
23 Source: https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/survival/versions/3.1-12/topics/concordance
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particular time than other considered models. Results for Model #3 are very close to those
for Model #2. Thus, I proceed with running my cumulative effects models with results
recommended by AIC.
Table 3.7: Model Selection: Concordance Statistics
Model # Predictors Concordance St.error
No Responsible Agency → Assign
1 clustering + 6 original controls 0.7786 0.0301
2 clustering + 6 original controls + newly-assigned and created units by alldiffusion variables 0.8320 0.0263
3 clustering + 6 original controls + newly-assigned and created units by alldiffusion variables recommended by AIC 0.8308 0.0257
4 clustering + 6 original controls + newly-assigned and created units by alldiffusion variables recommended by AIC but Ally 0.8217 0.0240
5 clustering + 6 original controls + created units by all diffusion variables 0.8186 0.0257
No Responsible Agency → Create
1 clustering + 6 original controls 0.7887 0.0303
2 clustering + 6 original controls + newly-assigned and created units by alldiffusion variables 0.8251 0.0269
3 clustering + 6 original controls + newly-assigned and created units by alldiffusion variables recommended by AIC 0.8109 .02810
4 clustering + 6 original controls + newly-assigned and created units by alldiffusion variables recommended by AIC but Ally 0.8104 0.0282
5 clustering + 6 original controls + created units by all diffusion variables 0.7996 0.0295
Robustness Checks
I conduct the following robustness checks.
Military Alliances. In addition to using ATOP data, I also use the Correlates of War (COW)
Project’s data on formal alliances (version 4.1) (Gibler 2008). As Table 3.11 demonstrates
my results are not robust. This is not surprising, given that the COW Alliances data set
contains a less comprehensive account of the formed alliances during the 1999-2018 period
under the study. Specifically, as Section 3.8 explains, the data set ends in 2012, contains
less detailed event descriptions, and fewer instances of the formed alliances even when COW
Alliances’ and ATOP’s time periods overlap (1999-2012).
Distance. In order to identify a country’s geographic neighbors, I use the following measures:
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Table 3.8: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year)
(a) Part (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Responsible Agency → Assign
New Responsibilities Weighted
by IGO Partners
0.135
(0.190)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (1)
0.145
(0.510)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (2)
−0.065
(0.470)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (3)
−0.054
(0.487)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Disarmament)
−0.055
(0.512)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Palestine)
−0.054
(0.500)
New Units Weighted by IGO
Partners
0.147
(0.205)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (1)
−1.215∗∗∗
(0.483)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (2)
−1.101∗∗∗
(0.454)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (3)
−1.058∗∗∗
(0.452)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Disarmament)
−0.655∗
(0.454)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Palestine)
−0.815∗∗
(0.493)
Attacker 1.121∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗
(0.376) (0.365) (0.364) (0.362) (0.365) (0.380)
Int_Users 1.268∗∗ 1.158∗∗ 1.139∗∗ 1.141∗∗ 1.185∗∗ 1.167∗∗
(0.582) (0.546) (0.546) (0.541) (0.558) (0.575)
Total MIDs 0.177 0.265 0.249 0.260 0.229 0.200
(0.219) (0.222) (0.218) (0.218) (0.222) (0.220)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
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Table 3.8: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year)
(b) Part (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Responsible Agency → Create
New Responsibilities Weighted
by IGO Partners
0.432∗∗
(0.187)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (1)
−0.169
(0.547)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (2)
−0.433
(0.458)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (3)
−0.293
(0.477)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Disarmament)
−0.139
(0.463)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Palestine)
−0.728
(0.570)
New Units Weighted by IGO
Partners
−0.044
(0.284)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (1)
−0.578
(0.624)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (2)
−0.344
(0.524)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (3)
−0.430
(0.548)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Disarmament)
−0.358
(0.548)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Palestine)
−0.466
(0.649)
Attacker 0.127 0.101 0.150 0.147 0.129 0.149
(0.573) (0.550) (0.552) (0.549) (0.551) (0.526)
Int_Users 1.321∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗ 1.084∗∗ 1.092∗∗ 1.131∗∗ 1.092∗∗
(0.603) (0.583) (0.585) (0.583) (0.590) (0.595)
Total MIDs 0.532∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.206) (0.202) (0.203) (0.205) (0.207)
Observations 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727
Additional Controls X X X X X X
Log Likelihood −288.079 −284.061 −281.948 −282.934 −286.900 −287.426
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by creating a new cybersecurity agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(a) Part (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Responsible Agency → Assign
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Nuclear)
0.139
(0.525)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Colonialism)
−0.154
(0.481)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (EconDev)
−0.339
(0.385)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (HumanRights)
−0.097
(0.467)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (1)
0.247
(0.289)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (2)
0.101
(0.147)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Nuclear)
−0.886∗∗
(0.474)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Colonialism)
−0.708∗∗∗
(0.353)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (EconDev)
−0.470
(0.390)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (HumanRights)
−1.212∗∗∗
(0.484)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (1)
0.348∗
(0.190)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (2)
0.144∗∗
(0.074)
Attacker 1.043∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.371) (0.371) (0.360) (0.363) (0.365)
Int_Users 1.219∗∗ 1.136∗∗ 1.040∗ 1.167∗∗ 1.154∗∗ 1.165∗∗
(0.556) (0.555) (0.582) (0.534) (0.564) (0.579)
Total MIDs 0.254 0.221 0.141 0.291 0.196 0.176
(0.222) (0.221) (0.218) (0.219) (0.222) (0.222)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(b) Part (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Responsible Agency → Create
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Nuclear)
−0.118
(0.480)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (Colonialism)
−0.753
(0.536)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (EconDev)
−0.389
(0.353)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by UN Partners (HumanRights)
−0.497
(0.451)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (1)
0.727∗∗∗
(0.245)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (2)
0.272∗∗∗
(0.107)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Nuclear)
−0.543
(0.552)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (Colonialism)
−0.451
(0.449)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (EconDev)
0.024
(0.438)
New Units Weighted by UN
Partners (HumanRights)
−0.288
(0.544)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (1)
0.157
(0.291)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (2)
0.090
(0.120)
Attacker 0.118 0.104 0.184 0.141 0.166 0.205
(0.555) (0.549) (0.543) (0.557) (0.569) (0.538)
Int_Users 1.165∗∗ 1.071∗∗ 1.060∗∗ 1.120∗∗ 1.025∗∗ 1.093∗∗
(0.583) (0.572) (0.612) (0.578) (0.566) (0.593)
Democracy −0.006 −0.268 0.248 −0.098 0.072 0.140
(0.449) (0.477) (0.427) (0.469) (0.436) (0.430)
Total MIDs 0.580∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.209) (0.202) (0.205) (0.209) (0.206)
Observations 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727
Additional Controls X X X X X X
Log Likelihood −284.708 −281.831 −289.019 −280.212 −285.379 −287.554
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by creating a new cybersecurity agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.10: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(a) Part (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Responsible Agency → Assign
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (3)
1.755
(1.934)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (4)
−0.082
(0.146)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (5)
−0.110
(0.228)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Trading Partners (1)
−0.275∗∗
(0.240)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Trading Partners (2)
0.148
(0.162)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Trading Partners (3)
−0.113
(0.194)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (3)
4.524
(3.307)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (4)
0.134
(0.101)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (5)
−0.305∗
(0.359)
New Units Weighted by Trading
Partners (1)
−0.129
(0.260)
New Units Weighted by Trading
Partners (2)
−0.660∗∗∗
(0.343)
New Units Weighted by Trading
Partners (3)
−0.022
(0.131)
Target −0.366 −0.386 −0.426 −0.458 −0.381 −0.428
(0.530) (0.565) (0.622) (0.612) (0.593) (0.603)
Attacker 1.078∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 1.131∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.372) (0.387) (0.384) (0.377) (0.383)
Int_Users 1.159∗∗ 1.237∗∗ 1.257∗∗ 1.252∗∗ 1.370∗∗ 1.201∗∗
(0.550) (0.589) (0.593) (0.590) (0.591) (0.596)
Total MIDs 0.237 0.174 0.197 0.195 0.183 0.163
(0.223) (0.221) (0.220) (0.222) (0.222) (0.220)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.10: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(b) Part (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Responsible Agency → Create
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (3)
4.822∗∗∗
(1.805)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (4)
0.165∗∗∗
(0.080)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Neighbors (5)
0.042
(0.143)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Trading Partners (1)
0.368∗∗
(0.125)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Trading Partners (2)
0.184∗∗
(0.173)
New Responsibilities Weighted
by Trading Partners (3)
0.250∗∗
(0.154)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (3)
−6.037
(3.533)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (4)
0.152∗∗
(0.110)
New Units Weighted by
Neighbors (5)
−0.088
(0.177)
New Units Weighted by Trading
Partners (1)
0.083
(0.276)
New Units Weighted by Trading
Partners (2)
−0.345
(0.354)
New Units Weighted by Trading
Partners (3)
−0.298
(0.221)
Attacker 0.214 0.215 0.175 0.266 0.180 0.178
(0.566) (0.519) (0.536) (0.541) (0.536) (0.537)
Int_Users 1.024∗∗ 1.002∗∗ 1.132∗∗ 1.021∗∗ 1.128∗∗ 1.131∗∗
(0.574) (0.601) (0.605) (0.603) (0.609) (0.609)
Democracy 0.135 0.296 0.202 0.245 0.233 0.288
(0.429) (0.427) (0.426) (0.427) (0.422) (0.427)
Total MIDs 0.511∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.205) (0.204) (0.202) (0.204) (0.204)
Observations 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727
Additional Controls X X X X X X
Max. Possible R2 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.217
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by creating a new cybersecurity agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.11: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(a) Part (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Responsible Agency → Assign
New Responsibilities Weighted by Adversaries 0.112
(0.096)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Linguistic Partners −1.124
(0.846)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies −0.052
(0.187)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies (COW) 0.027
(0.120)
New Units Weighted by Adversaries 0.121
(0.107)
New Units Weighted by Linguistic Partners −1.823∗∗
(0.856)
New Units Weighted by Allies 0.474∗∗∗
(0.141)
New Units Weighted by Allies (COW) 0.199∗∗
(0.096)
Target −0.503 −0.483 −0.449 −0.593
(0.620) (0.582) (0.637) (0.644)
Attacker 1.206∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.392) (0.373) (0.390) (0.380)
GDP_PerCapita 0.201 0.364 0.259 0.226
(0.380) (0.383) (0.380) (0.374)
Int_Users 1.171∗∗ 0.966∗ 1.147∗ 1.078∗
(0.592) (0.581) (0.601) (0.584)
Democracy 0.758 0.704 0.666 0.629
(0.457) (0.472) (0.466) (0.460)
IGO Membership −0.039 −0.167 0.047 0.011
(0.201) (0.194) (0.198) (0.198)
Total MIDs 0.100 0.192 0.142 0.122
(0.232) (0.228) (0.223) (0.226)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
• the inverse distance between the two capitals (Neighbors (1)),
• the squared inverse distance between the two capitals (Neighbors (2)),
• the logarithmized inverse distance between the two capitals (Neighbors (3)),
• a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share a land border or are
separated by at most 100 miles of water (Neighbors (4)) (Stinnett et al. 2002), and
• a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share a land border or are
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Table 3.11: Effects of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(b) Part (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Responsible Agency → Create
New Responsibilities Weighted by Adversaries 0.143∗∗
(0.067)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Linguistic Partners 0.017
(0.071)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies 0.223∗∗∗
(0.103)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Allies (COW) 0.203
(0.170)
New Units Weighted by Adversaries 0.117
(0.104)
New Units Weighted by Linguistic Partners −1.133
(0.686)
New Units Weighted by Allies 0.138
(0.290)
New Units Weighted by Allies −0.054
(0.140)
Target 0.060 −0.021 0.036 0.080
(0.173) (0.177) (0.170) (0.173)
Attacker 0.218 0.213 0.163 0.176
(0.534) (0.543) (0.529) (0.530)
GDP_PerCapita 0.317 0.284 0.265 0.197
(0.409) (0.395) (0.398) (0.406)
Int_Users 1.039∗∗ 0.997∗∗ 1.042∗∗ 1.140∗∗
(0.613) (0.591) (0.603) (0.610)
Democracy 0.319 0.329 0.174 0.203
(0.433) (0.428) (0.427) (0.422)
IGO Membership 0.033 −0.117 −0.026 −0.093
(0.207) (0.207) (0.197) (0.212)
Total MIDs 0.428∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.210) (0.206) (0.204)
Observations 2,727 2,727 2,727 2,727
R2 0.032 0.037 0.034 0.032
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by creating a new cybersecurity agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.12: Effect of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(a) Part (a)
(1) (2) (3)
No Responsible Agency → Assign
New Responsibilities Weighted by Regime Partners (1) −0.611
(0.371)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Regime Partners (2) −0.391
(0.338)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Regime Partners (3) −0.246
(0.346)
New Units Weighted by Regime Partners (1) 0.073
(0.573)
New Units Weighted by Regime Partners (2) −0.163
(0.480)
New Units Weighted by Regime Partners (3) 0.144
(0.589)
Target −0.416 −0.424 −0.414
(0.585) (0.605) (0.595)
Attacker 1.221∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.384) (0.382)
GDP_PerCapita 0.164 0.162 0.164
(0.378) (0.380) (0.379)
Int_Users 1.245∗∗ 1.256∗∗ 1.255∗∗
(0.589) (0.595) (0.594)
Democracy 1.098 1.089 0.793
(0.732) (0.698) (0.858)
IGO Membership −0.073 −0.073 −0.065
(0.196) (0.198) (0.198)
Total MIDs 0.181 0.168 0.172
(0.221) (0.220) (0.221)
Note: The dependent variable is Assign—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by assigning new cybersecurity responsibility to an existing agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
separated by at most 400 miles of water (Neighbors (5)) (Stinnett et al. 2002).24
As Tables 3.9 and 3.10 demonstrate my results are not robust.
Regime Type. Using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score, I implement three
different cut-off points to identify nations that share the same regime type:
1. Regime Partners (1): a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share
the same regime, using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score; nations
24 I have also considered using 200, 300, and 500 miles as my cut-off points but because these variables were
perfectly separated with my dependent variables in some of my models, I decided to include these variables
into my robustness checks.
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Table 3.12: Effect of New Responsibility and New Unit (Binary, Year) (Continued)
(b) Part (b)
(1) (2) (3)
No Responsible Agency → Create
New Responsibilities Weighted by Regime Partners (1) −0.119
(0.267)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Regime Partners (2) 0.097
(0.256)
New Responsibilities Weighted by Regime Partners (3) −0.031
(0.248)
New Units Weighted by Regime Partners (1) −0.385
(0.528)
New Units Weighted by Regime Partners (2) −0.098
(0.511)
New Units Weighted by Regime Partners (3) −0.076
(0.681)
Target 0.047 0.045 0.052
(0.169) (0.169) (0.169)
Attacker 0.265 0.187 0.195
(0.543) (0.527) (0.530)
GDP_PerCapita 0.223 0.233 0.229
(0.404) (0.404) (0.405)
Int_Users 1.134∗∗ 1.121∗∗ 1.126∗∗
(0.606) (0.608) (0.609)
Democracy 0.597 0.203 0.332
(0.654) (0.656) (0.939)
IGO Membership −0.049 −0.031 −0.032
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202)
Total MIDs 0.535∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.203) (0.203)
Observations 2,727 2,727 2,727
Note: The dependent variable is Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its
military cyberapparatuses by creating a new cybersecurity agency.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
that score a “4” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score a
“3” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy);
2. Regime Partners (2): a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share
the same regime, using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score; nations
that score a “5” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score a
“4” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy); and
3. Regime Partners (3): a dummy variable that identifies whether two countries share
the same regime, using Gurr, Marshall and Jaggers (2010)’s Polity IV score; nations
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that score a “6” or above receive a “1” (i.e., democracy) and those nations that score a
“5” or below receive a “0” (i.e., autocracy).
My results demonstrate that none of the specifications for the regime type is correlated with
the country’s choice to develop its military cybersecurity apparatus (Table 3.12).
Trade. I use the following three measures to identify a country’s trading partners:
1. Trading Partners (1): the amount of bilateral trade between two countries, taken
from the World Bank;
2. Trading Partners (2): the number of signed bilateral investment treaties between
two nations (Graham and Tucker 2019); and
3. Trading Partners (3): the number of signed preferential trade agreements between
two nations (Graham and Tucker 2019).
As Table 3.10, there is a positive correlation between the assignment of new responsibilities
to existing military agencies by the country’s trading partners and the country’s decision to
create a new military cybersecurity unit.
UNGA Resolutions. In addition to classifying UNGA resolutions into those on the subject of
conflict (UN Partners (1)) and non-conflict (UN Partners (2)), I also apply my analysis to
the UNGA resolutions on the six topics that contribute to these two categories as well as those
resolutions that belong to neither of these two categories (UN Partners (3)). In particular,
the UNGA resolutions on arms control and disarmament (Disarmament), nuclear weapons
and nuclear material (Nuclear), and the Palestinian conflict (Palestine) are grouped into
the UN Partners (1) category. The UNGA resolutions on colonialism (Colonialism),
economic development (EconDev), and human rights (HumanRights) contribute to the UN
Partners (2) category.
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Most of these variables have either negative correlation or no correlation with Assign
and Create. These results are not surprising, given that the UNGA resolutions on these
various topics do not touch on the subject of cybersecurity and the proliferation of military
cybercapacity. Thus, if the countries are busy with developing measures to deal with
these others issues, they are less likely to devote their attention to the subject of military
cybersecurity. The negative effect of the human rights resolutions is also not surprising. The
subject of human rights violation has been often discussed along with a state’s attempts
to boost its cybercapacity. In particular, some political acitivists and civil society groups
view an increase in state cybercapacity as new means to conduct surveillance and censorship
against citizens. For instance, Brazilian social activists argue that the desire to monitor
Brazilian citizens is one of the reasons why the government created its military department,
called the Centre for Cyber-defense (CDCiber) (Muggan, Diniz and Glenny 2014). A threat
of populous protest that often originated from abroad caused the country to increase its
offensive cyber capability and CDCiber and Brazil’s central intelligence agency (ABIN) to
create social media monitoring platforms in the aftermath of the 2013 protest (Muggan,
Diniz and Glenny 2014).
Cumulative Effect of Militarization. Suppose a country started developing its cyberapparatus
in year t. In addition to considering whether a country’s allies and adversaries started
developing their military cyberapparatuses in year t − 1, I use a binary variable that
records whether the country’s allies and adversaries started developing their military
cyberapparatuses in any year prior to year t − 1. Figure 3.7a demonstrates that signal
complementarity between allies is robust, but the effect of the rivals’ build-up of their military
cyberapparatuses disappears. This result might suggest that countries perceive only recent
development of military cyberapparatuses by their adversaries as threatening and have the
urge to respond. With time, this urge fades away.
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Figure 3.7: Robustness Checks: Alternative Dependent Variable
(a) Effect of Alternative “Neighbors” Measures on Create
Note: Dependent variable: Create—the country’s decision to initiate the development of its military
cyberapparatuse by creating a brand new unit. Results are from a Competing Risks Cox
Proportional-Hazards Model. The reported values are the hazard ratios and their confidence intervals.
There are 2,727 observations and 69 events. Each plot displays a weighted average effect of both assigning
new cybersecurity responsibilities to existing military agencies and creating new military cybersecurity
agencies. To create this effect, I record whether the country’s allies and adversaries started developing its
military cyberapparatus in any year prior to year t− 1 (instead of in previous year only). See the Online
Appendix for more details and a more details presentation of results. All results are based on two-tailed
tests.
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Chapter 4
Deterrence in the Cyber Realm: Public versus private
cybercapacity
A number of detrimental cyberoperations that we have witnessed over the last two decades
motivated nations to develop their cybercapacities. For instance, the Stuxnet worm,
discovered in 2010, was used against the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility to slow down its
nuclear weapons program. In 2014, a group with ties to the North Korean government hacked
Sony Pictures Home Entertainment and used a malicious software to erase Sony’s computer
infrastructure. In 2015 and 2016, the Russian government cyberattacked Ukrainian electric
power grids, as a result of which Ukrainian citizens remained without electricity for several
hours. In 2016, the Russian government meddled in the U.S. presidential elections by mainly
posting fabricated articles and disinformation on social media websites and hacking emails of
the Clinton campaign officials and strategically releasing the obtained information. All these
“strategic” attacks, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, detrimentally affected the
target country’s “economy and prosperity” (Fernandino 2018).
To deter such attacks, nations started implementing publicly observable proactive efforts
aimed at signaling their offensive and defensive cybercapabilities. They started adopting new
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legislation, doctrines, and strategies; creating new agencies responsible for cybersecurity;
adding new roles related to cybersecurity to existing agencies (such as cyber-education
programs within Ministries of Education); and adding cybersecurity components to military
exercises. I define all these efforts as public cyberinstitutions (PCIs). PCIs are meant
to deter adversaries from executing cyberattacks that cause significant damage to a
country’s prosperity and economy, but how effective are they at achieving that objective?
Specifically, this research investigates a question that has been completely overlooked in
the international relations literature until now: Can PCIs deter adversaries from executing
strategic cyberattacks?
To answer this question, I develop an incomplete-information model in which a challenger
considers attacking a defender. The challenger is not certain about the defender’s
cybercapacity and can only infer it from the defender’s observable PCIs. Thus, the
adversary’s decision to attack is endogenous to the defender’s type, and the defender has an
incentive to over-invest in public cybercapacity in order to signal that it is stronger that it
actually is.
This model leads to several insights. First, there are a large number of equilibria for
which PCIs have no influence on the challenger. Second, I show that the target countries’
strategic use of PCIs to deter their adversaries works only when two conditions are met:
(1) the adversary believes that a country possesses significant cybercapabilities and that it
would therefore be too costly to attack that country; and (2) the adversary is susceptible to
the cost exacted by PCIs. This finding shows that PCIs influence an adversary’s decision to
attack only in limited cases. Despite that, weaker states over-invest in PCIs to signal higher
cybercapacity than they possess, and strong cyber states over-invest so that their adversaries
do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong.
Scarce data on cyberincidents and PCIs,1 compounded by the secrecy surrounding
1 Currently, there are only two published datasets on cyberincidents: Valeriano and Maness 2018’s Dyadic
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national security issues, make it difficult to undertake a rigorous empirical test of my model’s
findings. Instead, I use a series of interviews with cybersecurity experts, intelligence reports,
and examples of attempted election interference to establish the empirical plausibility of
my theory. The evidence I obtained through these means supports the theory’s central
conjecture that deterrence by PCIs works but only in limited cases.
This paper makes a number of theoretical contributions to the existing
international-relations literature. First, it helps us better understand the nature of
deterrence in the information age. My unique strategic logic of PCIs as a proxy for
a country’s cybercapacity represents a departure from existing literature. While most
scholarly works on cyber-to-cyber deterrence focus on deterrence by punishment using
cyberoperations (Baliga et al. 2018; Gartzke and Lindsay 2015; Lindsay 2013; Rid 2013;
Valeriano and Maness 2014, 2018), this project presents a new theory that explains how
PCIs can deter by both prevention and threat of punishment, by signaling an increase in
both defensive and offensive cybercapabilities. This project also contributes to the literature
on cross-domain deterrence (Gartzke and Lindsay 2019) by explaining situations in which
countries use PCIs to deter their adversaries because non-cyber foreign policy options (i.e.,
economic sanctions, or diplomatic or military responses) are ineffective and/or costly.
Second, much of the literature on cybercoercion either focuses on intelligence and policy
dilemmas confronting major powers or seeks to adapt existing theories of coercive diplomacy
and deterrence to explain the strategic behavior of major powers in cyberspace (Borghard
and Lonergan 2017; Brantly 2016; Gartzke 2013; Libicki 2009; Lindsay and Gartzke 2015;
Nye Jr 2017; Valeriano and Maness 2018). I, instead, seek to explain the strategic behavior
of weaker cyber states or middle powers when these states suspect a cyberattack. In these
situations, middle powers often must rely on their own cybercapabilities because their allies
are unlikely to help. Cyberdefenses are unique to each country and not easily transferable;
Cyber Incident Dataset and Kostyuk and Zhukov 2019’s data on conflict in Ukraine. Datasets on
cyberinstitutions are in the process of being developed (Kostyuk 2020a).
128
close allies are often reluctant to disclose information about their offensive cybercapabilities
and/or commit cyberattacks on an ally’s behalf (as compared with their willingness to offer
military assistance during territorial invasions).
Third, this paper uses new sources to provide the first-ever theoretically informed
explanation of how nations can use their cybercapabilities to deter state-sponsored
interference campaigns. Most works on this relatively new phenomenon are limited to
descriptive policy reports or formal accusations that trace evidence to potential perpetrators
(Brattberg and Maurer 2018a; Cederberg 2018; Galante and EE 2018; Mueller 2019;
USDepartmentOfJustice 2018c,a).
The literature on the “bargaining model of war” focuses on how private information and
incentives to misrepresent, and commitment problems affected by power shifts explain costly
armed conflict (e.g., Fearon 1995, Reiter 2003, Powell 2006). Like this literature, my model
demonstrates that states tend to use costly signals and over-invest in their capabilities to
make their adversaries misinterpret the existing balance of power (Morrow 1989a); states
also tend to keep certain capabilities secret to obtain military advantage (Reiter 2003).
What is new about my model then? First, a different theoretical foundation drives a
nation’s decision regarding how to signal its cybercapacity. Unlike in the case of military
capacity, states cannot launch parades to signal their cybercapacity. Satellite images are also
unlikely to be useful to adversaries seeking to estimate a state’s cyberstrength. An executed
cyberattack may provide the target with a good estimate of the attacker’s capabilities, but
such an attack also de-values capability because it provides adversaries with instructions
on how to fix flaws in their own networks and systems. The time-limited life-span and the
dynamic nature of cyberoperations further complicate their signaling potential. While the
basic parameters for most traditional weapons remain relatively static, strategically relevant
features of certain cyberweapons might look quite different tomorrow (Libicki 2009). As a
result, signaling cybercapacity via PCIs is more effective than signaling via cyberoperations
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because it (1) preserves the value of a state’s cyberoperations, which diminishes after use, and
(2) provides the adversary with an immediate, often rough proxy for the state’s cybercapacity.
This logic demonstrates that a state makes this signaling choice not only to make the
adversary overestimate its capability but also to preserve the value of its secret cyber arsenal.
Second, existing models focus only on whether and how investment in military capacity
can deter a future attack or affect the likelihood of winning a war.2 My theoretical foundation
instead explains that sources of state cybercapacity are more diverse, lie beyond military and
government, and extend to a state’s private sector and even public-opinion management.
While investing in military cybercapacity is important for deterrence by the threat of
punishment, to deter adversaries by prevention, states might, for example, invest significant
resources into building public awareness about the danger of cyberoperations and information
operations, making potential election-interference campaigns harder.
Regarding the model, the closest works are Jackson and Morelli (2009), Powell (1993),3
Meirowitz and Sartori (2008),4 Debs and Monteiro (2014),5 and Morrow (1989a).6 But none
of these models focus on a state’s cybercapacity; instead, they explain how the state uses its
conventional military capability to lead wars and/deter its opponents. Baliga et al. (2018)
2 Some of these works include Debs and Monteiro (2014); Fearon (2018); Kydd (2000); Meirowitz and Sartori
(2008); Morrow (1989b); Slantchev (2005).
3 Using dynamic games, Jackson and Morelli (2009) and Powell (1993) examine how states simultaneously
or sequentially invest in their arms. The authors explain guns-versus-butter and peace-versus-war effects
of this choice. Unlike both models, mine assumes that an adversary is already armed at the time that it is
contemplating an attack. Moreover, instead of the guns-versus-butter choice, I focus on how the defender
chooses to allocate its resources between PCIs and covert cyberactivity in order to deter an adversary.
4 Meirowitz and Sartori (2008, 33) begin with complete information and use imperfect information about
states’ choices to acquire arms in order to demonstrate how self-interests and strategy can drive states’
decisions to acquire arms “in such a way as to create uncertainty about their military capability.” While
my model distinguishes between the defender’s public and covert cybercapabilities, it involves incomplete
information about a defender’s type, not its choices.
5 Similarly to Meirowitz and Sartori (2008), Debs and Monteiro (2014) focus on arming decisions that are
not observable and how these decisions can lead to preventive wars. My model does not focus on preventive
wars. Instead, it explains how observable PCIs can deter an adversary contemplating a cyberattack from
executing this attack.
6 Similar to Morrow (1989a), my model explains how the uncertainty about capabilities, and the divergence
between observable and real capabilities, lead to conflict. But unlike Morrow (1989a)’s sequential bargaining
model, with alternating offers by both states, my model focuses on how a state’s allocation of resources to
its PCIs allows an adversary to estimate a state’s cybercapacity and decide whether to attack.
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is the only other model that focuses on cyberdeterrence. In particular, this model explores
how the state’s inability to correctly attribute the origin of cyberoperations and to detect
the fact that it has been cyberattacked affects this state’s chances of deterring potential
attackers. Unlike that model, where there is uncertainty over the signal’s sender while the
signal’s quality is clear, my model investigates situations where the signal’s sender is known
but the signal’s quality is unclear. I chose to approach the inferential problem differently
from Baliga et al. (2018) because I look at the effect of PCIs—and not cyberattacks—that
signal both offensive and defensive cybercapacity.
Lastly, similarly to works on counter-terrorism policies (Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Dragu
2011; Dragu and Polborn 2014; Faria 2006), my model explains whether and why nations
might over-invest in public capacity and how effective these policies are. In addition to
over-investing due to security concerns, states also over-invest in public counter-terrorism
measures because of electoral pressure (Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Dragu and Polborn 2014),
legal limits on executive power (Dragu and Polborn 2014), and a anti-terrorist agency’s level
of privacy protections (Dragu 2011), among other reasons. This paper explains that nations
might over-invest in public cybercapability to deter their adversaries, who are unable to
directly evaluate nations’ actual cybercapability. This signaling choice helps nations preserve
their secret cyber arsenals whose value diminishes after use and, at the same time, reach
a wider audience. Because a weak state can appear strong by inflating PCIs, an optimal
resource allocation between public and covert cybercapacity may not be sufficient to deter
weak nations from mimicking PCIs of strong nations. Despite this race to over-invest in
public cybercapacity, my model shows that this deterrence strategy works only in limited
cases—a finding that resonates with Faria (2006)’s conclusion regarding the effectiveness of
deterrence as a counter-terrorism policy.
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4.1 Public Cyberinstitutions
I define public cyberinstitutions (PCIs) as publicly observable efforts aimed at signaling a
country’s level of offensive and defensive cybercapability.7 I distinguish two types of PCIs.
A state can: (1) create a new agency program, initiative, doctrine, strategy, or policy to
address some aspect of cybersecurity or (2) add new cyber roles to existing agencies or new
cyber provisions to existing policies. For instance, Sweden created the first type of PCI
by establishing an agency responsible for psychological defense to “improve the ability of
Swedish society to withstand pressure from a potential opponent” (Sweden’s Defense Policy:
2016 to 2020 2015, 5). An example of the second type of PCI is the hack-back strategy that
Germany considered, in preparation for the 2017 German elections, that would allow the
country to response to a potential cyberattack in a real time (Schwirtz 2017).
While PCIs often do not reveal all the details about a new initiative or a program, unlike
covert cyberactivity they allow an adversary to estimate the scope of the change and the
potential resulting increase in the target state’s cybercapacity. For instance, by adding voting
machines to a list of critical infrastructure objects after the 2016 U.S. elections (Johnson
2017), the U.S. government signaled that it prioritized spending its resources on building
better security for these machines, making them more difficult to hack. This information is
important for an adversary considering a cyberattack because non-state actors tend to be
important sources of state cybercapacity (Maurer 2018). For instance, Presidential Policy
Directive/PPD-21 (2013) introduced a collaboration program between the U.S. government
and the U.S. private sector focused on critical infrastructure protection. According to the
U.S. government, it planned through this program to “increase the volume, timeliness, and
quality of cyberthreat information shared with U.S. private sector entities” that chose to
participate in the program. Using the intelligence provided, the U.S. private sector would
7 It is important to know that these efforts do not need to be observable to the public but they should be
observable to potential adversaries.
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“protect and defend [itself] against cyberthreats” (Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21
2013).
I argue that public cyberinstitutions can deter by prevention and/or by threat of
punishment. PCIs can deter by prevention because adversaries may infer that their attacks
are likely to fail against the defenses implied by a PCI. A firewall, updated computer software,
or a new program aimed at educating the public about cyberthreat and information threats
are all examples of PCIs that can deter by prevention if they are perceived by an adversary
to make hacking more difficult. The 2013 Executive Order 13636, which outlined a set of
measures meant to provide better security for U.S. critical infrastructure objects against
cyberthreats (Obama 2013), falls into this category. Other sorts of PCIs can deter by the
threat of punishment. For instance, when the first French cyber offensive doctrine was
released (Public Elements of the Doctrine on Military Cyber Offensive 2019), the French
Defense Ministry stated that the country was “not afraid” of using cyber “weapons” in
response to cyberthreats (Laudrain 2019). Finally, some PCIs can deter by both prevention
and threat of punishment. The U.S. Cyber Strategy (2015, 3) uses deterrence by prevention
by specifying the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) role in defending its information networks,
and it uses the threat of punishment by establishing a Cyber Mission Force that will be used
to defend the United States against cyberattacks of “significant consequence.”
There are two reasons why I investigate situations in which both deterrence mechanisms
are at play. First, as the U.S. Cyber Strategy (2015)’s example demonstrates, one institution
can signal both cyber offensive and defensive capability, making it hard to separate deterrence
by the threat of punishment from deterrence by prevention. Second, when faced with a
strategic cyberthreat, states tend to respond with multiple cyberinstitutions and, as a result,
implement both types of deterrence at the same time to maximize their chances of success.
With main concepts defined, I will next venture into the relatively uncharted territory of
modeling strategic cyberattack deterrence using public cyberinstitutions.
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4.2 The Theory of Cyber Deterrence
The theory presented here examines the specific context in which a strong challenger (“he”)
contemplates a strategic cyberattack against a defender (“she”).8 When the challenger
considers a cyberattack, he calculates the value he can gain from this attack (e.g.,
undermining democratic processes, in the case of election interference) and the cost he can
incur. There are two types of costs. First is the cost of the defender’s potential retaliation
(e.g., using economic sanctions or cyberoperations). Second is the tendency of the value of
cyberoperations, unlike military operations, to diminish in value after their first use (Libicki
2007). A tank, for example, can be successfully deployed many times over many years.
Cyberattacks, on the other hand, often lose their effectiveness after their first use, even if
the attack fails due to the defender’s defenses. In using cyberattacks, the challenger risks
the possibility that the defender might be able to develop protection against similar attacks
in the future.
I argue that, for a challenger to decide to use a cyberattack against a defender, he must
believe that the attack’s value will outweigh its cost. What can change the attack’s value
and cost? Specifically, what can raise the cost enough to deter the challenger?
I argue that the costs from non-cyber foreign policy tools (i.e., diplomatic or military
responses, or economic sanctions) will not change the value and cost because they have
already been considered by the challenger in the initial decision-making process. These costs
are easy to estimate using the defender’s past history and are highly predictable based on the
challenger’s “prior beliefs about the defender’s willingness” to use one of these options (Fearon
2002, 6). Moreover, given that the defender’s capability in non-cyber foreign policy domains
8 I employ the language from the traditional deterrence literature and refer to an adversary as a challenger
and a defending state as a defender. The model makes an assumption that the defender attempts to deter
her strongest challenger, as those challengers can potentially cause the most significant damage. If she is
able to deter her strongest challenger, then all her other challengers will be deterred by default. Because
the model focuses only on the strong challenger, I have omitted “strong” and refer only to a “challenger” for
the remainder of the paper.
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is unlikely to change rapidly, the challenger’s estimate of the costs imposed by diplomatic
responses and economic sanctions is likely to be fairly accurate. The challenger is also aware
that military responses are costly and that it is therefore quite unlikely that the defender
will launch a military strike in response to information operations or cyberoperations.9
Given that challengers are unlikely to be deterred by a fear of a diplomatic or military
response, or by economic sanctions, the defender is left with cyber foreign policy tools to
deter the challenger from executing cyberattacks. I argue that cyber foreign policy tools
may raise the cost of a cyberattack for the challenger. Even if the challenger has a rough
estimate of the defender’s cybercapacity, the dynamic and time-limited nature of cyber
tools makes it difficult for the challenger to determine the defender’s cybercapacity with
precision or certainty. Specifically, while the basic parameters for most traditional weapons
remain relatively static, strategically relevant features of certain cyber weapons can change
significantly over a very short period of time. Even though conventional platforms become
obsolete over time, the life spans of cyberoperations are much shorter because they depreciate
after their first use and because the defender might recognize and fix the vulnerability before
the challenger is able to exploit it (Axelrod and Iliev 2014; Huntley 2018).
For deterrence to be successful, the defender must demonstrate two things: (1) resolve
and (2) capability (Schelling 2008). Given that the defender knows she is facing a challenger
contemplating a cyberattack, I assume the defender’s resolve is high to use her capability
to respond to the challenger in this high-stakes scenario (Press 2005).10 In this scenario,
deterrence depends on perceived, rather than actual, cyberstrength on the part of the
defender (Jervis 1976). To understand how the defender can achieve the appearance of
cyberstrength, we must first understand how a defender develops cybercapacity.
9 For instance, the Israeli Defense Force bombing a building where the Hamas group allegedly operated is
the first example when a state used a physical attack in response to cyberoperations (Newman 2019).
10 This assumption allows me to explain the effect of the distribution of capabilities on deterrence. I relax
this assumption and discuss how resolve can affect my model equilibria in Section 4.3.
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Cybercapacity. All nations have limited resources that they can allocate to cybercapacity.
For simplicity, I assume that, to maximize this capability, a government can divide
these resources between PCIs, which publicly signal the defender’s cyber offensive and
defensive capability,11 and covert cyberactivity (CCA), which involves secret development
of cybercapabilities and ongoing cyberoperations.12 Various programs, unknown to the
challenger,13 within intelligence agencies provide examples of covert cyberactivity.
There is a big difference between public and covert cybercapability in terms of a state’s
ability to send a signal about its overall cybercapacity. On the one hand, signaling
cybercapacity via covert cyberoperations provides the challenger with a more accurate
estimate of the defender’s capability. But the difficulty of attributing the origin of
cyberoperations and the time it takes to do so diminish the signal’s value, which is further
reduced by the time-limited life-span and the dynamic nature of cyberoperations. Signaling
cybercapacity via PCIs, on the other hand, provides the defender’s allies, adversaries,
domestic and international audiences with an immediate, often rough proxy for the state’s
cybercapacity and preserves the value of a state’s covert cyberoperations. For these reasons,
a state can get more bang for its buck by signaling via PCIs.
It is important to note that this model does not exclude the possibility that countries can
use cyberoperations to signal their capacity to an adversary. In my model, I incorporate this
signaling into the challenger’s prior beliefs regarding the defender’s overall cybercapability. If
the defender is strong and is able to leave non-malicious code in the challenger’s systems, the
challenger will be more likely to believe that the defender is strong. Weaker nations, on the
other hand may not have this capability. Thus, their only way to signal their cybercapability
may be to use PCIs. At the start of the game, I assume that such transparent covert
11 Section 4.1 provides a detailed explanation of PCIs.
12 Using primary evidence from my interviews, I assume that both PCIs and CCA are jointly optimal for
the development of a defender’s cybercapacity, and I opt to focus on the effect of public cyberinstitutions
on deterrence. Section 4.6 gives an overview of my interviews.
13 How much of the defender’s CCA are unknown to the challenger depends on the challenger’s (cyber and
non-cyber) intelligence capability.
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operations have already taken place. It is also worth noting that, just because a defender
has the ability to access a challenger’s systems and can leave non-malicious code to send a
message, there is no guarantee that they will do so; it is possible that they would prefer to
exploit this vulnerability at a later date. Thus, to signal their capability, they may instead
use PCIs.
PCIs and CCA form the defender’s overall cybercapacity, which does not necessarily
increase solely through increased investment in her PCIs because such a strategy takes
valuable resources away from CCA. For instance, a polished strategy document or
newly-constructed headquarters is a poor substitute for covert cyberactivity like penetrating
the challenger’s electricity grid and preparing for a future attack that could be used for
retaliation or for demonstrating the defender’s cybercapacity. As a result, over-investment
in PCIs at the expense of CCA can make a defender weaker. However, the relationship
between the defender’s overall cybercapacity and her chances at deterrence is not linear—i.e.,
an increase in one does not necessarily mean an increase in the other. Therefore, a defender
with weak cybercapabilities might strategically invest more in PCIs if such an investment
maximizes her chances at deterrence, even if it decreases her overall cybercapacity. I will
now model this logic explicitly.
Game Overview
This is a game between a challenger (C, “he") and a defender (D, “she"). C considers
executing a cyberattack against D. To deter C, D decides how to allocate her resources
between public and private cybercapacity and, as a result, which level of PCIs to implement.
D has a type θ ∈ {S,W} that differs in the amount of resources aθ available to her. The
strong defender DS has many more resources available to her than the weak defender DW .
θ is non-observable to the challenger.
The game starts with Nature’s choice. Nature selects that θ = S with probability pi
137
and that θ = W with probability 1 − pi. The model assumes that both players have a
common prior belief and that pi is the true probability that the defender is strong. Then D
decides how to allocate her resources between PCIs and CCA. After D implements PCIs,
C observes it, (possibly) updates his beliefs about D’s type, and decides whether he wants
to attack D. When C chooses whether to attack, he does so knowing the level of PCIs
D implements, but not knowing D’s type with certainty in most cases14 because D’s CCA
is not completely observable. Section 4.6 displays this two-player game with incomplete
information concerning D’s type.
Defender. Suppose D has a units of resources available for cybercapacity. Let I(r) denote
the PCIs that D can develop with r units of resources and let N(r) denote the CCA that D
can develop with r units of resources. I assume that both I and N are increasing in r and
that there are diminishing returns to investment in each (i.e. I ′(r), N ′(r) > 0 and I ′′(r),
N ′′(r) < 0).
When D invests r units of resources into PCIs, D’s overall cybercapability is c(r) =
I(r)+N(a− r). Since c is concave in r, a unique maximum exists.15 The level of investment
in PCIs rˆ that maximizes overall capability cˆ solves the equation
cˆ = maxr∈[0,a]c(r) = maxr∈[0,a]I(r) +N(a− r). (4.1)
Let Iˆ = I(rˆ) be the corresponding level of PCIs. Notice that c′(rˆ) = I ′(rˆ)−N ′(a− rˆ) = 0,
or I ′(rˆ) = N ′(a − rˆ). Thus rˆ can be viewed as an implicit function of a. Differentiating rˆ
with respect to a yields ∂rˆ
∂a
= N ′′(a− rˆ)/(I ′′(rˆ) + N ′′(a− rˆ)), which is positive for all a, by
the diminishing returns assumption. Thus rˆ is increasing in a.
14 C knows D’s type in a separating equilibrium, discussed later in Propositions 3.
15Recall that cybercapacity is a proxy for the defender’s ability to deter a challenger. When cybercapacity is
maximized, so is the defender’s chances at deterring the challenger from attacking her. D’s cybercapacity
does not necessarily increase simply by investing more in her PCIs because such a strategy takes valuable
resources away from CCA. As a result, it is optimal for the defender to allocate her resources so that
marginal returns are equal from I(r) and N(r).
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between Defender’s Type and Overall Cybercapacity as a Function of Iθ
I and N are the same for both strong and weak nations. The two types differ only in the
resources available for investment. Let us assume that DS has two units of resources that she
can invest in cybercapacity (aS = 2) and DW has one unit of resources (aW = 1). When Dθ
invests r units of resources into PCIs, Dθ’s overall cybercapability is cθ(r) = I(r)+N(aθ−r).
As above, let rˆθ denote the level of investment in PCIs that maximizes cθ, let cˆθ = cθ(rˆθ),
and let Iˆθ = I(rˆθ). Recall that rˆ is increasing in a. Thus rˆW < rˆS. Finally, I assume that
DW is able to invest enough resources to attain IˆS.16
Because C is able to observe I, it will be convenient to interpret c as a function of I.
Since I is a one-to-one function, r can be expressed as a function of I and so N can also be
expressed as a function of I. It follows that cθ can be expressed as a function of I, namely
cθ(I) = I + N(aθ − r(I)). The graph of cθ is shown in Figure 4.1. Here, the x-axis depicts
Dθ’s observed cybercapacity (Iθ) and the y-axis depicts Dθ’s overall cybercapacity (c). Let
Maxθ = (Iˆθ, cˆθ) denote the maximum point of the graph of cθ. Since rˆW < rˆS, we have that
IˆW < IˆS. If 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, then cW (r) = I(r) + N(1 − r) < I(r) + N(2 − r) = cS(r) and so
cW (I) < cS(I) for all levels of PCIs that DW can achieve. Thus, for each I, DS has greater
deterrence chances than DW .
16 Under this assumption, there will be five equilibria. If DW cannot attain IˆS , there would only be two
equilibria, in which PCIs have no influence (c.f. Proposition 1).
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When D decides how to allocate her resources, she faces the following optimization
problem:
minP (I) ∗Q(c) ∗ L, (4.2)
where P is the probability of an attack; Q is the probability that any attack is successful; and
L is the loss to a successful attack.17 P depends on the observed cybercapacity I, whereas
Q depends on total cybercapacity c. If the type were known, then each type would invest Iˆ
in PCIs as this level of investment would minimize both P and Q, and hence, the product
in Equation 4.2. But, as I show later, in some instances the defender may have an incentive
to deviate from this level of investment if doing so reduces the probability of an attack.
Challenger. C attacks D whenever his net gains from attacking outweigh his net gains
from not attacking (Equation 4.3):
[ηQ(cS(I)) + (1− η)Q(cW (I))]G > R. (4.3)
Here, η is the posterior belief that the defender is strong. Q, as defined above, is the
probability that the attack is successful that depends on D’s total capability c, given the
observed capability I. In the case of DS, it is cS(I) and in the case of DW , it is cW (I). G
is the gain if the attack is successful. R is C’s reservation utility (R ≥ 0). Section 4.6 of
Appendix 4.6 explains in details what goes into this calculation.
Solution Concept. The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, defined by the
set of strategies and beliefs:
(σθ, P (I), η(I)),
which are probability distributions that (1) Dθ implements each possible level of PCIs; (2)
the probability that C attacks Dθ as a function of Dθ’s PCIs that C observes; and (3) C’s
17 This choice involves important calculations that I present in Section 4.6.
140
posterior probability that Dθ is of a strong type, given PCIs he observes. Section 4.6 provides
a detailed explanation of the equilibrium components.
Model Equilibria. In this section, I discuss the intuition behind the model equilibria and
Section 4.6 provides all formal statements and proofs.
The equilibrium depends on the value of R relative to three cutoff values:
Q(cS(IˆS))G < [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1− pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G < Q(cW (IˆW ))G. (4.4)
Q(cW (IˆW ))G stands for C’s gains from attacking DW , given the probability that this
attack is successful. Q(cW (IˆW ))G is the largest out of the three values represented in
Inequality 4.4 because it is the easiest to attack DW . Q(cS(IˆS))G is the smallest value
because the probability of successfully attacking DS is the smallest. The value in the
middle—[piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1 − pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G—stands for C’s gains from attacking D, given
that with pi probability he is facing DS and with 1 − pi probability, he is facing DW that
pools with DS and implements IˆS. Q(cW (IˆS)) < Q(cW (IˆW )) because DW reduces her overall
cybercapacity by pretending to be strong and, as a result, increases the probability of C’s
successful attack.
Figure 4.2 displays the same three cutoff values in relationship to R, depicted by a
horizontal line. Let us understand how these relationships affect the type of equilibria that
occur in each of these regions.
Figure 4.2: Equilibria and Challenger’s Types
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In Region IV where Q(cW (IˆW ))G < R, C’s reservation value is higher than C’s gain from
attacking even if C knows that the defender is weak and implements IˆW . Since C never
attacks (¬A), I call him a disinterested challenger. In Region I where R < Q(cS(IˆS))G, C’s
gains from attacking are higher than the reservation value even if C knows that the defender
is strong and implements IˆS. Since C always attacks (A), I call him an undeterred challenger.
In both regions, both types of the defender have no influence over C’s behavior. As a result,
they have no incentive to implement anything other than their optimal strategy (Dθ → Iˆθ).
Proposition 1 summarizes both equilibria.
Proposition 1. Challenger’s Decision to Attack Is Independent of Defender’s
Public cyberinstitutions.
(a) If Q(cW (IˆW ))G < R, Dθ maximizes her cybercapacity and C never attacks. A
representative equilibrium of the above unique equilibrium outcome is: σS(IˆS) =
σW (IˆW ) = 1, and P (Iˆθ) = 0, η(IˆS) = 1, η(IˆW ) = 0.
(b) If R < Q(cS(IˆS))G, Dθ maximizes her cybercapacity and C always attacks. A
representative equilibrium of the above unique equilibrium outcome is: σS(IˆS) =
σW (IˆW ) = 1, and P (Iˆθ) = 1, η(IˆS) = 1, η(IˆW ) = 0.
The strategic use of PCIs to deter C occurs in the signaling region where there is both
the need for and the possibility of deterrence. Here Dθ’s PCIs can influence C, which will
take different actions depending on the defender’s true type. Specifically, the challenger will
attack the defender if he knows that the defender is weak and will avoid attacking if he
knows the defender is strong. I call this challenger opportunistic. In this region, depicted by
Regions II and III in Figure 4.2, there are two pure strategy equilibria (Propositions 2- 3)
and one mixed strategy equilibrium (Proposition 4), which depend on where R falls relative
to [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1− pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G.
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If [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1 − pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G < R < Q(cW (IˆW ))G (Region III of Figure 4.2), C
will attack DW if DW implements IˆW . If DW mimics DS and plays IˆS, however, C has no
way to tell which type he is facing and believes the defender is strong with probability of the
prior pi (η = pi). At the prior belief, C does not attack. As a result, instead of implementing
IˆW to maximize her overall cybercapacity (point MaxW in Figure 4.3a) and face an attack
with certainty, DW strictly prefers pooling with DS (point A in Figure 4.3a) and facing
no attack. This pooling equilibrium holds only when the probability of the defender being
strong (pi) is high enough. Note that [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1−pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G is decreasing in pi as
Q(cS(IˆS)) < Q(cW (IˆS)). The minimum value of pi for the pooling equilibrium to hold should
be at least
pi >
R−GQ(cW (IˆS))
G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS)))
. (4.5)
Proposition 2 presents this pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Pooling Equilibrium. If [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1 − pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G < R <
Q(cW (IˆW ))G and pi > R−GQ(cW (IˆS))G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS))) , Dθ implements IˆS and C attacks only when
he sees IˆW . A representative equilibrium of the above unique equilibrium outcome is:
σS(IˆS) = σW (IˆS) = 1, P (IˆW ) = 1, η(IˆW ) = 0, and P (IˆS) = 0, η(IˆS) = pi; for any
I /∈ {IˆS, IˆW}, P (I) ∈ [0, 1], η(I) ∈ [0, 1].18
If the probability of the defender being strong is low (pi < R−GQ(cW (IˆS))
G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS)))), C
interprets pooling as weak and attacks when he sees IˆS. This happens if Q(cS(IˆS))G <
R < [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1 − pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G (Region II of Figure 4.2). DS is aware that DW is
trying to imitate her PCIs. As a result, DS can take one of the two following actions. First,
not wanting to be confused with DW , DS alters her behavior to clearly distinguish herself
from DW to ensure that C is deterred. Specifically, DS spends enough resources to reach a
level of PCIs that DW cannot attain: I > IW (1) (recall that IW (1) is the maximum level
18 It is important to note that off-the-equilibrium beliefs do not matter here because no D has an incentive
to deviate from this equilibrium since C does not attack.
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of PCIs that DW can attain) or I¯ (point B in Figure 4.3b). Observing I¯, C knows that the
defender is strong as DW could not play that strategy. Not able to pool with DS at I¯, DW
implements her optimal strategy IˆW . Since separation is costly as it reduces DS’s overall
capacity (Q(cS(I¯)) < Q(cS(IˆS))), for this equilibrium to hold C should not attack when he
sees I¯ even though he knows that DS’s overall capacity is reduced (Q(cS(I¯))G < R).
Proposition 3. Separating Equilibrium. If Q(cS(IˆS))G < R < [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1 −
pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G, pi < R−GQ(cW (IˆS))G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS))) , and Q(cS(I¯))G < R, DW implements IˆW , DS
implements I¯, and C attacks only when he sees IˆW . A representative equilibrium of the above
unique equilibrium outcome is: σW (IˆW ) = σS(I¯) = 1, P (IˆW ) = 1, η(IˆW ) = 0, P (I¯) = 0, and
η(I¯) = 1.
(a) Pooling Strategy (b) Strategic Separation Strategy
Figure 4.3: Defender’s Pure Strategy Actions when Facing an Opportunistic Challenger
Second, if DS decides not to implement PCIs that DW is not able to mimic (I ≤ IW (1))
because this will weaken DS’s defenses and invite an attack, then a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist with the strategies IˆW and IˆS in Region II of Figure 4.2. If both types
implement IˆS, C attacks. As a result, DW has no incentive to play IˆS because since she
is going to be attacked she does better allocating her resources optimally. If each type
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implements Iˆθ, then C attacks IˆW and DW has an incentive to pool. While there exists no
pure strategy equilibrium, there does exist a mixed strategy equilibrium where DW mixes
between IˆW and IˆS and C is indifferent between attacking and not.
DW mixes with a probability that makes C indifferent between attacking and not:
η =
R−GQ(cW (IˆS))
G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS)))
. (4.6)
Since 0 < η < pi in Region II of Figure 4.2, for this equilibrium to hold, R < GQ(cW (IˆS))
and R − GQ(cW (IˆS)) < GQ(cS(IˆS)) − GQ(cW (IˆS)). C attacks with a probability such
that DW is indifferent between implementing IˆW and IˆS; it is when P (IˆS)Q(cW (IˆS))L =
P (IˆW )Q(cW (IˆW ))L. Since P (IˆW ) = 1,
P (IˆS) =
Q(cW (IˆW ))
Q(cW (IˆS))
, (4.7)
which is less than one since the probability that C’s attack is successful is lower if DW plays
her optimal strategy.
Because DS gets attacked with some probability in this region, he would like to deviate
to I¯ > IˆS. If I¯ > IW (1), then C will know that the defender is strong and has reduced her
overall capacity by deviating to I¯. As a result, DS does not deviate to I¯ > IW (1) because it
invites an attack (Q(cS(I¯))G > R). Moreover, DS does not deviate to any I < IW (1) because
I assume that both types are equally likely to play any out-of-the-equilibrium strategy, as a
result, C’s out-of-the-equilibrium belief is the prior pi.
Proposition 4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium. If Q(cS(IˆS))G < R < [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1−
pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G, pi = R−GQ(cW (IˆS))G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS))) , and Q(cS(I¯))G > R,
1. DW mixes between IˆW and getting attacked with certainty and IˆS and getting attacked
with probability η = R−GQ(cW (IˆS))
G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS))) ;
2. DS maximizes her overall cybercapacity;
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3. C always attacks when he sees IˆW and mixes between attacking and not attacking when
he sees IˆS with P (IˆS) = Q(cW (IˆW ))Q(cW (IˆS)) .
A representative equilibrium of the above unique equilibrium outcome is: σS(IˆS) = 1,
σS(IˆW ) = 0, σW (IˆW ) = σW (IˆS) = R−GQ(cW (IˆS))G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS))) , σS(I¯) = σW (I¯) = 0, P (IˆW ) = 1,
η(IˆW ) = 0, P (IˆS) = Q(cW (IˆW ))Q(cW (IˆS)) , η(IˆS) =
R−GQ(cW (IˆS))
G(Q(cS(IˆS))−Q(cW (IˆS))) , P (I¯) = 1, η(I¯) = µ.
Table 4.1 lists assumptions and players’ actions under different model equilibria.
Additionally, it specifies whether the equilibria include any additional parameters that could
be found in Propositions 2- 4.
4.3 Comparative Statics
As explained earlier in Section 4.2, the model has five equilibria (Figure 4.2). Each of these
equilibria depends on the value of R in relationship to the cutoff points. If the value of R is
high, C’s gains from not attacking are greater than from attacking and we end up in Region
IV (Proposition 1, part (a)). When the value of R decreases to Region III, DW pools with
DS and C does not attack (Proposition 2). When the value of R becomes even lower, we
end up in Region II, where there are two possible equilibria—separating and mixing. In the
separating equilibrium, DS implements the level of PCIs that DW is not able to imitate. As a
result, DW implements IˆW and gets attacked (Proposition 3). In the mixing equilibrium, DW
mixes between IˆW and IˆS and C mixes between attacking and not attacking (Proposition 4).
When the value of R is the lowest, C’s gains from attacking are greater than from not
attacking and we end up in Region I (Proposition 1, part (a)).
But these equilibria do not only depend on the value of R, they also depend on the
following model parameters: pi, G, and Q(c). Let us explore how the equilibria range shifts
with a change in these parameters. Recall that Nature selects the defender’s type θ. With
probability pi, Nature selects θ = S, and with probability 1 − pi, Nature selects θ = W .
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When pi = 1, [piQ(cS(IˆS)) + (1 − pi)Q(cW (IˆS))]G = Q(cS(IˆS))G and as a result Region II
in Figure 4.2 disappears.19 This result shows that with an increase in the probability of
the defender being strong pi, weak nations are more likely able to deter their adversaries by
pretending that they are strong.
With an increase in C’s gains G, the boundaries of all regions in Figure 4.2 shift to the
right. As a result, Region IV shrinks because some weak types that were able to deter C
by maximizing their overall capacity will start pooling. Similarly, Region II absorbs some
portion of Region III because some weak types that were able to deter by pooling in Region
III will now start mixing and some strong types will separate themselves from weak types.
Lastly, Region I where deterrence is not possible will expand. This result shows that with an
increase in C’s gains from attacking, it becomes much more difficult to deter C. We observe
the same set of changes with an increase in the probability of C’s successful attack Q(c).
Now, let us examine how real-world factors can cause these changes in parameters,
resulting in equilibria shifts. The probability of C’s successful attack Q(c(I)) is a function
of D’s overall capacity, which is a function of D’s PCIs. In other words, how D decides to
allocate her resources between PCIs and CCA determines how successful C’s attack will be.
Among a plethora of factors that can affect D’s resource allocation, I focus on public opinion
and the influence of D’s alliances. I also consider how the influence of D’s alliances and D’s
resolve affect C’s gains G.
Public Opinion. Seventy percent of Americans expect that the U.S. public infrastructure
and financial systems will experience significant cyberattacks in the next five years (Smith
2018). To address this potential concern of voters, politicians can over-invest in PCIs
to “signal to their domestic audience that they are taking actions to solve the problem”
(Kostyuk 2019b: #50). This sub-optimal resource allocation might make people feel more
secure and guarantee leaders’ reelection (Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007; Gronke, Koch
19 Note that if pi = 0, then there are still four regions in Figure 4.2, since Q(cW (IˆS)) < Q(cW (IˆW )).
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and Wilson 2003).20 But the effectiveness of these measures is often doubtful (Bueno de
Mesquita 2007). An increase in public cybercapacity results in a decrease in overall capacity,
causing an increase in the probability of a successful attack. Corollary 1 summarizes this
counter-intuitive result.
Corollary 1. Public Opinion: With an increase in pro-PCI sentiment among the
population, D may implement a higher level of PCIs, leading to a decrease in D’s overall
cybercapacity and an increase in the probability of C’s successful attack.
Alliances. The presence of a strong ally for the defender can increase chances of extended
deterrence (Danilovic 2001; Huth and Russett 1988; Leeds 2003; Weede 1983) because
the combined military capacity of an alliance can reduce the challenger’s gains (Benson,
Meirowitz and Ramsay 2014; Leeds 2003; Morrow 1994; Smith 1995; Yuen 2009; Zagare and
Marc Kilgour 2003). The larger this combined capacity, the lower the challenger’s gains
or decreasing the probability of successful attack (Danilovic 2001; Fearon 1992; Huth and
Russett 1988; Leeds 2003; Weede 1983). This will shift all equilibria in Figure 4.2 to the left,
expanding the regions where deterrence can work.
Additionally, pressure from alliances can often explain a state’s decision to aggregate
its military capabilities (Schweller 1994; Sweeney and Fritz 2004). As a result, a strong
ally can also affect the defender’s resource allocation. For example, despite the fact
that Estonia mostly faces cybercrime, influence operations, and ransomware attacks as
opposed to state-sponsored cyberattacks (Annual Cyber Security Assessment 2017 Estonian
Information System Authority 2017, 9), the country prioritizes full operationalization of its
cyber command to be on par with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
(National Defence Development Plan 2017-2026 2017). Strong allies often provide resources
to their weaker partners to increase the latter’s capacity. To appear strong and satisfy their
20 Variation in regime type affects the extent to which public opinion matters on leaders’ decisions to use
force (Baum 2004; Berinsky 2009; Holsti 2004).
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allies, weaker partners may choose to over-invest in PCIs to appear strong. Such resource
misallocation will shift all equilibria in Figure 4.2 to the right, reducing the regions where
deterrence can work. As a result, pressure and assistance from allies have an ambiguous
effect on deterrence. Corollary 2 summarizes this counter-intuitive result.
Corollary 2. Ally Support: An increase in D’s ally influence, either in the form of support
or pressure, has an ambiguous effect on deterrece. On the one hand, it might lead to a
decrease in C’s gains, reducing the probability of C’s attack. On the other hand, it might
lead to an increase in D’s level of PCIs, leading to a decrease in D’s overall cybercapacity
and an increase in the probability of C’s successful attack.
This ambiguous effect of alliances may depend largely on the credibility of mutual
defense commitments. If the credibility is low or seemingly conditional, as recent President
Trump’s remark on NATO allied defense spending seemed to suggest (Haltiwanger 2019),
then incentives to over-invest are more likely. These incentives to over-invest might be
particularly true for the cyberrealm, where allies may disagree much more on what kinds
of responses are appropriate, leading even to a stronger case that alliances are not likely to
help deterrence much.
Resolve. As discussed in Section 4.2, for deterrence to be successful, D must demonstrate
her resolve and capability (Schelling 2008). My model presents a simple case that assumes
that D has a high resolve to use her capability to respond to C. What happens if we relax
this assumption? If we view resolve as a parameter of C’s gains G, an increase in resolve
will reduce G, shifting all equilibria in Figure 4.2 to the left and, as a result, expanding the
regions where deterrence can work. Corollary 3 summarizes this result.
Corollary 3. Defender’s Resolve: An increase in D’s resolve might lead to a decrease
in C’s gains from attack, reducing the probability of C’s attack.
While these equilibria shifts are plausible, they are unlikely. Resolve, in a reduced form, is a
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country’s reputation for defending itself over years. It is an observable feature. The country
cannot have resolve without demonstrating it, as summarized by Dr. Strangelove: “the...
whole point of the doomsday machine... is lost... if you keep it a secret!”
4.4 Evidence
The novelty, secrecy, and sensitivity of the topic of cyber deterrence prevents me from
conducting a rigorous empirical test of my findings. Instead, this paper aims to demonstrate
the empirical plausibility of my theory and provide support for my model equilibria, using
elite interviews and case studies of elections.
Interviews
I conducted sixty-five interviews with cybersecurity experts from twenty-five countries most
of whom were either current or former government employees.21 Figure 4.4 displays the
number of interviews that I conducted in-person or via video calls or emails between February
and December of 2018. In Israel and Estonia, I was able to conduct nine interviews during
this time.22
My interviewees pointed to two trends in the defender’s behavior. First is pooling
behavior among weak cyber nations where instead of developing cybercapabilities solely for
intelligence collection, for instance, these weaker cyber countries start developing offensive
cybercapabilities within their militaries. The main purpose of this “loud” signal, contrary
to quiet cyber intelligence operations, is “to signal the country’s readiness to go beyond
its national borders to punish cyber aggressors” (Kostyuk 2019b: #11). However, careful
examination of these public signals shows that the stated capability is not always present.
For instance, when asked for concrete details about the recruitment and training of cyber
21 I received an IRB approval to conduct my interviews on February 14, 2018 (Study #HUM00127749).
22 This section provides only a brief overview of the main trends from my interviews. Section 4.6 elaborates
on these trends.
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Figure 4.4: Number of Interviews per Country (February-December 2018)
soldiers, silence, vague responses, or the excuse that many countries were finding it difficult
to recruit cyber warriors into their forces followed (Kostyuk 2019b: #11, #20, # 35, #49).
This discrepancy between stated and actual capabilities may hint that countries use easy to
observe but difficult to verify public cyberinstitutions to make their adversaries overestimate
their existing cybercapabilities in the hopes of deterring them from attacking.23
Second is a strategic separation of strong cyber nations where despite their significant
cybercapabilities, cyber powers continue to invest in their public cyberinstitutions to
differentiate themselves from weaker nations. For instance, Russia has established
information warfare units (Reuters 2017) and is committed to invest between $200 million
and $250 million USD per year to significantly strengthen its offensive cybercapabilities,
and to create a cyber-deterrent that “will equate to the role played by nuclear weapons”
(Gerden 2016). Such additional investments and multiple public cyberinstitutions signal
“mostly failure” of the already implemented efforts (Kostyuk 2019b: #20). If deterrence had
23 Other reasons why a country might prioritize developping PCIs over CCA include an appeal to public,
cooperation with allies, and prestige (Kostyuk 2019b).
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worked and the country was ready and confident in its ability to defend itself in cyberspace,
it would not need “to make [any additional] noise” (Kostyuk 2019b: #20).
My interviewees profess the belief that deterrence is working in the case of strategic
cyberattack scenarios but remain skeptical of cyberinstitutions as an effective deterrent
mechanism, citing the difficulty of demonstrating this effect empirically as a major challenge.
They point to two signs of successful deterrence. First, the decision to design cyber weapons
with more care and precision shows that states have started practicing some restraint as
more nations become cyber-dependent (e.g., built-in restrictions in the WannaCry and
NotPetya attacks) (Kostyuk 2019b: #48, 49). Second, cyber powers have changed their
cyber strategies. With an increase in China’s reliance on the Internet, resulting in an
increase in China’s own cybervulnerability, the country has changed its cyber force posture
from brinkmanship to calibrated escalation, signaling to its adversaries that it wants to avoid
full-scale retaliation (Cunningham 2018).
Case Studies of Elections
My theory is agnostic regarding the type of a strategic cyberattack that a nation prefers
to deter. As one way to demonstrate that my theory holds, I draw evidence from
illustrative examples from elections (Section 4.4 and Section 4.4 from Appendix 4.6).
I focus on the presence or absence of state-directed24 election-interference campaigns
because such campaigns constitute a prominent subset of strategic cyberattacks. After
the interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, many nations added election protections to
their top national-security priorities. Given that 169 nations will have either presidential
or parliamentary elections in the next four years, and that all of these nations are vulnerable
to potential election-interference campaigns, the importance of understanding how to deter
such campaigns will only continue to grow.
24 Section 4.6 defines types of actions can constitute election interference as well as the various levels of
involvement a state can have in such actions.
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My comparative case study method focuses on Kremlin-directed attempts to influence
electoral campaigns in Western democracies. I choose the most similar cases for my
comparison (George 2019); they share the same cyber-capable attacker (Russia), have similar
targets (Western democracies), use the same methods (cyber and information operations
executed by the same set of actors), have the same purpose (election interference), and have
similar time frames (2016-2018). They differ, however, in the level of cyberinstitutions that
the targets implement.
My model predicts that Moscow is deterred when it overestimates its target’s
cybercapacity as a result of observing the target’s cyberinstitutions. This can be seen in
the 2017 Swedish election. In the other two scenarios, public cyberinstitutions had no effect
on the Kremlin’s decision whether to attack. In the German 2017 elections, a combination of
non-cyber factors shifted Russia’s cost-benefit calculus in favor of not attacking even before
cyberinstitutions were put in place (Section 4.6). In the U.S. 2016 elections, Moscow was
willing to pay any cost and risk any potential U.S. (cyber and/or non-cyber) retaliation for
an influence campaign that could help create a global authoritarian fraternity (Section 4.6).
2018 Swedish National Elections: Opportunistic Challenger & Pooling
Equilibrium
The 2018 Swedish national elections provide support for the pooling equilibrium in which
the challenger is opportunistic (Region III in Figure 4.2). By investing significant resources
into PCIs, Sweden, as a middle power, was able to create an impression that it possessed
significant cyber defenses and offenses and, as a result, was able to deter the Russian
government from interfering in the 2018 Swedish elections.
Why did Russia consider interfering in the Swedish electoral process? Sweden’s
non-alignment policy has always served as a guarantee of Russia’s security. Recently,
however, Sweden shifted its military non-alignment position by strengthening its
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international defense cooperation with NATO (Kunz 2015). In response, Russia’s defense
minister Sergei Shoigu described Sweden’s involvement in NATO activities as “worrying”
and added that “such steps...[were] forcing us to take response measures” (Russia Concerned
by Efforts to Draw Finland, Sweden Into NATO - Defense Minister 2018). Military actions
and/or economic sanctions are possible response measures, although to date, Russia has
pursued neither of these. The Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, combined with NATO-Swedish
defense cooperation (even if it falls short of collective defense) are most likely responsible for
preventing Russia from taking a military approach.
Russia is, on the other hand, a mastermind of influence campaigns and has been
preparing a strong foundation for such a campaign on the Swedish population for some time.
Starting in 2014, the Swedish information landscape witnessed an increase in disinformation
campaigns, led by trolls, bots, and Kremlin-sponsored media outlets, such as Sputnik
International (Kragh and Åsberg 2017, 774). Even after the Sweden-targeted version of
Sputnik International was terminated in the spring of 2016, other cyberoperations and
information campaigns aimed at influencing the Swedish public opinion continued. Russian
actors were behind a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks25 against Swedish
news sites and a disinformation campaign about NATO in the Swedish media.26 Moreover,
in 2016, the Swedish authorities reported an increase in information campaigns aimed at
“polarizing Swedish society, undermining stability, and spreading falsehoods” leading up to
the 2018 Swedish elections (Cederberg 2018, 5). A 2018 U.S. Senate report confirms this by
providing evidence that Sweden remained one of the few “favorite target[s] of the Kremlin’s
propaganda machine” (Putin’s Assymetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe 2018,
109).
These ongoing cyber and information operations were bolstered by a political climate
of anti-immigration sentiment in both the Swedish parliament and populace. Immigration
25 These attacks flood a website with multiple requests, making it crash.
26 See https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4627057-16-2517-CKK-2017-09-15-State-Production-3.html
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has always been a contentious issue in Swedish politics, recently exacerbated by the Syrian
refugee crisis. Over the last five years, Sweden, a country of ten million, has welcomed
165,000 asylum-seekers from the Middle East (Cerrotti 2017). To demonstrate how polarizing
the topic of immigration is in Swedish politics and among its population, let us look at the
Sweden Democrats party. Using immigration as one of its agenda items, the far-right Sweden
Democrats became the third largest party in the Swedish parliament in 2018 after having
occupied only two seats in 2010 (Johnson and Evans 2018). The party’s anti-immigration
stance and the divide in the general population over the immigration issue presented the
perfect environment for the Kremlin’s influence campaigns.
However, by 2018, in the immediate lead-up to the election, Kremlin-linked
disinformation campaigns seemed to fade, and there was no outright election interference
(Cederberg 2018). Why? What stopped Russia from interfering in the Swedish elections?
I argue that the Swedish government’s persistence, drive, and transparency in establishing
public cyberinstitutions aimed at protecting its elections most likely convinced Russia
that an interference campaign would have been too costly. Even prior to Russia’s 2016
U.S.-election interference, the Swedish government took significant publicly observable
steps to improve its cyber defense and offense in order to deter future information
operations and cyberoperations. Having witnessed Russia’s interference in the U.S. elections,
Sweden, assuming that its 2018 election would be the Kremlin’s next target, preemptively
substantially increased their already ongoing efforts.
Swedish defense started with clearly defined priorities. As early as 2015, Sweden’s Defense
Policy named protection of democracy as one of the country’s security objectives (Sweden’s
Defense Policy: 2016 to 2020 2015)—an objective reiterated in National Cybersecurity Policy
(2017). The documents laid out a series of measures aimed at creating better cyber defenses
to “raise the threshold [of] attacking Sweden” (National Cybersecurity Policy 2017, 19).
Importantly, Sweden has designated its election systems as critical infrastructure.
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The government also increased the budgets of existing agencies to include election
protection into their scope, and it established new agencies, forums, and programs to protect
against election interference and disinformation campaigns. The Swedish government’s crisis
preparation and response agency became the main authority for election coordination.
Through a special Cabinet decision, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB),
together with the Swedish Security Services and the Election Authority, was tasked with
coordinating election protection. The Swedish Agency for Public Management became
responsible for “coordinating Swedish public agencies which could carry out ‘psychological
defense” ’ (SverigesRadio 2017) during peacetime to “improve the ability of Swedish society
to withstand pressure from a potential opponent” (Sweden’s Defense Policy: 2016 to 2020
2015, 5).
Swedish security services (SÄPO), the Swedish Police Authority, the Election Authority,
and MSB established a high-level national forum, responsible for briefing election
administrators on potential threats (Cederberg 2018). Having created a confidential report
using past cases of election interference, this forum traveled throughout the country to
educate local election administrators about how better to protect against these cyberthreats
(Cederberg 2018, 15). Similar education campaigns were undertaken by media outlets
and political parties (SverigesRadio 2017) and were also carried out in schools (Roden
2017). To prepare for total defense awareness, including in a cyber emergency, MSB
produced a pamphlet titled “If Crisis or War Comes” and “sent it to all 4.7 million Swedish
households” (Brattberg and Maurer 2018a, 29). During all this preparation, SÄPO and
other governmental agencies were relatively open and transparent about the initiatives
they undertook to address potential interference. Such clear communication might have
increased public awareness and the likelihood that Swedes would practice better cyber
hygiene (Brattberg and Maurer 2018a).
In addition to building better defenses, Sweden invested significant resources in improving
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the cybercapabilities of its intelligence agencies to detect external threats and of its
military forces to respond to them (Rettman and Kirk 2018). The National Defense Radio
Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) — both
responsible for signals intelligence—installed special detection and warning systems to guard
against foreign powers hacking into sensitive agencies. In preparation for elections, the
government increased expenditure on signals intelligence and added to it new projects that
included “the development of advanced offensive smart technologies and tools that have the
capacity to weaponize counter-strike actions against...perpetrators” (O’Dwyer 2018).
Sweden also strengthened its military posture. For the first time in more than two
decades, the Swedish government decided to substantially increase its defense budget, some
of which was to be spent on active cybercapabilities (Sweden’s Defense Policy: 2016 to 2020
2015, 4-5). The country re-introduced military conscription, with some of these new recruits
contributing to the cyber work force. Most importantly, during the country’s preparatory
efforts to deal with any potential election interference by foreign powers, Sweden’s Prime
Minister Stefan Löfven emphasized the country’s military cyber offensive capability and
the government’s willingness to use it. For instance, when discussing a three-point plan to
stop foreign powers from influencing the 2018 Swedish elections, Löfven publicly claimed
that the Swedish Armed Forces were capable of carrying out “active operations in the cyber
environment” (SverigesRadio 2017). At a security conference in January 2018, Löfven clearly
communicated the country’s willingness to act in case of election interference: “To those
thinking about trying to influence the outcome of the elections in our country: Stay away!”
(as quoted in Cederberg (2018, 11)).
These public cyberinstitutions, put in place before elections, made the Kremlin
overestimate Sweden’s cybercapacity and, as a result, deterred Moscow from interfering in
the 2018 Swedish elections.
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Alternative Explanations. There are other factors that, at face value, could have deterred
Russia from interfering. Upon closer inspection, however, these factors probably did not play
such a role. First is NATO’s military capabilities. The NATO-Sweden cooperation defense
pact prioritizes security in the Baltic Sea region and the “develop[ment of] interoperable
capabilities and maintain[ance of] the ability of the Swedish Armed Forces to work with those
of NATO and other partner countries in multinational peace-support operations” (Relations
with Sweden 2018). In other words, this pact is meant to protect Sweden from a physical
invasion by Russia (akin to those in Ukraine and Georgia) but not from election interference.
Second is the threat of Western economic sanctions. The ineffectiveness of these sanctions
in changing Moscow’s behavior in Ukraine and Syria suggest that they are unlikely to
have deterred the Kremlin from executing its plan. Third is Russia’s lack of interest in
interfering. This explanation contradicts evidence from a U.S. government report that
outlines preparatory influence operations aimed at undermining the 2018 Swedish elections
(Putin’s Assymetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe 2018). In the same vein,
Cederberg (2018) argued that Russia prioritized the planning of an interference campaign
into the 2018 U.S. elections. But, according to former Director of National Intelligence Daniel
Coats, there was no vote tampering during the 2018 U.S. elections other than “influence
activities and messaging campaigns” by “Russia, and other foreign countries, including China
and Iran” meant “to promote their strategic interests” (Coats 2018).
Last is Sweden’s actual cybercapacity. Though Russia may have believed that, instead
of using pooling to merely appear strong, Sweden had, in fact, become a strong cyber
nation, this would have been a misperception on Russia’s part. As time passed after the
2018 Swedish elections, it became clear that Sweden was, in fact, not as cyber-strong as
their public cyberinstitutions suggested. In particular, there was a discrepancy between
the Swedish government’s publicly announced commitments and the implementation of
these commitments (Cederberg 2018, 29). For instance, despite the Swedish government’s
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announcements, not only was no psychological defense agency created prior to the elections,
the government did not even appoint an investigator responsible for determining this
agency’s scope. Moreover, government initiatives did not always translate into more resilient
defense cybercapability. Even though Sweden’s security agencies had been publicly working
with political parties and media outlets to increase their awareness of how to deal with
cyberthreats and information threats, the information these agencies presented was not
necessarily useful in addressing these threats. Similarly, despite Sweden’s relatively small
population, no studies have measured whether or how Sweden’s public awareness campaigns
translated into behavioral change. Kostyuk and Wayne (2020) demonstrate that public fails
to engage in safer online behavior even though they intended to do so after they were exposed
to a cyberattack. Having ruled out the above factors, it appears that Sweden was able to
deter Russia from interfering in its 2018 elections by using public cyberinstitutions to make
the Kremlin overestimate Sweden’s cybercapacity.
4.5 Discussion and Implications
This study has revealed several important patterns of the strategic use of public
cyberinstitutions to deter challengers that differ by their type. When the challenger is
disinterested, he has no interest in attacking the defender, giving the false impression of
deterrence success. When the challenger is undeterred, he has decided to attack the defender
even before observing her PCIs, giving the false impression of deterrence failure. Both
scenarios demonstrate that even if PCIs provide the challenger with information about the
defender that he did not previously possess, not all challengers will base their decision
to attack on this information. Inadequate signaling or a variety of other factors, such as
domestic politics, budgetary and legal constraints, or organizational and strategic culture
might explain the challenger’s choice to attack.
When the challenger is opportunistic and only attacks the defender if he perceives
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her as cyber weak and avoids attacking if he perceives her as cyber strong, PCIs can
indeed play a strategic role. To deter this challenger, weak cyber nations might choose
to over-invest their limited resources into public cyberinstitutions and under-invest in covert
cyberactivity to appear strong. Strong cyber nations, in their turn, over-invest their limited
resources into PCIs to distinguish themselves from weak cyber nations pretending to be
cyber strong. This sub-optimal resource allocation, which makes the defender weaker in her
overall cybercapacity, can be worthwhile because it may deter the challenger. These results
have important theoretical and policy implications.
First, they shed light on a theoretical debate surrounding cyber deterrence. Similar
to Tor (2017), this article stresses the need to re-think our reference to absolute nuclear
deterrence as a matrix of deterrence success for cyberoperations. Countries do not create
cybercapacity to deter low-level cyberoperations; instead, their goal is to stop adversaries
from executing strategic cyberattacks, which can cause detrimental damage to the country’s
economy, prosperity, and security. As the cyberthreat landscape grows and changes,
states tend to update their definitions of strategic cyberattacks to reflect this change.
Less than a decade ago, for instance, countries focused only on the protection of their
critical infrastructure (Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 2013). Following the 2016 U.S.
elections, many nations added election protection to their top national security priorities
(National Cybersecurity Policy 2017).
As countries constantly re-define what constitutes strategic cyberattacks, adversaries
become more creative in the execution of cyberoperations aimed at achieving their strategic
goals. For example, in response to Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections, the U.S.
government took steps to protect its 2018 elections, including sanctions. In response to
this measure, Russian bots and trolls adjusted their behavior and started operating during
the election off-season. For instance, there was a spike in Russian bot and troll tweets in
the summer after the 2016 U.S. election (Roeder 2018). These influence campaigns, even if
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conducted during election off-seasons, shape public opinion and might affect public voting
behavior. Emerging digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, bring a new set of
challenges that governments should be prepared to address. “Deep learning” technology,
a method in which computers learn how to solve certain tasks based on the analysis of
large information sets, allows to automatically create fake images and videos that are
indistinguishable from real content.
Second, over-investment in PCIs demonstrates that states are changing their deterrent
tactic. Over the last two decades, states have mainly invested in their CCA to deter
adversaries. But this tactic is inefficient because it is: (1) costly due to the diminishing
value of cyberoperations after their first use; and (2) ineffective due to the difficulty of
cyberattribution. As my findings demonstrates, over-investment in PCIs—in limited cases—
allows weak cyber nations to deter their strong adversaries. But it is not clear how long
this tactic will be effective. With time, weak cyber nations attempting to imitate strong
cyber nations are more likely to be exposed as weak nations and their cyberinstitutions will
become less effective in deterring adversaries.
As a result, states should take the signaling of cybercapacity via PCIs with a grain of salt.
While PCIs serve as a cyberthreat assessment barometer because they allow a challenger to
estimate a defender’s ability to conduct cyberoperations, the defender’s willingness to use
these operations, and the scope of the defender’s potential retaliation, this assessment is not
precise. To better estimate the defender’s cybercapacity, in addition to PCIs, challengers
should examine other indicators, such as economic and technological achievements and the
defender’s reliance on the private sector for cybercapacity. This cumulative approach used
to estimate cybercapacity will help governments better evaluate options that minimize the
risk of escalation.
My approach of studying deterrence by PCIs is not without limitations. My model
oversimplifies real-world scenarios by making assumptions to identify the causal effect of
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PCIs on deterrence chances. Specifically, my model views the challenger’s decision to attack
and the defender’s choice to establish PCIs as a one-time decision. In practice, PCIs present
a state’s cumulative effort to boost its cybercapacity. Similarly, influence campaigns, for
example, are composed of many small campaigns that span an extended period. As a result,
it is not easy to distinguish between situations in which deterrence by PCIs fails to deter
election interference and those in which PCIs were not even considered by the challenger.
This is because it is hard to determine how much updating-of-beliefs took place during
different stages of the influence campaign.
Moreover, my model equates the defender’s probability of successfully retaliating against
the challenger with the probability that her cyber defenses hold because PCIs often tend to
signal an increase in both offensive and defensive cybercapabilities (Schneider 2019). Future
iterations of this model should explore scenarios when it is not the case. For instance, when
PCIs only signal an increase in offensive cybercapability, the threat of cyber retaliation might
not deter a country that does not have many cyber targets, like North Korea. PCIs that only
signal an increase in cyber defenses might deter countries that view attacking well-protected
targets as too costly. As a result, by practicing both the deterrence by prevention and by the
threat of punishment, the country maximizes its chances at deterrence because it increases
the cost of attacking for all attackers.
“If deterrence fails, it is usually because someone thought he saw an ‘option’ that the...
government had failed to dispose of, a loophole that it hadn’t closed against itself” (Schelling
2008, 44). By building offensive cybercapabilities, government officials seem to assume that
“cybercapabilities alone have a deterrent effect without taking into consideration the strategic
requirements that come with deterrence by the threat of punishment, namely credibly holding
assets at risk and signaling desired behavior while being willing to face consequences in case of
an escalation” (Schulze and Herpig 2018). As my model demonstrates, successful deterrence
depends on both a defender’s cybercapacity and a challenger’s type. Some challengers may
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remain undeterred due to a lack of political will in the defending nation to launch a retaliatory
cyberattack against an adversary as formidable as, say, Russia or China. In these cases,
the potential consequences of entering an escalation cycle with such an adversary may be
perceived to be too great to risk. Thus, to maximize the desired deterrent effect of publicly
flexing their cyber muscles, nations must explicitly spell out their cybersecurity strategies in
order to close the loopholes that adversaries can exploit. Until they do, the pessimistic view
of cyber deterrence will persist.
4.6 Appendix
Election Interference
In this section, I define what types of actions can constitute election interference as well as
the various levels of involvement a state can have in such actions.27 Specifically, a state can
use cyberoperations and/or information operations to interfere in elections. Cyberoperations
are conducted via the Internet to collect sensitive information (i.e., cyberespionage) and/or
disrupt or degrade the work of a computer, program, or an infrastructure system (e.g.,
computer-based attacks against an electric power grid, computerized voting machines, etc.).
Information operations, by contrast, which are used to influence public opinion in ways
that can affect election outcomes (e.g., via propaganda or “fake news”), though often
disseminated via the Internet (e.g., on social media platforms), can also be spread by more
conventional (non-computer-based) media. Table 4.2 lists a few examples of cyberoperations
and information operations that the state can use to influence an election outcome (Galante
and EE 2018).
First, a state can use cyberoperations to distort data or system functionality via
infrastructure exploitation. For example, the Russian state used cyberoperations to
27 I use “election interference” and “influence campaign” interchangeably in this paper.
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compromise voter-registration and campaign-finance databases in thirty-nine states during
the 2016 U.S. elections (Riley and Robertson 2017). Second, a state can use cyberoperations
to manipulate votes by changing vote tallies, input, or transmission. For example, a few
days before the 2014 Ukrainian elections, the Russian state destroyed key electronic files of
Ukraine’s Central Election Commission’s computer programs that monitor the tallying of
votes.
A state can also use information operations to execute (either independently or in
combination) the following three actions: false-front engagement, sentiment amplification,
and fabricated content. False-front engagement involves the fabrication of a public identity
by an individual member of a group in order to use that identity to interact with others.
Sentiment amplification involves “the dissemination and prominence of a specific viewpoint”
(Galante and EE 2018, 5). Fabricated content involves the spread of false information. To
amplify the effect of each of these techniques, a state often uses all three simultaneously. For
instance, the Internet Research Agency (IRA)—a Russian company whose owner, Yvgeniy
Prigozhin, has ties to Putin—created social media accounts under assumed American
identities in order to disseminate incorrect claims that would exploit and amplify divisive
political sentiments in the United States (USDepartmentOfJustice 2018c).
A state can use both cyberoperations and information operations to influence elections.
For instance, in the case of strategic publications, a state uses cyberoperations to illicitly
obtain sensitive data, such as internal communications, and then strategically releases them
to tarnish the reputation of electoral candidates. After having obtained sensitive information
through the 2015 U.S. Democratic National Committee (DNC) hack, the Russian state
published this information on DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks to damage Hillary Clinton’s
candidacy.
In addition to the six types of actions outlined above that are used to influence elections,
I distinguish three possible levels of state involvement in influence campaigns (Table 4.2).
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First, at the highest level of involvement, a state can direct a campaign. Examples of
state-directed interference include the cyberoperations in the 2014 Ukrainian and 2016 U.S.
elections that were attributed to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 28 — part of the Russian
military’s main intelligence directorate, the GRU (Alperovitch 2016). Second, at a lower
level of involvement, a state can encourage interference by ensuring that a third party has
knowledge of the “state’s objectives [and] can partake with reasonable assurance that these
efforts will be viewed favorably” (Galante and EE 2018, 6). For instance, prior to the 2016
Brexit referendum, the IRA operated an extensive social media pro-Brexit campaign, but
no evidence confirmed that the Kremlin directed this campaign. Third and finally, a state
can have no involvement in an election-interference campaign even though the interference
is aligned with state objectives. For example, the interference into the 2017 French elections
seemed to align with the objectives of the Russian state, but the French National Agency for
the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI) confirmed that the Kremlin was not behind
the interference and presented the simplicity of the attacks as evidence pointing to an actor
with lower cybercapacities than the Russian state (France says no trace of Russian hacking
Macron 2017).
Table 4.2: Types of Election Interference
Level of State Involvement
State-directed State-encouraged State-aligned
Cyberoperations InfrastructureExploitation
X X
Vote Manipulation X
Information Operations
False Front Engagement X
Sentiment Amplification X X
Fabricated Content X X
Cyberoperations & Strategic Publication X
Information
Operations
2014 U.S. 2016 U.K. 2017 French
elections referendum elections
Election examples
This paper focuses on examples of state-directed attempts to interfere into foreign elections
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by using cyberoperations and information operations.
Game Model in Details
Extensive Form Game Tree of Deterrence by Public Cyberinstitutions. Figure 4.5 displays
my two-player game with incomplete information concerning the defender’s type. In the first
stage, Nature selects that θ = S with probability pi and that θ = W with probability 1− pi.
The model assumes that both players have a common prior belief and that pi is the true
probability that the defender is strong. In the second stage, Dθ decides how to allocate her
resources between PCIs and CCA and the level of PCIs she implements. AfterDθ implements
PCIs, C observes it, (possibly) updates his beliefs about whetherDθ is strong (η), and decides
whether he wants to attack Dθ; the decision to attack also depends on the probability that
his attack would succeed and the probability that Dθ would retaliate. The model assumes
that even though C cannot observe θ directly, he has a prior belief of θ, derived from, for
example, past cyberoperations attributed to the defender and the defender’s technological
and scientific abilities. When C chooses whether to attack, he does so knowing the level of
PCIs Dθ implements, but not knowing Dθ’s type with certainty because Dθ’s CCA is not
completely observable.
If C does not attack the game ends. If C decides to attack Dθ, his attack can
either succeed or fail. The probability of a successful attack is determined by Dθ’s
overall cybercapacity and how she distributes her resources between her public and private
cybercapacity. In the next stage, Nature selects that C’s attack is successful with probability
Q(cθ) and that C’s attack is not successful and with probability 1 − Q(cθ). If C’s attack
does not succeed, the game ends. If C’s attack succeeds, Dθ must decide whether to retaliate
against C.28 If Dθ does not retaliate, the game ends. If Dθ retaliates, Nature selects that
28 The defender knows who the challenger is because the model operates in a closed system with two players
and cyber attribution is no longer a challenge. I do not model the cyber attribution challenge for the
following two reasons: (1) a state’s decision to attribute cyberoperations is no longer a technical challenge
but is instead a political decision (Rid and Buchanan 2015; Soldatov and Borogan 2017); and (2) Baliga
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Dθ’s retaliation is successful with probability Pθ and that Dθ’s retaliation is not successful
with probability 1 − Pθ. The probability of a successful retaliation is determined by Dθ’s
overall cybercapacity and how she distributes her resources between her public and private
cybercapacity. Regardless of whether or not the retaliation is successful, the game ends.
Figure 4.5: Extensive Form Game Tree of Deterrence by Public Cyberinstitutions
Defender’s Choices & Payoffs. If D successfully deters C and C decides not to attack, D
receives value from deterring C, VD ∈ [0, 1]. If D does not deter C using her PCIs, she pays
the cost of being attacked, CD ∈ [0, 1]. C’s choice of action is endogenous to D’s PCIs, which
et al. (2018) models the feasibility of deterrence when the cyber attribution challenge is present.
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signals to C the defender’s type, her cybercapacity, and how damaging retaliation will be if
C attacks this type and/or how good Dθ’s cyber defenses are, allowing C to estimate how
costly it will be for him to break these defenses. C wants to avoid attacking DS because her
retaliation will do more damage to C than will retaliation by DW and/or it will be much
costlier to break DS’s defenses than to break DW ’s defenses.
If C attacks, Dθ’s cyber defenses may or may not be sufficient to stop this attack from
getting through. C’s probability of successful attack (Q) depends on Dθ’s cybercapacity
(Q ≡ Q(c)). The model assumes Q is decreasing in c and Q ∈ [0, 1]. I define QS = Q(cˆS) and
QW = Q(cˆW ) as the lowest probabilities that C successfully attacksDS andDW . If C’s attack
is successful, Dθ decides whether to retaliate. If Dθ retaliates, she pays the cost of attempted
retaliation, CR ∈ [0, 1], which incorporates the cost of using cyberoperations whose value
diminishes after their first use, regardless of whether retaliation is successful. If retaliation
is successful, Dθ additionally receives value from successful retaliation, VR ∈ [0, 1].29 The
probability that this retaliation is successful (P ) depends on Dθ’s cybercapacity (P ≡ p(c)).
The model assumes that P is increasing in c and P ∈ [0, 1]. I define PS = p(cˆS) and
PW = p(cˆW ) as the greatest probabilities that DS and DW successfully retaliate against C.
Challenger’s Choices & Payoffs. C attacks Dθ whenever his net gains from attacking
outweigh his net gains from not attacking. Equation 4.1 explains when it is the case and
what goes into this calculation.
PBVC − PBσRθPACP − CC > R, (4.1)
where PB is C’s expectation that Dθ’s cyber shields will fail against his attack, having
observed Dθ’s PCIs; VC ∈ [0, 1] is the value that C receives from successfully attacking Dθ;
σRθ is the probability that Dθ retaliates against C as a function of whether C attacks Dθ,
having observed her PCIs; PA is C’s expectation that Dθ will retaliate successfully having
29 Because Dθ’s main goal is to deter C, the model assumes that VD > VR.
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observed Dθ’s PCIs; CP ∈ [0, 1] is C’s expected cost from Dθ’s retaliation; CC ∈ [0, 1] is C’s
expected cost from attacking Dθ that incorporates the cost of using cyberoperations whose
value diminishes after their first use. R is C’s reservation utility, which represents C’s net
gains from not attacking Dθ (R ≥ 0).
C’s expectation that Dθ’s cyber shields will fail against his attack, having observed Dθ’s
PCIs as
PB = η(I)Q(cS(I)) + (1− η(I))Q(cW (I)), (4.2)
where QS = Q(cˆS) and QW = Q(cˆW ) are the lowest probabilities that C successfully attacks
DS and DW , respectively, or the highest probabilities that DS’s and DW ’s cyber defenses
successfully hold against C’s attack. In Equation 4.1, Dθ’s cybercapacity serves as a proxy
for C’s expectation of how unbreakable Dθ’s defenses are — the larger C’s expectation of
Dθ’s cybercapacity, the more likely C is to believe that Dθ’s cyber defenses will hold against
his attack and, as a result, the more deterred C will be from attacking Dθ. Equation 4.1
also demonstrates the difference between my model of cyber deterrence and the model of
deterrence by non-cyber means — in the former, even if C’s attack is not successful, Dθ’s
retaliation is assumed.
C’s expectation that Dθ will retaliate successfully having observed Dθ’s PCIs as
PA = η(I)p(cS(I)) + (1− η(I))p(cW (I)), (4.3)
where PS = p(cˆS) and PW = p(cˆW ) are the greatest probabilities that DS and DW ,
respectively, successfully retaliate against C. Similarly, in Equation 4.1, Dθ’s cybercapacity
serves as a proxy for C’s expectation of Dθ’s retaliation — the larger C’s expectation of Dθ’s
cybercapacity, the more likely C is to believe that Dθ will retaliate against C after being
attacked, and the more damaging C believes this retaliation will be. As a result, the larger
the expectation of Dθ’s cybercapacity, the more deterred C will be from attacking her.
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Because the challenger observes the same PCIs to estimate the probability of Dθ’s
retaliation and the probability that Dθ’s defenses withstand his attack, I assume that
PA = PB and refer to both probabilities as PA. Similarly, I assume that PS = QS and
PW = QW and refer to both probabilities as PS and PW .
Solution Concept. An equilibrium to the model is defined by the set of strategies and beliefs:
(σθ, σRθ , P (I), η),
which are probability distributions that (1) Dθ implements each possible level of PCI; the
probability that (2) Dθ retaliates against C as a function of whether C attacks this type,
having observed her PCI;30 (3) the probability that C attacks D as a function of D’s PCI
that C observes; and (4) C’s posterior probability that D is of a strong type, given PCI he
observes.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (σθ, σRθ , P (I), η), which has four
components. First, σRθ is the probability distribution over [0, Iθ(1)] for each type of D, θ.
σRθ > 0 only if this probability maximizes Dθ’s expected payoff, given C’s decision to attack
her having observed D’s PCI (P (I) : [0, IS(1)] → [0, 1]). D retaliates against C when net
gains from retaliation are at least as good as net gains from non-retaliation. D’s expected
payoff is shown in Equation 4.4.
σRθ(I) > 0⇔ I ∈ argmaxI
[
(1−σRθ)(−CD)+σRθ
[
p(cθ)[VR−CD−CR]+(1−p(cθ))(−CD−CR)
]]
(4.4)
Second, there is a probability distribution σθ over [0, Iθ(1)] for each type of D, θ. σθ > 0 only
if this probability maximizes Dθ’s expected payoff, given C’s decision to attack her having
observed D’s PCI (P (I) : [0, IS(1)]→ [0, 1]). D’s expected payoff is shown in Equation 4.5.
30 I excluded DS ’s and DW ’s probabilities of retaliation from the solution concept in Chapter 4 because
these probabilities are incorporated into C’s gains.
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σθ(I) > 0⇔ I ∈ argmaxI
[
P (I)
[
Q(cθ)
[
σRθ
[
p(cθ)[VR−CD−CR]+(1−p(cθ))(−CD−CR)
]
+
(1− σRθ)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cθ))VD
]
+ (1− P (I))VD
]
(4.5)
Third, C attacks D with positive probability (P (I) : [0, IS(1)]→ [0, 1]) when net gains from
attacking are at least as good as net gains from not attacking, given his expectations of D’s
type:
P (I) ∈ argmaxP (I)∈[0,1]
[
(1−P (I))R+P (I)
[
PB
[
σRθ
[
PA(VC−CP−CC)+(1−PA)(VC−CC)
]
+
(1− σRθ)(VC − CC)
]
+ (1− PB)(−CC)
]]
(4.6)
In Condition 4.6, PA = η(I)p(cS(I)) + (1 − η(I))p(cW (I)) and PB = η(I)Q(cS(I)) + (1 −
η(I))Q(cW (I)). Since Condition 4.6 is a linear function of P (I), P (I)∗ ∈ {0, 1} ∀PA 6= P¯
and ∀PB 6= P¯ .
Fourth, C updates his posterior beliefs (η: [0, IS(1)]→ [0, 1]) about D’s type using Bayes’
Rule
η(I) =
qσS
qσS + (1− q)σW , (4.7)
∀I such that σS(I) + σW (I) > 0.
Proofs
I am using the following definitions in the proofs:
• Let’s define I(r) = I, then r = I−1(I).
• cθ(I) ≡ I(r) + N(aθ − r) = I + N(aθ − r(I)) is Dθ’s cybercapacity if she chooses Iθ,
expressed in terms of I;
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• Iσθ ≡ {I : σθ > 0} is set of PCI for Dθ that will be chosen with positive probability
under strategy σθ;
• Iθ(P¯ ) ≡ {I : p(cθ(I)) > P¯} is the set of PCI for Dθ that leads to the probability of
Dθ’s successful retaliation that is higher than P¯ .31
Due to the characteristics of this game, there might exist a lot of equilibria. Therefore,
I introduce the notion of outcome equivalence. Two equilibria — (σθ, σRθ , P (I), η) and
(σ′θ, σ
′
Rθ
, P (I)′, η′)—are outcome-equivalent if the expected payoffs of each player are the
same under these two equilibria (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). The game has a unique
equilibrium outcome if any two equilibria are outcome-equivalent. Therefore, I can pick one
representative equilibrium if the game has a unique equilibrium outcome.
Defender’s choice to retaliate. Examining D’s choice to retaliate, I have the following
utilities:
EUD(¬Retaliate) = −CD, and
EUD(Retaliate) = Pθ(VR − CD − CR) + (1− Pθ)(−CD − CR)
D is indifferent between retaliating and not retaliating when EUD(Retaliate) =
EUC(¬Retaliate), i.e.,
Pθ(VR − CD − CR) + (1− Pθ)(−CD − CR) = −CD
PθVR − PθCD − PθCR − CD − CR + PθCD + PθCR = −CD
PθVR = CR, (4.8)
where
• Pθ is the probability that Dθ successfully retaliates, which is determined by Dθ’s overall
cybercapacity and how she distributes her resources at Stage 1,
31 As mentioned earlier, this could be also viewed as the probability that Dθ’s cyber defenses hold.
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• VR is the value that Dθ receives from successful retaliation,
• CD is Dθ’s cost of being attacked, and
• CR is the cost that Dθ pays for retaliating.
Equation 4.8 derives the defender’s choice to retaliate, depicted in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. A defender retaliates if her value from retaliation, given the probability that
retaliation is successful, is greater than her cost (PθVR > CR).
Being weak implies that Pθ is low, as a result, VR should be much larger that CR for DW
to retaliate. DW often does not have significant cybercapacity and given that DW faces a
strong challenger, I assume that CR < VR. As a result, I assume that DW does not retaliate
when attacked.32 On the contrary, DS gains significant value from retaliation. Not only
does she punish C, she also deters other potential challengers from cyberattacking her. As
a result, I assume that hyDS always retaliates when attacked.
Challenger’s choice to attack. Examining C’s choice of action, I have the following
utilities:
EUC(¬Attack) = R, and
EUC(Attack) = PB
[
σRθ
[
PA(VC −CP −CC) + (1− PA)(VC −CC)
]
+ (1− σRθ)(VC −CC)
]
+ (1− PB)(−CC) == PB
[
σRθ
[
PAVC − PACP − PACC + VC − CC − PAVC + PACC
]
+
+ (1− σRθ)(VC − CC)
]
+ (1− PB)(−CC) =
= PB
[
σRθ
[− PACP + VC − CC]+ (1− σRθ)(VC − CC)]+ (1− PB)(−CC) =
= PB
[
− σRθPACP + σRθVC − σRθCC + VC − CC − σRθVC + σRθCC
]
+ (1− PB)(−CC) =
= −PBσRθPACP + PBVC − PBCC − CC + PBCC = −PBσRθPACP + PBVC − CC
32 In Section 4.3, I discuss when it is not the case—DW has a high resolve and retaliates.
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C is indifferent between attacking and not attacking when EUC(Attack) = EUC(¬Attack),
i.e.,
− PBσRθPACP + PBVC − CC = R (4.9)
If Dθ does not retaliate (σRθCP = 0), then
PBVC − CC = R,
meaning that C is indifferent between attacking or not if his gains from this attack is the
same as the value from his reservation point. Solving for PB, we obtain
PB =
CC +R
VC
(4.10)
If Dθ retaliate (σRθCP 6= 0), then
PBVC − PBσRθPACP − CC = R, (4.11)
meaning that C is indifferent between attacking or not if his value from this attack minus the
costs of potential retaliation and of an attack is the same as the value from his reservation
point. Because the model assumes that PA = PB,
PAVC − P 2AσRθCP − CC = R, or
P 2AσRθCP − PAVC + CC +R = 0
Solving this for PA, we obtain
PA =
VC ±
√
V 2C − 4σRθCP (CC +R)
2σRθCP
Without loss of generality, I assume C’s reservation utility, R, is equal to 0. As a result,
PA =
VC ±
√
V 2C − 4σRθCPCC
2σRθCP
. (4.12)
Because PA is a probability, two clarifications should be made about Equation 4.12. First, I
assume that V 2C ≥ 4σRθCPCC , so that both solutions are real numbers. Second, because all
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values in this equation are distributed between 0 and 1, I only focus on the positive solution
of Equation 4.12 and I denoted it by P¯ . P¯ can be interpreted as the cut-off point for D’s
successful retaliation probability when C is indifferent between attacking and not attacking.
Equations 4.10-4.12 derive conditions when C uses a cyberattack against Dθ. Specifically,
Lemma 2 defines the critical value at which the challenger is indifferent between attacking
and not attacking.
Lemma 2. A critical value of PA for which the challenger is indifferent between attacking
and not attacking is:
(a) P¯ = CC+R
VC
, if σRθCP = 0, and
(b) P¯ =
VC+
√
V 2C−4σRθCP (CC+R)
2σRθCP
, if σRθCP 6= 0.
C’s choice of action only depends on the relationship between his critical value of
being indifferent between attacking or not attacking P¯ and his perceived probability of
D’s successful retaliation against him, PA, given that he observes PCI. Here, PA =
pS(I)η(I)+pW (I)(1−η(I)), where η(I) is C’s belief thatD is strong type and pθ(I) = p(cθ(I))
is Dθ’s successful retaliation probability, given the cybercapacity that Dθ obtains, having
implemented PCIs. Because this cybercapacity is not always optimal, pθ ≤ Pˆθ, where Pˆθ is
Dθ’s maximum probability of successful retaliation.
Let’s consider how the model equilibria change based on the values of PA and P¯ .
Specifically, we have the following three conditions:
1. If PA > P¯ , C does not attack
2. If PA = P¯ , C mixes between attacking and not attacking
3. If PA < P¯ , C attacks
Because PA stands for both PS and PW , let’s now consider how these equilibria change based
on the relationship of values of PS and PW and P¯ . Specifically, there are five possible regions:
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1. If PS > PW > P¯ , C does not attack
2. If PS > P¯ > PW , C attacks when he sees IˆW and does not attack when he sees IˆS
3. If PS < PW < P¯ , C always attacks
4. If PS > P¯ = PW , C mixes between attacking and not attacking when he sees IˆW and
does not attack when he sees IˆS
5. If PS = P¯ > PW , C does not attack when he sees IˆW and mixes between attacking and
not attacking when he sees IˆS
Now I consider each of these regions to derive the model equilibria.
Case 1: P¯ < PˆW < PˆS. I am going to show that in this region the unique equilibrium
outcome is: C does not attack, Dθ get her first-best outcomes—Dθ deters C and Dθ does
not retaliate.
First, I consider potential separating equilibria in which IσS ∩ IσW = ∅. Then I know C’s
belief η(I) is
η(I) =

1, for I ∈ IσS
0, for I ∈ IσW
[0, 1], o.w. (off the equilibirum path).
The corresponding on-path PA is
PA =

p(cS(I)), for I ∈ IσS
p(cW (I)), for I ∈ IσW .
Since P¯ < PˆW < PˆS, Iθ(P¯ ) 6= ∅, for both types of D. Each type’s best response is choosing
any level of PCI within the set Iθ(P¯ ) which leads to PA > P¯ . Hence, C does not attack on
177
the equilibrium path. Both types of D get their first-best outcomes and have no incentives
to deviate. Therefore, it is a equilibrium.
Second, I consider equilibria in which IσS ∩ IσW 6= ∅. Then I know C’s belief η(I) is
η(I) =

qσS(I)
qσS(I)+(1−q)σW (I) , for I ∈ IσS ∪ IσW
[0, 1], otherwise
.
The corresponding on-equilibrium path PA is PA = pS(I)η(I) + pW (I)(1 − η(I)). I know
that if both types of D choose PCI from their own Iσθ set, then for any belief η(I),
PA = pS(I)η(I) + pW (I)(1 − η(I)) ⇒ PA > P¯η(I) + (1 − P¯ )η(I) ⇒ PA > P¯ . Hence C
does not attack. Both types of D get their first-best outcomes and have no incentives
to deviate. A representative equilibrium of the above unique equilibrium outcome is:
σS(IˆS) = σW (IˆW ) = 1, σRS(IˆS) = σRW (IˆW ) = 0, and P (Iˆθ) = 0, η(IˆS) = 1, η(IˆW ) = 0. This
case proves Proposition 1 part (a) of Chapter 4.
Case 2: PˆW < P¯ < PˆS. In this case, DW has an incentive to imitate DS. I consider two
different assumptions in this case. I define H ≡ IS(P¯ ) ∩ (IW (1), IS(1)]. If H = ∅, DW can
imitate PCI in H. If H 6= ∅, DW cannot imitate any PCI in H because it is beyond her
capability for any I ∈ (IW (1), IS(1)], while choosing I ∈ H is both doable and profitable for
DS.
Case 2.1: H = ∅. Under this assumption, there is no separating equilibria. Suppose there
exists a separating equilibrium in which IσS ∩ IσW = ∅. Then we know C’s belief η(I) is
η(I) =

1, for I ∈ IσS
0, for I ∈ IσW
[0, 1], o.w. (off equilibirum path).
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The corresponding on-path PA is
PA =

p(cS(I)), for I ∈ IσS
p(cW (I)), for I ∈ IσW .
Let’s consider DW ’s strategy. Because p(cW (I)) < P¯ for any I ∈ IσW , C attacks DW . In
order for this to be an equilibrium, p(cS(I)) < P¯ for all I ∈ IσS , otherwise DW will deviate
to IσS . That is, IσS ∩ Iθ(P¯ ) = ∅. In particular, IˆS /∈ IσS . Then, σ′S(IˆS) = 1 is a profitable
deviation for DS. Specifically, DS’s expected utility when she deviates to IσS is:
EUDS(σ
′
S) = P (I)
′
[
Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σ′RS
[
p(cS(IˆS))[VR−CD −CR] + (1− p(cS(IˆS))(−CD −CR)
]
+ (1− σ′RS)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(IˆS)))VD
]
+ (1− P (I)′)VD
EUDS(σ
′
S) = P (I)
′
[
Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σ′RS
[
p(cS(IˆS))VR − p(cS(IˆS))CD − p(cS(IˆS))CR − CD−
CR + p(cS(IˆS))CD + p(cS(IˆS))CR
]− CD + σ′RSCD]+ (1−Q(cS(IˆS)))VD]+ (1− P (I)′)VD
EUDS(σ
′
S) = P (I)
′
[
Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σ′RSp(cS(IˆS))VR − σ′RSCD − σ′RSCR − CD + σ′RSCD
]
+
(1−Q(cS(IˆS)))VD
]
+ (1− P (I)′)VD
EUDS(σ
′
S) = P (I)
′
[
Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σ′RSp(cS(IˆS))VR − σ′RSCR − CD
]
+ VD −Q(cS(IˆS))VD
]
+ (1− P (I))′VD
EUDS(σ
′
S) = P (I)
′
[
Q(cS(IˆS))σ
′
RS
p(cS(IˆS))VR −Q(cS(IˆS))σ′RSCR −Q(cS(IˆS))CD+
VD −Q(cS(IˆS))VD
]
+ (1− P (I))′VD
EUDS(σ
′
S) = P (I)
′Q(cS(IˆS))σ′RSp(cS(IˆS))VR − P (I)′Q(cS(IˆS))σ′RSCR
− P (I)′Q(cS(IˆS))CD − P (I)′Q(cS(IˆS))VD + VD
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If DS does not deviate and C attacks, then:
EUDS(σS) = Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σRS
[
p(cS(IˆS))[VR − CD − CR] + (1− p(cS(IˆS))(−CD − CR)
]
+ (1− σRS)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(IˆS)))VD
EUDS(σS) = Q(cS(IˆS))σRSp(cS(IˆS))VR −Q(cS(IˆS))σRSp(cS(IˆS))CR −Q(cS(IˆS))CD+
VD −Q(cS(IˆS))VD
Because P (I)′ ∈ {0, 1}, EUDS(σ′S) ≥ EUDS(σS). Because cS(IˆS) > cS(I) for any I ∈ IσS ,
EUS(σ
′
S) >
∫
I∈IσS
Q(cS(IˆS))σ
′
RS
p(cS(IˆS))VRσS(I)dI −
∫
I∈IσS
Q(cS(IˆS))σ
′
RS
CRσS(I)dI−∫
I∈IσS
Q(cS(IˆS))CDσS(I)dI −
∫
I∈IσS
Q(cS(IˆS))VDσS(I)dI + VD
Now, let’s consider potential pooling equilibria in which IσS ∩ IσW 6= ∅. Let’s pick any
I¯ ∈ IσS ∩ IσW , η(I¯) = qσS(I¯)qσS(I¯)+(1−q)σW (I¯) .
1. Suppose PA(I¯) < P¯ , i.e., P (I¯) = 1. Then at least one type of D has an incentive to
deviate. For example, if I¯ 6= IˆS, then IˆS gives DS a higher expected payoff than I¯. A
profitable deviation would be shifting the probability assigned to I¯ to IˆS,
σ′S(I) =

σS(I), for I /∈ {I¯ , IˆS}
0, for I = I¯
σS(I¯) + σS(IˆS), for I = IˆS
.
It is easy to check that σ′S(I) indeed is a strategy (a probability distribution,
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∫
I
σ′S(I)dI = 1). Using the definition of DS’s expected payoff, we have:
EUDS(σ
′
S)− EUDS(σS) =
[
P (I)′
[
Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σ′RS
[
p(cS(IˆS))(VR − CC − CR)+
p(cS(IˆS))(−CD − CR)
]
+ (1− σ′RS)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(IˆS)))VD
]
+ (1− P (I)′)VD
]
−[
Q(cS(I¯))
[
σRS
[
p(cS(I¯))(VR−CC−CR)
]
+(1−p(cS(I¯))(−CD−CR)
]
+(1−σRS)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(I¯)))VD
]
σS(I¯)
This is because:
EUDS(σS) =
∫
σS(I)
[
P (I)
[
Q(cS(I))
[
σRθ
[
p(cS(I))(VR − CC − CR)
+(1−p(cS(I)))(−CD−CR)
]
+(1−σRθ)(−CD)
]
+(1−Q(cS(I)))VD
]
+(1−P (I))VD
]
dI
EUDS(σ
′
S) =
∫
σS(I)
′
[
P (I)
[
Q(cS(I))
[
σRθ
[
p(cS(I))(VR − CC − CR)
+(1−p(cS(I)))(−CD−CR)
]
+(1−σRθ)(−CD)
]
+(1−Q(cS(I)))VD
]
+(1−P (I))VD
]
dI
Let’s assume[
P (I)
[
Q(cS(I))
[
σRθ
[
p(cS(I))(VR − CC − CR) + (1− p(cS(I)))(−CD − CR)
]
+ (1− σRθ)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(I)))VD
]
+ (1− P (I))VD
]
= m(I).
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σS = σ
′
S, for all I 6= I¯ , IˆS.
EUDS(σ
′
S)− EUDS(σS) =
∫
σS(I)
′
m(I)dI −
∫
σS(I)m(I)dI =∫
I 6=I¯,IˆS
σS(I)
′
m(I)dI +
∫
I∈I¯,IˆS
σS(I)
′
m(I)dI −
∫
I 6=I¯,IˆS
σS(I)m(I)dI−∫
I∈I¯,IˆS
σS(I)m(I)dI =
∫
I∈I¯,IˆS
σS(I)
′
m(I)dI −
∫
I∈I¯,IˆS
σS(I)m(I)dI =
σ
′
S(I¯)m(I¯) + σ
′
S(IˆS)m(IˆS)− σS(I¯)m(I¯)− σS(IˆS)m(IˆS) =
0 +
[
σS(I¯) + σS(IˆS)
]
m(IˆS)− σS(I¯)m(I¯)− σS(IˆS)m(IˆS) =
σS(I¯)m(IˆS) + σS(IˆS)m(IˆS)− σS(I¯)m(I¯)− σS(IˆS)m(IˆS) = σS(I¯)
[
m(IˆS −m(I¯))
]
.
Because P (I) ∈ {0, 1},
EUDS(σ
′
S)− EUDS(σS) ≥
[
Q(cS(IˆS))
[
σ′RS
[
p(cS(IˆS))(VR − CC − CR)
+ p(cS(IˆS))(−CD − CR)
]
+ (1− σ′RS)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(IˆS)))VD
]
−
[
Q(cS(I¯))
[
σRS
[
p(cS(I¯))(VR − CC − CR)
]
+
(1− p(cS(I¯))(−CD − CR)
]
+ (1− σRS)(−CD)
]
+ (1−Q(cS(I¯)))VD
]
σS(I¯)
Because cS(IˆS) > cS(I¯), EUDS(σ′S) − EUDS(σS) > 0. Hence, σ′S(I) is a profitable
deviation.
The above logic applies to the case I¯ 6= IˆW as well. But I¯ cannot be IˆS and IˆW at the
same time. Therefore, at least one of DS and DW has an incentive to deviate.
2. Suppose PA(I¯) > P¯ , i.e., P (I)(I¯) = 0. DS and DW get the first-best outcomes and
have no incentive to deviate. As long as there exists some I such that PA(I¯) > P¯ ,
I could have pooling equilibria. Now let’s find a sufficient condition for this. Define
g(I) = pS(I)q + pW (I)(1 − q), then g(I) = pS(I)q + pW (I)(1 − q) = p(cS(I))q +
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p(cW (I))(1− q) = p(I + (1− I−1S (I))n)q + p(I + (1− I−1W (I))n)(1− q). One sufficient
condition is
max
I∈[0,IW (1)]
g(I) > P¯ (4.13)
If Inequality 4.13 is satisfied, then there exists a set Ig ≡ {I ∈ [0, IW (1)] : g(I) > P¯}.
Hence a representative pooling equilibrium is: σS(I1) = σW (I1) = 1, σRθ(I1) = 0,
P (I1) = 0, η(I1) = pi, and P (I) ∈ [0, 1], η(I) ∈ [0, 1] for I 6= I1, where I1 is a number
in Ig. This case proves Proposition 2 of Chapter 4.
Case 2.2: H 6= ∅. Under this assumption, η(I) = 1 for any I ∈ H. Therefore, PA(I) =
pS(I)η(I) + pW (I)(1 − η(I)) and pS(I) > P¯ , for any I ∈ H. As long as DS chooses PCI in
H, she get her first best outcome and DW cannot imitate DS and implements IˆW . Since C
does not attack DS, there is no need for DS to consider retaliation against C (σRS = 0). As
assume earlier, DW does not retaliate, even though she is attacked.
Hence there exists a separating equilibrium outcome. A representative equilibrium
is: σS(I0) = 1, σW (IˆW ) = 1, σRS(I0) = 0, σRW (IˆW ) = 0, P (I0) = 0, P (IˆW ) = 1, η(I0) =
1, η(IˆW ) = 0, where I0 is any number in H. This case proves Proposition 3 of Chapter 4.
The existence of pooling equilibria shall follow Case 2.1 (part 2).
Case 3: PˆW < PˆS < P¯ . In this case, Iθ(P¯ ) = ∅ for Dθ. Hence, for any PCI and for η(I),
PA(I) = pS(I)η(I) + pW (I)(1 − η(I)). If PˆW < PˆS < P¯ , pS(I)η(I) + pW (I)(1 − η(I)) <
P¯η(I) + (1 − P¯ )η(I) ⇒ PA(I) < P¯ , meaning that C attacks when observing any I. Then,
Dθ’s expected payoff is
Q(cθ)
[
σRθ
[
p(cθ)(VR−CP−CR)+(1−p(cθ))(−CD−CR)
]
+(1−σRθ)(−CD)
]
+(1−Q(cθ))VD
Dθ maximizes p(cθ(I)) to maximize her expected payoff. I have defined that
Iˆθ = argmax cθ(I), since p(·) is a increasing function, Iˆθ = argmax p(cθ(I)). As
mentioned earlier, Dθ retaliates when p(cθ(Iˆθ))VR > CR. Therefore, for any equilibrium
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σS(IˆS) = σW (IˆW ) = 1, σRS(IˆS) = 1, σRW (IˆW ) = 0, P (I) = 1 for any I, η(IˆS) = 1, η(IˆW ) = 0.
This case proves Proposition 1 part (b) of Chapter 4.
Case 4: P¯ = PˆW < PˆS. If P¯ = PˆW < PˆS,
C :

mixes I = IˆW ,
does not attack I = IˆS.
In this situation DW has an incentive to deviate to some I
′
W = IˆS and not to be attacked
by C.
Case 5: PˆW < P¯ = PˆS. If PˆW < P¯ = PˆS,
C :

attacks I = IˆW ,
mixes I = IˆS.
If I ∈ [0, IW (1)] and if DW implements IˆW , she will be attacked. To avoid that, DW has an
incentive to mimic DS. Thus, while there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium in this
region, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where DW mixes between IˆW and IˆS and
C is indifferent between attacking and not.
DW mixes with probability that makes C indifferent between attacking or not:
P¯ =
√
V 2C − 4σRθCP (CC +R)
2σRθCP
,
as demonstrated by Equation 4.12.. C attacks with probability such that DW is indifferent
between implementing IˆW and getting attacked with certainty, and implementing IˆS and
getting attacked with some probability. To calculate this probability, let’s assume that C
attacks when he observes IˆS with probability α. If DW does not imitate DS, she receives
EUDW (IˆW , IˆS) = −VD + PˆW (VR − CD − CR).
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But, if DW imitates DS, then
cW (IˆS) = IˆW (Iˆ
−1
W (IˆS)) +N(1− Iˆ−1W (IˆS)) = IˆS +N(1− Iˆ−1W (IˆS)).
This is because solving for the level of r, such that a weak type mimics a strong type, I get:
IW (r) = IˆS → r = Iˆ−1W (IˆS). As a result, DW imitates DS, when
P¯2 = P(cW (IˆS)). (4.14)
Then,
EUDW (I
′
W = IˆS, IˆS) = (1−α)(0)+α[−VD+P¯2(VR−CD−CR)] = α[−VD+P¯2(VR−CD−CR)].
DW ’s payoff from mimicking DS is
α[−VD + P¯2(VR − CD − CR)].
Her payoff from not mimicking DS is
−VD + PˆW (VR − CD − CR).
When
α =
VD − PˆW (VR − CD − CR)
VD − P¯2(VR − CD − CR) , (4.15)
DW mixes between IˆW and IˆS. In this case, DS will not imitate DW because C
attacks DW . Here we have a mixed strategy separating equilibrium, where σS(IˆS) =
1, σW (IˆW ) = σS(IˆS) =
√
V 2C−4σRθCP (CC+R)
2σRθCP
, σRS(IˆS) =
VD−PˆW (VR−CD−CR)
VD−P¯2(VR−CD−CR) , σRW (IˆW ) =
0, P (I) = VD−PˆW (VR−CD−CR)
VD−P¯2(VR−CD−CR) , η(IˆS) =
√
V 2C−4σRθCP (CC+R)
2σRθCP
, η(IˆW ) = 0. This case proves
Proposition 4 of Chapter 4.

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Elite Interviews: Public Cyberinstitutions as a Deterrent
Overview of the Interviews. I personally conducted sixty-five interviews with cybersecurity
experts from twenty-five countries in-person or via Skype or email, to control for potential
interviewer effects and maintain consistency across interviews. While in total, I contacted
231 experts in 47 countries, many were reserved to speak to me even off the record because
of the sensitivity of the topic of cybercapacities for the following three reasons. First, many
governments have been developing so-called “cyber weapons” for a while but have not publicly
announced such efforts. Second, governments are reluctant to admit that their deterrent
efforts were failing and the insecurity of their system. Third, even though the governments
announced the development of their cyberinstitutions, they did not want anyone to find out
that they were not able to fulfill their proposed plans. A strong governmental control in
autocratic regimes might explain hesitation to engage in an interview with me even among
non-governmental experts. It took my about 44 hours to conduct all interviews, with the
duration between 15 minutes and 3 hours, and a median of 1 hour and mean of 1.48 hours.
Anecdotal Evidence from Interviews. I first examine the defender’s behavior and then take
a look at the challenger’s choice of actions.
The fact that more than one hundred of the world’s militaries are said to have some
sort of an organization or a unit to address “cyber warfare” might be suggestive of two
trends. First is these countries’ deterrent intent. When a country starts developing its
offensive cybercapability, the most natural fit is to place its offensive cyberoperations within
its signals intelligence (SIGINT) agencies because these agencies are the most equipped
to deal with “cyber” (Kostyuk 2019b: #3). Such a move signals that the country is in the
process of utilizing the advantages of cyberspace to primarily collect intelligence. If a country
proceeds to the next step and starts creating offensive cybercapabilities within its military,
it signals its capability and intent to use its offensive cybertools to go beyond its national
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borders to punish cyber aggressors (Kostyuk 2019b: #11). Contrary to cyberintelligence,
which includes quiet penetration operations that aim to stay undetectable in adversarial
networks as long as possible, this loud signal of readiness to attack is meant to deter potential
perpetrators. A recent U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) strategy of “active defense,”
defined as “the employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested
area or position to the enemy” (US DoD Active Defense 2019), is an example of such a public
cyberinstitution meant to deter adversaries.
Second is pooling behavior of these nations (Singer and Friedman 2014). Without
providing specific details regarding the capabilities of the created units, nations hope to hide
their low cybercapacities behind these cyberinstitutions and convince their adversaries that
their cybercapacities are real and growing. While there are many examples of this pooling
behavior, let us take a quick look at Norway, which created its cyber command back in 2012
(Kostyuk 2019b: #4, #15). Despite an eagerness to invest in its offensive cybercapabilities,
Norway has not made much progress in the development of these capabilities. A desire
to be “forward leaning,” which one interviewee describes as a typical Norwegian feature,
likely explains why the country was so quick to document its plan to create a cyber military
unit (Kostyuk 2019b: #11), but it does not explain why the country has been slow in
implementing this plan. Instead, the country’s desire to pool with strong cyber nations is a
more plausible explanation for this behavior.
Norway is not an exception in this regard. During the last few years, many countries have
become eager to announce the creation of offensive cybercapacities within their governments’
militaries and the adjustment of their cyber doctrines to reflect this change. For instance,
the pacifistic nature of the German and Japanese constitutions does not prevent these
nations from developing cyber military units and from slowly shifting their cyber defensive
postures to more offensive ones (Matsubara 2018; Schulze and Herpig 2018). Recently,
French armed forces minister Florence Parly unveiled the country’s first doctrine for offensive
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cyberoperations (Public Elements of the Doctrine on Military Cyber Offensive 2019), stating
that France is “not afraid” of using cyber “weapons” in response to cyberthreats (Laudrain
2019).
Careful examination of these public actions and declarations may lead to the conclusion
that the stated capability is not always present. For example, with plans to establish military
cyberunits, countries tend to report how many cyber soldiers these units will have in a
three- or five-year period. While militaries often rely on contractors for the development
of a computer code, these contractors are forbidden to execute actual operations on behalf
of military. As a result, these newly recruited cyber soldiers should possess at least some
basic computer skills to be able to execute cyberoperations against enemies. When asked for
concrete details about the recruitment and training of cyber soldiers, silence, vague responses,
or the excuse that many countries were finding it difficult to recruit cyber warriors into their
forces followed (Kostyuk 2019b: #11, #20, # 35, #49).
There are two possible explanations of this discrepancy between stated and actual
capabilities. First, it can hint that countries use public cyberinstitutions, which are easy
to observe but difficult to verify, as their main strategy of signaling their cybercapacity
and resolve in hopes that their adversaries overestimate their true cyber arsenals and
intentions. Second, it can be the common maturation trend within militaries in which
doctrine and organizational outpaces operations capabilities. China, for example, has an
aspirational doctrine since 2001 but took a few years to build up operational capabilities
to be able to implement that doctrine in 2005. This is when it make its military cyber
organizations/doctrine public.
While many nations create cyberinstitutions to pool with so-called cyber powers,33 these
powers, in their turn, implement a more significant level of cyberinstitutions to differentiate
themselves from weaker cyber nations. For instance, Russia established information warfare
33 China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Vavra 2017).
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units (Reuters 2017) and has committed between $200 million and $250 million USD per year
to significantly strengthen its cyber-offensive capabilities and to create a cyber-deterrent that
“will equate to the role played by nuclear weapons” (Gerden 2016). The U.S. DoD’s 2017
cyber budget of $6.7 billion USD was devoted to “strengthening cyber defenses and increasing
options available in case of a cyber-attack” (U.S.DepartmentOfDefense 2016). Even though
its exact number remains unknown, some of this budget was spent on the implementation
the U.S. cyber strategy of active defense or on the establishment of other cyberinstitutions.
If deterrence had worked and the country was ready and confident in its ability to defend
itself in cyberspace, it would not need “to make [any additional] noise” (Kostyuk 2019b:
#20). Multiple efforts — more investment in cyberinstitutions, in this case — can simply
signal “mostly failure” of the already implemented efforts (Kostyuk 2019b: #20).
Now, let us examine how such actions affect the challenger’s decisions. My interviewees
were rather skeptical—in line with the model’s results—of cyberinstitutions as an effective
deterrent mechanism, citing the difficulty of demonstrating this effect empirically as a major
challenge. Because cybersecurity is a relatively new area of national security, and most
information about decision-making processes regarding this area remains classified, there
is no publicly-available evidence suggesting that policy-makers, for example, have decided
not to attack a country in cyberspace because they were afraid of that country’s potential
cyber response. We can assume that U.S. adversaries became more concerned about their
networks after Snowden, Stuxnet, and Shadow Brokers, for instance, revealed the skill and
organizational capacity of the National Security Agency (NSA). But, an official confirmation
of this assumption is lacking.
My interviewees professed the belief that deterrence is working in the case of strategic
cyber-attack scenarios—blackouts attacks, for example. They point to two signs of successful
deterrence. First, the decision to design cyber weapons with more care and precision shows
that states have started practicing some restraint as more nations become cyber-dependent.
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Supporting this explanation, one of my interviewees pointed to the built-in restrictions in the
WannaCry and NotPetya attacks as “evidence that government agencies might be restraining
themselves” (Kostyuk 2019b: #48). Without these restrictions, the consequences of these
operations could have been more devastating (Vanderburg 2017). Second, cyber powers have
changed their cyber strategies. With an increase in China’s reliance on the Internet, resulting
in an increase in China’s own cyber vulnerability, the country has changed its cyber force
posture from brinkmanship to calibrated escalation, signaling to its adversaries that it wants
to avoid full-scale retaliation (Cunningham 2018).
Election Examples
In Chapter 4, I present the case of the 2018 Swedish elections where PCIs deterred the
Kremlin from interfering into this election (Section 4.4). Here, I focus on the two cases
where PCIs had not effect on the Kremlin’s decision of whether to attack. In the German
2017 elections, a combination of non-cyber factors shifted Russia’s cost-benefit calculus in
favor of not attacking even before PCIs were put in place (Section 4.6). In the U.S. 2016
elections, Moscow was willing to pay any cost and to risk any potential U.S. (cyber or non-)
retaliation for its influence campaign that could help create a global authoritarian fraternity
(Section 4.6).
2017 German Federal Elections: Disinterested Challenger
The 2017 German federal elections provide support for the equilibrium in which the
challenger is disinterested (Region IV in Figure 4.2). I argue that German cyberinstitutions
had no effect on Russia’s decision to stay away from the 2017 German federal elections.
Instead, a combination of non-cyber factors shifted Russia’s cost-benefit calculus in favor of
not attacking even before PCIs were put in place.
The history of cyberoperations and information operations attributed to the Kremlin
a few years prior to the elections demonstrate that the Russian state had interest in
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German elections interference. Information operations started in 2013, when three key
German-language Kremlin-linked propaganda outlets — Sputnik Deutsch, RT Deutsch, and
NewsFront Deutsch — entered the German market (Nimmo 2017) and were later joined by
trolls34 and bots.35 The 2015 and 2016 cyberoperations against the parliament and political
parties demonstrate that Moscow was also eager to obtain sensitive information for potential
future use (Herpig 2017). But value from these efforts for an effective influence campaign
were overwhelmed by potential costs resulting from the following factors.
First, Germany’s balanced media systems, the lack of polarization among the German
public, Germany’s multiparty and proportional system, and a “gentleman’s agreement”
between major political parties not to use any information leaked as a result of cyberattacks
made it difficult for Moscow to sow confusion in the public (Schwirtz 2017). Second, the only
clear beneficiary of these campaigns was the Alliance for Germany (AfD)—the rest of parties
supported the sanction regime against Moscow. But when AfD entered the race, they only
had between eight and ten percent of vote, which was not enough to gain the majority. Third,
the use of old-fashioned paper ballots on the local level afforded Germany with an accurate
recount in the event that digitized votes used on the federal level were compromised (Herpig
2017). Lastly, high-level deterrent rhetoric by German politicians referencing a deterioration
of the relationship between the two countries if interference occurred likely played a part.36
Although Putin and Merkel’s relationship has eroded over time, alienating Germany—an
important bridge between the West and Russia—was not in Russia’s interest.
If not these factors, what other factors could have stopped Russia from election
interference? Brattberg and Maurer (2018b) and Schwirtz (2017) suggest that a failure to
34 A troll is someone who argues for extreme views without credible sources.
35 An automated program that runs over the Internet.
36 During its spring 2017 visit to Moscow, the “Chancellery emissary delivered a stern warning”; in May,
Merkel herself issues a warning to Putin, by saying “she assumes ‘German parties will be able to decide their
election campaign among themselves” ’(Beuth et al. 2017); and in June, German President Frank-Walter
Steinmeier warned Moscow that “Were [it] to interfere in the election of the Bundestag, then the share of
commonalities will necessarily decrease further. That would be damaging for both sides” (as quoted in
Brattberg and Maurer (2018b, 18)).
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influence the 2017 French presidential elections made the Kremlin re-think its approach, since
it lost the element of surprise. While quite plausible, the evidence later revealed interference
into the French elections was not directed by the Kremlin, although it was aligned with its
objectives (Galante and EE 2018).
2016 U.S. Election: Undeterred Challenger
The 2016 U.S. presidential elections provide support for the equilibrium in which the
challenger is undeterred (Region I in Figure 4.2). Having witnessed the worldwide impact of
the mass disclosures of the U.S. government’s treatment of private data, Moscow was willing
to pay any cost and to risk any potential U.S. (cyber or non-) retaliation for its influence
campaign that could help create a global authoritarian fraternity. Having made up its mind
before or in 2014, the Russian government was an unstoppable tank moving towards its
target and not U.S. cyberinstitutions could have stopped the Kremlin from executing its
plan.
Moscow’s online campaigns and the Russian intelligence-gathering mission that began
in 2014 demonstrate the seriousness of Russia’s intentions in implementing its democracy
containment doctrine (USDepartmentOfJustice 2018c). Specifically, the Russian influence
campaign took root back in 2014, when the Internet Research Agency (IRA) began operating
a social media campaign, “designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in
the United States” (Mueller 2019, 4). With time, this campaign evolved into “a targeted
operation that...favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton” (Mueller 2019,
4). In addition to these overt online operations, the Russian government also used covert
cyberattacks to achieve its goal. For example, in July 2015, Russia’s General Staff Main
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) gained access to the Democratic National Committee (DNC)
networks; in March 2016, they began cyberoperations aimed to compromise email accounts
of Democratic Party officials; and in June 2016, they released content of the stolen data
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using WikiLeaks and DCLeaks.com (Assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent
US elections 2017, 2).
When planning this influence campaign, Moscow likely contemplated between its value
and cost. Its lowest value was “undermin[ing] public faith in the U.S. democratic process”
and its highest value was “harm[ing Secretary Clinton’s] electability and potential presidency”
that could have resulted in the change in the U.S. foreign policy (Assessing Russian activities
and intentions in recent US elections 2017, ii). Even its lowest value was far greater than
any costs Russia could envision paying.
If caught, Moscow knew that it faced potential retaliation by the world’s military and
cyber power. This retaliation, aligned with U.S. foreign policy tools, could have taken one
of the following forms: diplomacy, economy, nuclear, and/or military (cyber and non-).
Diplomatic retaliation was the least of Russia’s worries considering the existing tension
between the two countries. Moscow expected that, if elected, Clinton would only exacerbate
this tension. The cost of additional economic sanctions—in addition to those that the country
already faced for the Ukrainian conflict—was marginal. Moreover, nuclear and military
responses to cyber and information operations were off the table.
At the time when the Russian government was about to start its influence campaign,
it was not clear whether the U.S. government had the political will to retaliate against the
Kremlin using cyber means. If the Kremlin was accused of interference, it could simply
cite the difficulty of attributing the origin of cyberoperations to deny their involvement
or to blame patriotic hackers for executing these operations, as it has done in the past
(Rid 2013). In this case, a U.S. cyber response against the Kremlin might not have been
justifiable. Moreover, Washington might have been hesitant to retaliate because of the
high U.S. Internet connectivity that created a vast cyberattack surface providing plenty of
targets if Russia chose to respond. Lastly, U.S. cyber defenses were not strong enough to
deter Russia by prevention because, in 2014, the U.S. government was working on protecting
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its own network and critical infrastructure objects from cyberoperations, and had yet to
realize the danger of information campaigns.
This evidence demonstrates that there was a significant gap between the value and cost
of the Kremlin’s influence campaign at its start in 2014. In the following two years, the
Kremlin likely felt that military and economic options were unlikely to add any additional
costs because Washington was unlikely to change its view on these foreign policy tools.
Because Moscow was aware that Washington was building its cyberinstitutions to increase
its defenses and improve its offense, the Kremlin must have contemplated the additional
cyber costs that it would incur during the influence campaign.
There were a few possible sources of additional costs. The first source was better
defenses from cyberoperation and information operations. Washington’s cyberinstitutions
implemented prior to 2014, meant to deter by prevention, could have given the Kremlin an
idea of Washington’s best possible defense. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 (2013),
for instance, which focused on critical infrastructure protection might have sent two signals.
First, because it did not cover voting machines as part of critical infrastructure, Moscow
might have interpreted this as a signal that the government was not paying attention to
election infrastructure protection. Second, because critical infrastructure protection was a
rather new direction in U.S. cyber policy, Russia might have assumed that Washington,
with its vast bureaucracy, would continue working in this direction over the next few
years. Because a swift change in U.S. cyber policy was quite unlikely, the Kremlin was,
to some extent, confident that Washington was not going to spend significant resources on
educating political campaign leaders and the public about the danger of cyberthreats and
disinformation operations. But even if it did, the short-term impact of these efforts were quite
uncertain, only slightly raising the already relatively low costs of the Kremlin’s information
operations.
The second source is retaliation via launching an information campaign or executing
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cyberattacks. Both options were rather costly and ineffective and would have resulted in
relatively minimal costs for the Kremlin. Washington was unlikely to attempt information
operations because of Kremlin’s tight control of Russia’s print, online, and social media and
because of Russia’s treatment of information as a weapon, allowing its military to respond
to such information threats (Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation in the Information Space 2011).
Similarly, even if Washington spent the necessary time and resources on targeting Russia’s
critical infrastructure, the damage that Russia experienced would have been limited. For
example, it is impossible to hack Russia’s entire power grid system at once because most
stations are manually controlled and can be restored by flipping a switch. Moreover, the
Kremlin periodically tests the “cyber robustness” of all potential targets and does not use
U.S. equipment to avoid the risk of Washington’s remote-access backdoor (Ryabikova 2019).37
But, in these hypothetical scenarios, the main question remains: was Washington willing even
to consider any of these options for retaliation via cyberspace, given the U.S. high Internet
connectivity?
In short, the potential worst-case scenario costs that Moscow faced were lower than the
value it would gain by election interference. Thus, the Kremlin’s interference campaign was
never going to be deterred by U.S. cyberinstitutions.
37 A backdoor is an undocumented portal that allows an attacker to enter the system.
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Chapter 5
Limitations and Future Research
5.1 Public Cyberinstitutions: Causes and Effects
This dissertation asks two important questions that have been overlooked by existing
scholarship: What drives the development of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs)? And what
their effects are?
To answer the first question, this dissertation delves into the creation of national
cybersecurity strategies and the development of military cyberapparatuses—two examples of
PCIs that lie on opposite sides of the state cybercapacity spectrum. National cybersecurity
strategies, which signal the country’s defensive capability, outline a set of basic, initial
measures that a country plans to implement to address cybersecurity: public education about
the dangers of cyberthreats, technical means to respond to cybercrime, and international
cooperation, among others. Similar to the creation of national cybersecurity strategies, the
development of military cyberapparatus signals defensive capability, but in a narrower sense.
They signal a country’s ability to protect its military’s networks and systems and, in some
cases, objects of national critical infrastructure. More importantly, these agencies signal the
country’s offensive capability. As a result, the development of a military cyberapparatus
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is more a profound, resource- and expertise-intensive step than the creation of a national
cybersecurity strategy.
Since these two types of capabilities serve different purposes, the factors that contribute
to their development also differ. This dissertation shows that state preferences on
cybersovereignty have an important role to play in the spread of national cybersecurity
strategies whereas alliance politics plays an important role in the case of the development of
military cyberapparatuses. In particular, when developing its first national cybersecurity
strategy, a country considers the strategies adopted by nations that share its views on
cybersovereignty. When developing its military cyberapparatus, the country complements its
allies’ behavior. This research also demonstrates irrelevance of any other type of network (i.e.,
adversaries, neighbors, trading partners, countries that voted similarly on various UNGA
resolutions, countries that have joint membership in various intergovernmental organizations,
countries that share a colonial past or with the same official language) that could capture
the global spread of cybersecurity strategies or military cybercapacity.
In addition to explaining the potential drivers of PCIs, this dissertation also investigates
whether a state is able to achieve its primary objective—to deter adversaries from executing
cyberattacks against the state by signaling its increased power to hurt. This research
demonstrates that this effort can only be successful when an adversary is susceptible to the
costs created by these PCIs. Otherwise, PCIs cannot stop determined attackers. Despite
this, states tend to over-invest their resources into PCIs instead of distributing them between
PCIs and covert cyberactivity to maximize their overall cybercapacity. In particular, weak
cyber states over-invest to appear strong and strong cyber states over-invest so that they
are not viewed as weak cyber states pretending to be strong.
This dissertation offers a simplified analysis of a complex problem and has two obvious
limitations that I plan to address with future research. First, my explanations generally focus
on strategic factors of international politics, and do not do justice to domestic politics and, in
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particular, the role public opinion plays in a government’s decision to develop cybercapability
and how the public perceives this capability. Second, it only explains how the state initiates
two different types of PCIs, while signaling a public cybercapacity is a complex process that
involves a variety of institutions used at once. While this research looks at the initiation
of this process, it should also evaluate subsequent steps that involve the adoption of new
documents, revisions of old documents, the creation of new agencies, and the extension of
existing missions to incorporate new tasks, among others. I expand on these two limitations
in the subsequent sections and explain how I plan explore these two main omissions in my
future work.
5.2 Limitations and Next Steps
A Missing Puzzle: Domestic Politics & Public Opinion
The governments of the United States and Russia both report that the other country’s
increase in cyberoffensive capability pose a serious threat to their own national security.1
To address this threat and to deter each other from using cyberoperations against each
other, both countries have been publicly signaling the development of their cyberoffensive
capabilities and clarifying the doctrines behind their use. This behavior is not an exception
but rather part of a global trend—countries have been spending significant resources to
publicly signal their cybercapabilities. Since the conditions under which such deterrent
tactics could conceivably “work” are fairly limited (Kostyuk 2019a), are these measures
intended to deter adversaries or to serve as “security theaters” aimed at gaining political
support? If governments use these measures to gain political support, does this strategy
work?
To answer these questions, future research can investigate how a country’s public
1 https://taskandpurpose.com/gao-national-security-threats-2019
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perceives their and adversarial government’s efforts to publicly signal an increase in their
cyberoffensive capability. Given that the United State and Russia have been actively
developing cybercapacity to deter each other, future research can investigate the American
public’s evaluation of the increase in cyberoffensive capabilities by the U.S. and Russian
governments as well as their preference for how the U.S. government should respond to public
increases in such capability by the Russian government. For example, have Americans begun
to feel more secure since the U.S. government threatened to retaliate against cyberattacks
with all its means in its Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report (2011)? Do they
feel more threatened having learned that the Kremlin created information troops within its
army and how, if at all, do they prefer that the U.S. government responds to this action by the
Russian government? Similarly, does the Russian public feel safe from external cyberthreats
knowing that the Russian government might adopt the “sovereign Runet,” allowing Moscow
to monitor all Internet traffic in Russia?2 Or does this law make Russians more frightened of
the Kremlin’s increasing ability to monitor their online behavior? How do the Russians feel
about the U.S. National Cyber Strategy (2018) that allows the U.S. government to confront
its adversary in adversarial networks and what is their preference for how the Kremlin should
respond to this strategy?
To answer these questions, I hypothesize that public signaling of a government’s
cybercapabilities may play three distinct roles. First, an increase in state cybercapability may
cause the public to become complacent because of their over confidence in their government’s
ability to protect them from cyberthreats, resulting in a lower level of “civil cyberdefense”
(e.g., fewer efforts to protect personal and corporate information online) and thereby making
them more vulnerable to cyberthreats. Second, such an increase may make citizens worry
more about their government’s ability to monitor their online actions, making them more
willing to engage in safe online behavior. Third, the public might not perceive potential
2 https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/08/02/2019/5c5c51069a7947bef4503927
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threats of cyberoperations from adversarial nations as existential threats, which is how
governments often tend to frame them (Fernandino 2018). As a result, citizens might be
dissatisfied in their government’s over-investment in cybercapability, costing leaders their
political office (Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007; Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003).
To test this theory, I plan to use two sets of survey experiments. The first set will
explore the specific mechanisms explaining public perception of their own state’s increased
cybercapability by looking at the reactions of Americans and Russians. The second set
will test the mechanisms that explain public perception of increased cybercapability by the
adversarial government, this time examining the Russian public’s reaction to increased U.S.
cybercapability intended to deter Russian attacks, and vice versa.
The results of these experiments will make a number of contributions to the existing
international-relations literature. It will offer the first analysis of public perceptions of these
deterrent efforts by their governments and adversarial governments. Existing studies on
cybercoercion tend to focus on strategic interactions between major powers (Borghard and
Lonergan 2017; Brantly 2016; Gartzke 2013; Libicki 2009; Lindsay and Gartzke 2015; Council
et al. 2009; Nye Jr 2017; Valeriano and Maness 2018) and ignore the role that public opinion
plays in shaping these interactions.
By focusing on a bottom-up perspective, this research will fill an existing gap in political
science and public policy literature by evaluating both an emotional mechanism underlying
public perceptions of state offensive cybercapabilities and public evaluation of policy
responses to an increase in cybercapabilities by adversarial nations. A few experimental
works focus either on emotional mechanisms underlying citizens’ cyberthreat perceptions
(Canetti, Gross and Waismel-Manor 2016; Jarvis, Macdonald and Whiting 2017; Kostyuk
and Wayne 2020) or on public evaluation of policy responses to cyberattacks (Kreps and Das
2017).
Lastly, this research will take a unique approach and study public perception in both
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defending and challenging countries. Most existing work take a one-sided approach and
examine either public perception of the American foreign policy in relation to Russia
(Koopman et al. 1998; Tetlock 2017) or public perception of Russian foreign policy in relation
to the United States (Koopman et al. 1998; Zimmerman 2009). By evaluating all four
perspectives, this study demonstrates actual, not anticipated or desired, effects of increased
cybercapability.
This future research has important policy implications because it will help leaders seeking
to formulate public policies meant to protect the psychological health and well-being of their
citizenry understand the nuanced cognitive and emotional responses of civilian populations
to investments in cybercapability.
Future Work: Measuring State Cybercapacity
The questions that motivated this dissertation are “What is cybercapacity” and “How can we
measure it”? Measuring cybercapacity is a complicated task. Here is just the two reasons of
why it is the case.
When it comes to military capacity, secrecy is important for preserving cybercapabilities.
States cannot launch parades to show off their cybercapacity and satellite images are not
useful in estimating this capacity. While cyberattacks many give a good estimate, they
tend to devalue this capability after the first use. The basic parameters for most traditional
weapons remain relatively static, but strategically relevant features of certain cyber weapons
might look quite different tomorrow (Libicki 2009).
Furthermore, given the ubiquitous presence of the Internet, cybercapacity is more than
military capacity intertwined with every single aspect of our life—healthcare, education,
transportation, banking, etc. Public education about the dangers of cyberthreats and how
to safely surf the web plays a crucial role in raising the country’s cyberdefense. Thirty percent
of data breaches occur because of “wet-ware”—situations when individual users fail to engage
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in basic cyberhygiene to protect their computers (e.g., password and software update) (Levin
2015). To some this importance of practicing cyberhygiene might seem minuscule, but studies
after studies keep pointing to the importance of citizens safely browsing the Internet as the
first line of defense against cyberattacks (Cain, Edwards and Still 2018; Levin 2015; Maennel,
Mäses and Maennel 2018; Oravec 2017; Vishwanath et al. 2020). Adjustments in individual
behavior however do not have the same effect for improving the state military defenses.
Because of these differences, estimating cybercapacity is a complicated process that will
involve using a variety of indicators that lie inside and outside the government. I start
with understanding how governments create their cybercapacity. While the amount of
budget and personnel that they hire is not always public, I instead record information
on various agencies that governments choose to create as the proxy for this capacity.
Specifically, I collected the first of its kind, comprehensive data set on state cybersecurity
organizations. The State Cybersecurity Organizations (SCO) data set contains information
on 203 nations that developed more than 2,700 agencies within their governments to deal
with different aspects of cybersecurity between 1987 until 2018. This data set distinguishes
between civilian, intelligence, and military agencies and the type of change the government
makes.3 Figure 5.1 highlighted the countries that developed at least one civilian, military, or
intelligence agency to deal with cybersecurity within their governments. Figure 5.1a shows
that almost all nations in the world have a civilian agency that deal with opportunities and
challenges presented by the Internet for economy, healthcare, transportation, education, etc.
Figure 5.1b and 5.1c demonstrates that less countries devoted their attention to publicly
developing their military or intelligence capability. Future research could explain why it is
the case.
By mapping out the landscape of public cybercapabilities in the form of various
governmental agencies, the SCO data set allows future generation of scholars not only to
3 Chapter 3 provides a more detailed explanation of this data.
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Figure 5.1: Diffusion of State Cybersecurity Organizations (1987-2018)
(a) National Civilian Cybersecurity Organizations
(b) National Military Cybersecurity Organizations
(c) National Intelligence Cybersecurity Organizations
Source: State Cybersecurity Organizations (SCO) data. Countries highlighted on the map created
at least of one state organization of a specified type between 1987 and 2018.
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explain why it is the case but to investigate how countries develop their public capabilities,
how these capabilities translate into actual operational capacity, and what implications it
has for the dynamics of military effectiveness and innovation, cyberwarfare, deterrence, and
escalation. The impact of ICTs and the Internet on our lives will continue to grow with the
number of Internet-connected devices (known as the Internet-of-things), artificial intelligence,
and quantum computing, we no longer can ignore it this undeveloped area of scientific
inquire. Only a cumulative approach will allow us to fully understand how nations build
their cybercapabilities—a complex, continuously evolving and expanding area of political
science and public policy research that has significantly impacted how nations interact in
the age of information technologies.
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